•  66
    Achtung vor Personen
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (4). 2007.
    Es geht in diesem Aufsatz um die Frage, was es heißt, eine andere Person zu achten. Im Zentrum steht dabei die moralische Achtung, nicht die Achtung im Sinne der Wertschätzung einer anderen Person. Ein wohlfahrts- und ein autonomietheoretisches Verständnis moralischer Achtung werden dargestellt und zurückgewiesen. Es wird für ein Verständnis moralischer Achtung argumentiert, wonach eine Person genau dann geachtet wird, wenn ihr authentischer Wille ernst genommen wird. Die Achtung schulden wir da…Read more
  •  28
    Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
    with Mark S. Peacock and Michael Schefczyk
    Analyse & Kritik 27 (1): 188-196. 2005.
    In this paper we examine Fehr’s notions of “altruism”, “strong reciprocity” and “altruistic punishment” and query his ascription of altruism. We suggest that, pace Fehr, altruism cannot be defined behaviourally because the definition of altruism must refer to the motives of actors. We also advert to certain inconsistencies in Fehr’s usage of his terms and we question his explanation of altruism in terms of ‘social preferences’.
  •  1
  •  18
    Humanitäre Intervention als moralische Pflicht
    Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (3): 295-303. 2006.
    Some authors think that humanitarian interventions are always morally wrong. Others think that they are sometimes justified. In this paper, I argue that the international community has a moral duty to humanitarian intervention when it comes to mass murder, mass rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and deliberate starvation. It is argued that we all have good reasons to endorse an intervention norm protecting basic rights.
  •  40
    Demanding something
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1): 63-77. 2014.
  • . 2011.
  •  51
    Normative Handlungsgründe
    Analyse & Kritik 21 (1): 25-40. 1999.
    It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing
  •  4
    From the editors
    with Richard Haynes, Frans W. A. Brom, and Jan Elliott
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (1-2): 1-5. 2000.
  •  8
    Menschenwürde: ein für die Medizinethik irrelevanter Begriff?
    Ethik in der Medizin 24 (4): 297-306. 2012.
    ZusammenfassungEs wurde für die These argumentiert, dass der Begriff der Würde in der Medizinethik nutzlos sei und in den Fällen, in denen er verständlich verwendet wird, nichts anderes meint als den Respekt vor der Autonomie von Personen. In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese These falsch ist. Es wird ein Begriff von Würde vorgestellt, der sich nicht auf den Begriff des Respekts vor der Autonomie von Personen reduzieren lässt. Anhand der Diskussion um ein Sterben in Würde soll auch …Read more
  •  58
    Wieso moralische Achtung wichtig ist
    Analyse & Kritik 31 (2): 351-361. 2009.
    Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, tha…Read more
  •  8
    Book Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 357-362. 1998.
  •  37
    Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure.
  • The indispensability of motives: Thoughts on Ernst Fehr and altruism
    with Mark S. Peacock and Michael Schefczyk
    Analyse & Kritik 27 (1): 188-196. 2005.
  •  2
    Moralischer Realismus
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (4): 778-779. 1998.
  •  105
    Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1): 155-161. 2014.
    According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and t…Read more
  • Der Wert von Autonomie
    Studia Philosophica 49 (n/a): 39-48. 1990.
  •  107
    Value pluralism: Some problems (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1): 71-78. 1999.
  •  10
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 357-362. 1998.
  •  4
    Ökologie aus philosophischer Sicht (edited book)
    with Thomas Kesselring, Ortwin Renn, and Humboldt-Studienzentrum Ulm)
    Humboldt-Studienzentrum, Universität Ulm. 1994.
  •  50
    Human dignity, self-respect, and dependency
    with P. Kaufmann, H. Kuch, C. Neuhaeuser, and E. Webster
    In , . pp. 151-158. 2011.
    The paper deals with the question of whether poverty as such violates the dignity of persons. It is argued that it does. This is, it is argued, not due to a lack of basic goods, nor to the fact that poverty prevents persons from enjoying the rights they have, particularly the right to bodily integrity. Poverty does violate dignity, so it is argued, insofar as poor people are dependent on others in a degrading way.
  • Analytische Moralphilosophie
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (3): 423-423. 1999.
  •  14
    Should research on stem cells be allowed?
    Ethics in Science and Technology 2 7-24. 2005.