Peter Schaber

While the importance of Consent has been discussed widely over the last few decades, interest in its study has received renewed attention in recent years, particularly regarding medical treatment, clinical research and sexual acts. The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into five main parts: General Questions Normative Ethics Legal Theory Medical Ethics Political Philosophy ¿ Within these sections central issues, debates and problems are examined, including: the nature and normative importance of consent, paternalism, exploitation and coercion, privacy, sexual consent, consent and criminal law, informed consent, organ donation, clinical research, and consent theory of political obligation and authority. ¿ The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent is essential reading for students and researchers in moral theory, applied ethics, medical ethics, philosophy of law and political philosophy. This volume will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as political science, law, medicine and social science.

It has been argued that environmental decision-making can be improved be introducing citizen panels. The authors argue that citizen panels and other models of citizen participation should only be used as a consulting forum in exceptional cases at the local level, not as a real decision-making procedure. But many problems in the field of environmental policy need nonlocal, at least regional or national, regulation due to the fact that they are of national impor-tance. The authors argue that there are good reasons not to institutionalise national citizen panels. They advocate the view that more reasonable and more competent solutions can be found by introducing forms of direct democracy

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article

Es geht in diesem Aufsatz um die Frage, was es heißt, eine andere Person zu achten. Im Zentrum steht dabei die moralische Achtung, nicht die Achtung im Sinne der Wertschätzung einer anderen Person. Ein wohlfahrts- und ein autonomietheoretisches Verständnis moralischer Achtung werden dargestellt und zurückgewiesen. Es wird für ein Verständnis moralischer Achtung argumentiert, wonach eine Person genau dann geachtet wird, wenn ihr authentischer Wille ernst genommen wird. Die Achtung schulden wir dabei der Würde der Person. Achtung vor der Würde der Person ist Achtung vor dem, was die Selbstachtung von Personen ermöglicht. Die Würde von Personen ist unantastbar sowohl in der anderen wie auch in der eigenen Person. Der authentische Wille von Personen darf entsprechend bloß dann geachtet werden, wenn er mit dieser Würde sich verträgt

ZusammenfassungEs wurde für die These argumentiert, dass der Begriff der Würde in der Medizinethik nutzlos sei und in den Fällen, in denen er verständlich verwendet wird, nichts anderes meint als den Respekt vor der Autonomie von Personen. In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese These falsch ist. Es wird ein Begriff von Würde vorgestellt, der sich nicht auf den Begriff des Respekts vor der Autonomie von Personen reduzieren lässt. Anhand der Diskussion um ein Sterben in Würde soll auch deutlich werden, dass auf den Begriff der Würde auch in der Medizinethik nicht verzichtet werden kann.

Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, that you can only be a proper friend of someone, if the relation to her or him is based on moral respect.

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights