•  138
    It is argued that the lesson we should learn from Bell's inequalities is not that quantum mechanics requires some kind of action at a distance, but that it leads us to believe in parallel worlds.
  •  226
    Time-Symmetrized Counterfactuals in Quantum Theory
    Foundations of Physics 29 (5): 755-765. 1999.
    Counterfactuals in quantum theory are briefly reviewed and it is argued that they are very different from counterfactuals considered in the general philosophical literature. The issue of time symmetry of quantum counterfactuals is considered and a novel time-symmetric definition of quantum counterfactuals is proposed. This definition is applied for analyzing several controversies related to quantum counterfactuals
  •  38
    Nonlocal measurements and teleportation of quantum states
    In M. Ferrero & Alwyn van der Merwe (eds.), Fundamental Problems in Quantum Physics, Springer. pp. 347--356. 1995.
  •  94
    It is argued that standard quantum theory without collapse provides a satisfactory explanation of everything we experience in this and in numerous parallel worlds. The only fundamental ontology is the universal wave function evolving in a deterministic way without action at a distance.
  •  151
    Variations on the Theme of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger Proof
    Foundations of Physics 29 (4): 615-630. 1999.
    Three arguments based on the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) proof of the nonexistence of local hidden variables are presented. The first is a description of a simple game which a team that uses the GHZ method will always win. The second uses counterfactuals in an attempt to show that quantum theory is nonlocal in a stronger sense than is implied by the nonexistence of local hidden variables and the third describes peculiar features of time-symmetrized counterfactuals in quantum theory
  •  222
    Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
    In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics, Springer. pp. 299--311. 2012.
    It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in th…Read more