•  1
  •  16
    Humanitäre Intervention als moralische Pflicht
    Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (3): 295-303. 2006.
    Some authors think that humanitarian interventions are always morally wrong. Others think that they are sometimes justified. In this paper, I argue that the international community has a moral duty to humanitarian intervention when it comes to mass murder, mass rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and deliberate starvation. It is argued that we all have good reasons to endorse an intervention norm protecting basic rights.
  •  39
    Demanding something
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1): 63-77. 2014.
  • . 2011.
  •  48
    Normative Handlungsgründe
    Analyse & Kritik 21 (1): 25-40. 1999.
    It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing
  •  3
    From the editors
    with Richard Haynes, Frans W. A. Brom, and Jan Elliott
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (1-2): 1-5. 2000.
  •  7
    Menschenwürde: ein für die Medizinethik irrelevanter Begriff?
    Ethik in der Medizin 24 (4): 297-306. 2012.
    ZusammenfassungEs wurde für die These argumentiert, dass der Begriff der Würde in der Medizinethik nutzlos sei und in den Fällen, in denen er verständlich verwendet wird, nichts anderes meint als den Respekt vor der Autonomie von Personen. In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese These falsch ist. Es wird ein Begriff von Würde vorgestellt, der sich nicht auf den Begriff des Respekts vor der Autonomie von Personen reduzieren lässt. Anhand der Diskussion um ein Sterben in Würde soll auch …Read more
  •  8
    Book Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 357-362. 1998.
  •  57
    Wieso moralische Achtung wichtig ist
    Analyse & Kritik 31 (2): 351-361. 2009.
    Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, tha…Read more
  • The indispensability of motives: Thoughts on Ernst Fehr and altruism
    with Mark S. Peacock and Michael Schefczyk
    Analyse & Kritik 27 (1): 188-196. 2005.
  •  37
    Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure.
  •  2
    Moralischer Realismus
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (4): 778-779. 1998.