Olivier Massin

This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.

L'enseignement viennois de Brentano a faconne les philosophies exactes du XXe siecle, au travers de ses eleves Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, Stumpf, Ehrenfels ou Marty. Si la theorie de l'intentionnalite, l'ontologie et la logique de Brentano ont fait l'objet de discussions approfondies, son anatomie d'une grande variete d'actes mentaux - choisir, hair, juger, percevoir, preferer, remarquer, savoir, sentir, souffrir, toucher, voir - demeure encore trop ignoree. Ce livre est consacre a cette analyse descriptive minutieuse et foisonnante. Outre son interet historique, celle-ci permet de renouveler bon nombre de debats contemporains en philosophie des emotions, en epistemologie, en philosophie du langage, ainsi qu'en philosophie de l'esprit.

It is often said that impenetrability is the mark of the material, and that whatever is real is material. This naive materialism however faces many putative counterexamples: 1. a tree and the molecules that compose it (Wiggins, 1968): they are distinct (the tree can survive the loss of some molecules, the molecules can survive the death of the tree) and both are at the same place at the same time. 2. Tibbles-minus-tail and Tib (Wiggins, 1968): At t1, Tibbles is a cat and Tib a proper part of it which corresponds to Tibbles without its tail. Tibbles and Tib are distinct. At t2, Tibble loses its tail. Then at t2, both Tibbles and Tib are in the same place at the same time