•  56
    Für viele stellt das Instrumentalisierungsverbot, wonach man andere Menschen nie blo als Mittel behandeln darf, eine fundamentale moralische Wahrheit dar. Dieses Buch ist der Versuch, diese Ansicht näher zu fassen und zu begründen. Das Instrumentalisierungsverbot spielt nicht nur in unserer Alltagsmoral, sondern auch in moraltheoretischen Diskussionen eine wichtige Rolle. Verschiedenste Praktiken werden mit der Begründung als unzulässig kritisiert, dass mit ihnen Menschen instrumentalisiert würd…Read more
  •  190
    Democracy and Environmental Decision-Making
    with Klaus Peter Rippe
    Environmental Values 8 (1): 75-88. 1999.
    It has been argued that environmental decision-making can be improved be introducing citizen panels. The authors argue that citizen panels and other models of citizen participation should only be used as a consulting forum in exceptional cases at the local level, not as a real decision-making procedure. But many problems in the field of environmental policy need nonlocal, at least regional or national, regulation due to the fact that they are of national impor-tance. The authors argue that there…Read more
  •  110
    Human Rights and Basic Needs
    with Marion Albers, Thomas Hoffmann, and Reinhardt Jörn
    In Peter Schaber, Marion Albers, Thomas Hoffmann & Reinhardt Jörn (eds.), Ius Gentium, . pp. 109-120. 2014.
  •  87
    Demanding something
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1): 63-77. 2014.
  •  107
    Wieso moralische Achtung wichtig ist
    Analyse & Kritik 31 (2): 351-361. 2009.
    Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, tha…Read more
  •  100
    Analytic ethics in German philosophy
    with Anna Kusser and Klaus-Peter Rippe
    Cogito 8 (3): 264-267. 1994.
  •  66
    Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure.