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64Review of George A. Reisch, How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science. (review)British Journal for the History of Science 40 (1): 153-155. 2007.
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352Hacking on the looping effects of psychiatric classifications: What is an interactive and indifferent kind?International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3). 2007.This paper examines Ian Hacking's analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking's distinction between 'interactive kinds' (human kinds) and 'indifferent kinds' (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are 'interactive and indifferent kinds,' given the way that he introduces the interactive-indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion of…Read more
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616Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn ConnectionIn William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 311. Springer. 2015.Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship betwe…Read more
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65Defining Mental Disorder, Review of Derek Bolton, What is Mental Disorder? (review)Metascience 18 (2): 251-255. 2009.
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734Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change: its historical and contemporary interestSynthese 176 (3): 429-445. 2010.In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of …Read more
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1486DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric ClassificationIn Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel, Springer. pp. 43-62. 2015.A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information …Read more
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299The Reality and Classification of Mental DisordersDissertation, University of Chicago. 2008.This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hackin…Read more
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223Review of Gary L. Hardcastle & Alan W. Richardson (Eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America. (review)Philosophy of Science 72 (4): 153-155. 2005.An essential overview of this important intellectual movement. This latest volume in the longest-standing and most influential series in the field of the philosophy of science extends and expands on the discipline's recent historical turn. These essays take up the historical, sociological, and philosophical questions surrounding the particular intellectual movement of logical empiricism--both its emigration from Europe to North America in the 1930s and 1940s and its development in North America …Read more
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1405Intervention, Causal Reasoning, and the Neurobiology of Mental Disorders: Pharmacological Drugs as Experimental InstrumentsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2): 542-551. 2012.In psychiatry, pharmacological drugs play an important experimental role in attempts to identify the neurobiological causes of mental disorders. Besides being developed in applied contexts as potential treatments for patients with mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play a crucial role in research contexts as experimental instruments that facilitate the formulation and revision of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. This paper examines the various epistemic functions that pharmacolo…Read more
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50Introduction: Objectivity in ScienceIn Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson & Jonathan Y. Tsou (eds.), Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives From Science and Technology Studies, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 310. Springer. pp. 1-15. 2015.
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219Reconsidering Feyerabend’s “Anarchism‘Perspectives on Science 11 (2): 208-235. 2003.This paper explores Paul Feyerabend's (1924-1994) skeptical arguments for "anarchism" in his early writings between 1960 to 1975. Feyerabend's position is encapsulated by his well-known suggestion that the only principle for scientific method that can be defended under all circumstances is: "anything goes." I present Feyerabend's anarchism as a recommendation for pluralism that assumes a realist view of scientific theories. The aims of this paper are threefold: (1) to present a defensible view o…Read more
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103Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content from Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on FullerSouthwest Philosophy Review 28 (2): 53-57. 2012.In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument (RA), and argue t…Read more
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38Rationality and compulsion: Applying action theory to psychiatry – by Lennart Nordenfelt (review)Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4): 415-418. 2009.No Abstract
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946Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSMHistory of Psychiatry 27 (4): 406-424. 2016.This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive …Read more
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