Lev Vaidman

It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in the world corresponding to that outcome?''; b). A gedanken experiment which splits the world into several worlds which are identical according to some symmetry condition; and c). Relativistic causality, which together with explain the Born rule of standard quantum mechanics. The Quantum Sleeping Beauty controversy and ``caring measure'' replacing probability measure are discussed.

There is a trend to consider counterfactuals as invariably time-asymmetric. Recently, this trend manifested itself in the controversy about validity of counterfactual application of a time-symmetric quantum probability rule. Kastner (2003) analyzed this controversy and concluded that there are time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals which are consistent, but they turn out to be trivial. I correct Kastner's misquotation of my defense of time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals and explain their non-trivial aspects, thus contesting the claim that counterfactuals have to be time-asymmetric.

Protective measurement, which we have introduced recently, allows one to observe properties of the state of a single quantum system and even the Schrödinger wave itself. These measurements require a protection, sometimes due to an additional procedure and sometimes due to the potential of the system itself The analysis of the protective measurements is presented and it is argued, contrary to recent claims, that they observe the quantum state and not the protective potential. Some other misunderstandings concerning our proposal are also clarified.

This paper is an answer to the preceding paper by Kastner, in which she continued the criticism of the counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergman-Lebowitz rule in the framework of the time-symmetrized quantum theory, in particular, by analyzing the three-box “paradox.” It is argued that the criticism is not sound. Paradoxical features of the three-box example are discussed. It is explained that the elements of reality in the framework of time-symmetrized quantum theory are counterfactual statements, and therefore, even conflicting elements of reality can be associated with a single system. It is shown how such “counterfactual” elements of reality can be useful in the analysis of a physical experiment (the three-box example). The validity of Kastner's application of the consistent histories approach to the time-symmetrized counterfactuals is questioned