Johannes Brandl

In this paper, I discuss the different views of the founders of descriptive psychology in the 19th century about the meaning and purpose of this discipline and sketch a new plan for connecting descriptive psychology with the language-critical tradition of analytic philosophy. I will show that the goals Hermann Lotze, Franz Brentano, and Wilhelm Dilthey set for descriptive psychology were too lofty for different reasons. The common problem they faced was how to reconcile the ideal of autonomous philosophical knowledge with the empirical relevance that descriptive psychology should have. Faced with this dilemma, I outline a new plan to conceive of descriptive psychology as a critical project aimed at overcoming the obstacles that language places in the way of our knowledge of mental phenomena.

We develop a new theory of the cognitive changes around 4 years of age by trying to explain why understanding of false belief and of alternative naming emerge at this age. We make use of the notion of discourse referents as it is used in File Change Semantics, one of the early forms of the more widely known Discourse Representation Theory. The assumed cognitive change exists in how children can link DRs in their mind to external referents. The younger children check whether the conditions for a DR match the conditions of an external entity. The older children, in addition, have an explicit understanding of reference in virtue of making explicit identity assertions. This involves the metarepresentational ability of representing that different DRs represent the same external referent, which — we argue — is required for alternative naming and for the false belief task.

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis

Kant offered a subtle theory of consciousness and self-knowledge which articulated the intuition that consciousness is a mode of being in a mental state, as opposed to a property of that state. This paper develops this theory and argues that McDowell's treatment of these issues in "Mind" and "World" overlooks the resources of Kant's views. McDowell conflates consciousness and self-consciousness, leading him to formulate too demanding a constraint on rational concept use. Kant's theory can be developed so as to avoid this unfortunate corollary. The paper concludes by comparing Kant's account to contemporary approaches to the problem of consciousness.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik ¿ Philipp Frank und Abel Rey Nicola Mössner: Testimoniale Akte neu definiert ¿ ein zentrales Problem des Zeugnisses Anderer Simon Dierig: Goldmans Scheunen-Beispiel und das Problem der Vereinbarkeit von Externalismus und Selbstkenntnis Diskussionen/Discussions Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Besprechungen/Review Essays Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Eingelangte Bücher/Books Received.

Die beste Erklärung für den Gegenstandsbezug unserer Gedanken erhalten wir, so die These meines Aufsatzes, indem wir die Semantik jener Ausdrücke studieren, mit denen wir uns auf Individuen beziehen. Für diese methodologische Entscheidung sprechen dreierlei Gründe: Erstens die Uneinheitlichkeit der Kategorie singulärer Terme; zweitens die Notwendigkeit, zwischen einem starken und einem schwachen Begriff des de re Glaubens zu unterscheiden; sowie drittens die Unmöglichkeit, psychische Phänomene zu einem Verbindungsglied zwischen Worten und Gegenständen zu machen. Im ersten Punkt stütze ich mich auf eine Lesart der attributiv/referentiell Unterscheidung, die Donnellan zu einem Partner und nicht zu einem Gegner von Russell macht. Schon die Kennzeichnungstheorie stellt jeden Versuch in Frage, zwei so grundverschiedene Arten des Bezeichnens gleichermaßen durch ein 'intentionales Gerichtetsein' der Sprecher zu erklären. An dieser Schwierigkeit scheitert auch, so mein zweites Argument, Chisholms Versuch, zwei unterschiedlich starke Begriffe des de re Glaubens auf intentionale Weise zu definieren. Schließlich verteidige ich Wittgensteins streng antireduktionistische Haltung gegenüber Deutungen, die ihn zum Advokaten eines Primats des Intentionalen machen würden.

It is argued that Davidson's basic objection to the Building Block Method in semantics is neither that it gives the wrong explanation of how a first language is learned nor that it assigns a meaning to Single words prior to interpreting a whole language. The arguments against Fregean concepts and truth-values as the references of predicates and sentences are found to be equally superficial as the arguments against a primitive notion reference defmed in causal terms.Davidson's basic objection turns out to be that thoughts do not have a deep-structure which can be revealed by a correct analysis. His constraints on a theory of meaning do not allow for a distinction, as suggested by Dummett, between analysis and decomposition of thoughts. This forces us to a very general decision about how to do philosophy. As a non-reductivist I think it makes sense to assume a basic thought-structure. From this perspective the use of buildingblocks in semantics is vindicated.

How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see Kraus 1966, Szrednicki 1965, Stegmüller 1969, Kamitz 1983, Chrudzimski 2001). This fundamental shift in Brentano’s view is regarded as a change from an ontological to a “gnoseological”, i.e. epistemic, theory of truth (see Kastil 1934). Brentano’s mature view is sometimes said to resemble a neo-Kantian conception of truth or related views (see Kraus 1966, van der Schaar 1999, 2003), it has been compared with a coherence theory of truth (see Krantz 1990/91), and it is regarded as embracing a form of alethic anti-realism that places a substantial epistemic constraint on the concept of truth (see Künne 2003). More recently, Charles Parsons suggested that the early Brentano may also be regarded as a precursor of a deflationist theory of truth (see Parsons 2004). Following up on this proposal, the received view has been challenged by a new interpretation that ascribes to Brentano a deflationist position that he held throughout his career in combination with the view that truth pertains primarily to self-evident judgment (see Brandl forthcoming). Section 1 first summarizes the received view and then indicates two problems raised by this interpretation. Section 2 explains in which sense Brentano may have been a deflationist and how this interpretation avoids the problems of the received view.

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis.

Wittgenstein meint, nur ein endliches Verifikationsverfahren könne einem Satz Sinn verleihen. Darin unterscheidet er sich sowohl vom alten Verifikationismus des Wiener Kreises als auch von neueren Bedeutungstheorien, die den Satzsinn durch die Bedingungen des berechtigten Behauptens erklären wollen. Es wird gezeigt, daß beide Positionen in einen Regreß münden, sobald sie Wittgensteins Forderung nach vollständiger Verifizierbarkeit ernst nehmen. Weder der epistemische Begriff des "endgültigen" Verifizierens noch der semantische Begriff der "ausgezeichneten" Verifikation kommen ohne einen externen Bezugspunkt wie Wahrheit oder Rationalität aus. Da Wittgenstein jedes Verbindungsglied ablehnt, das noch zwischen den Satz und seine Verifikation treten kann, bleibt für ihn als Ideal der Vollständigkeit nur der Punkt, an dem sich die Erklärungskraft einer zur Demonstration vorgeführten Verifikation erschöpft. Zur Erläuterung dieser Position wird auf die Tractatus-These der internen Relationen und auf das Argument des Regelfolgens zurückgegriffen.

IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally Guide His Actions?Martina HERRMANN: Competence, Options, and RelationsWeitere Abhandlungen/Further ArticlesEduardo FERMANDOIS: Kommunikation ohne Sprache? Zu Davidsons später SprachphilosophieGuido IMAGUIRE: Die Form der Externalität in Russells An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry und die Ursprünge seiner RelationstheorieBuch-Symposium/Book-SymposiumJohn BICKLE: Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New WaveAnsgar BECKERMANN: Physicalism and New Wave ReductionismJ. Christopher MALONEY: Reservations about New Wave ReductionAchim STEPHAN: How to Lose the Mind-Body ProblemJohn BICKLE: New Wave Metascience. Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and StephanBuchnotizen/Critical NotesEingesandte Bücher/Books Received.

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis.

It is argued that Davidson's basic objection to the Building Block Method in semantics is neither that it gives the wrong explanation of how a first language is learned nor that it assigns a meaning to Single words prior to interpreting a whole language. The arguments against Fregean concepts and truth-values as the references of predicates and sentences are found to be equally superficial as the arguments against a primitive notion reference defmed in causal terms.Davidson's basic objection turns out to be that thoughts do not have a deep-structure which can be revealed by a correct analysis. His constraints on a theory of meaning do not allow for a distinction, as suggested by Dummett, between analysis and decomposition of thoughts. This forces us to a very general decision about how to do philosophy. As a non-reductivist I think it makes sense to assume a basic thought-structure. From this perspective the use of buildingblocks in semantics is vindicated.