In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 554-555 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas White. Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics.New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 369. Cloth, $55.00. This is a thoughtful book on an interesting subject by a well-known scholar of ancient ethical philosophy. However, the organization and mode of exposition is, in some ways, rather odd; and this rather muffles the…
Read moreIn lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 554-555 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas White. Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics.New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 369. Cloth, $55.00. This is a thoughtful book on an interesting subject by a well-known scholar of ancient ethical philosophy. However, the organization and mode of exposition is, in some ways, rather odd; and this rather muffles the potential depth and impact.White challenges (what he presents as) a widespread current view about Greek ethical philosophy. This is that Greek philosophy does not contain the same kinds of moral conflict that we find in modern thought: namely, between the claims of the individual and the state, and between doing your duty, or what is best for others, and pursuing your own happiness. White, by contrast, believes that those conflicts do figure—as substantive, problematic issues—in Greek thought, and that they are conceived in a way that is broadly similar to modern thought, despite some other salient differences. Further, White maintains that the general denial of conflict in Greek thought has its roots in certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual tendencies. A crucial factor was the Hegelian picture of Classical Greek thought as free from the conflicts between individual and state, and between happiness and duty that are central in modern thought and are articulated especially by Kant. White sees the Hegelian view as influential on late nineteenth-century readings of Greek philosophy by thinkers such as Sidgwick, on more recent anti-Kantian thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, as well as on much current scholarship on Greek philosophy.White confronts what he sees as a mistaken tendency partly by charting its historical roots and partly by offering a competing (or at least "ground-clearing" [xiii]) reading of key relevant features of Greek ethics. Two crucial topics are Plato's presentation of the demand that the fully trained philosopher-rulers go back into the cave to direct the state rather than philosophizing, as they would prefer (Republic 219-21) and Aristotle's selection [End Page 554] of the philosophical life, rather than the ethical life of practical action, as the highest form of human happiness (Nicomachean Ethics10.7-8). White argues, first, that these are recognized as substantive and difficult issues by the two Greek thinkers and, second, that the way in which the issues are conceived is (roughly) in terms of the modern-style contrast between doing your communal duty and pursuing your personal happiness. The "eudaimonistic" (happiness-centered) outlook often seen as typical of Greek philosophy does not mean that these issues are therefore defused or resolved. Hellenistic (Epicurean and Stoic) philosophy does offer a unified ethical outlook, but not in a way that matches the Hegelian pattern. The influential Hegelian reading of Greek ethics is shown up as mistaken and the door is opened for interpretations which recognize and analyse these issues in more accurate terms.White's central claims are challenging, important and, in principle at least, plausible. How effectively is the case made? As indicated earlier, the organization of the book does not seem to me to support the argument as well as it could. The discussion of Plato and Aristotle, which forms the core of White's thesis, is preceded by an extended preparation, extending to nearly half of the book. This examines, in meticulous detail, the background in modern intellectual history to the tendency that White attacks. It also explores in general terms conceptual issues (about deliberative conflict, the role of imperatives and the city-state as a source of normativity) that bear on his claims about Greek thought. When White finally gets to detailed discussion of philosophical texts, he does not—surprisingly—try to show in specific ways how current leading scholarly interpretations are informed by the Hegelian pattern he has so elaborately described. His confrontation with the modern version of this pattern is generalized, with references to scholarly readings largely confined to footnotes. The thrust of his interpretative discussion is negative, ruling out the harmonizing, Hegelian...
