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305Real wholes, real parts: Mereology without algebraJournal of Philosophy 103 (12): 597-613. 2006.
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50Continuants and OccurrentsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 59-92. 2000.Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and th…Read more
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21Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock. Against the Current: Selected Philosophical Papers. Frankfurt: Ontos, 2012. ISBN: 9783868381481 . Pp. xii + 456 (review)Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1): 145-148. 2015.
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40A Semantics for OntologyDialectica 39 (3): 193-215. 1985.SummaryLeśniewski presented his logical systems in a way which conformed to his nominalism, so the question arises whether Leśniewski's logic can be given a natural formal semantics which, unlike current versions, avoids commitment to abstract entities. Building on hints in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, I develop the idea of a way of meaning which is the basis for what I call combinatorial semantics. I then consider whether this commits us to abstract objects or an intensional metalogic
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657Plural reference and set theoryIn Barry Smith (ed.), Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag. pp. 199--260. 1982.
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71A leśniewskian language for the nominalistic theory of substance and accidentTopoi 2 (1): 99-109. 1983.
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55Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus?Grazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 165-186. 1986.The philosophies of late Brentano and early Wittgenstein can be brought closer in two ways. One way discovers a surprising amount of part-whole theory in the Tractatus if we see states of affairs (not wholly wilfully) as thinglike rather than factlike. This throws up a modal analogue to Chisholm's entia successiva in the form of situations. The other way sees all propositions as truth-functions of existential propositions, supporting Brentano's view that existentials are primary, and incidentall…Read more
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25Multivalence and Vagueness: A Reply to CopelandProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Peter Simons; Multivalence and Vagueness: A Reply to Copeland, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 201–210, https://
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Supernumeration: Vagueness and NumbersIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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Lesniewski's Logic and its Relation to Classical and Free LogicIn G. Dorn & P. Weingarten (eds.), Foundations of Logic and Linguistics. Problems and Solutions, Plenum. pp. 369-400. 1985.
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46Reasoning on a tight budget: Lesniewski's nominalistic metalogic (review)Erkenntnis 56 (1): 99-122. 2002.
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5Why the negations of false atomic sentences are trueEssays on Armstrong. Acta Philosophica Fennica 84. 2008.
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1222Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substancePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 553-575. 1994.
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11Who's Afraid of Higher-Order Logic?Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 (1): 253-264. 1993.Suppose you hold the following opinions in the philosophy of logic. First-order predicate logic is expressively inadequate to regiment concepts of mathematic and natural language; logicism is plausible and attractive; set theory as an adjunct to logic is unnatural and ontologically extravagant; humanly usable languages are finite in lexicon and syntax; it is worth striving for a Tarskian semantics for mathematics; there are no Platonic abstract objects. Then you are probably already in cognitive…Read more
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Nominalism in PolandIn Jan Wolenski, Roberto Poli & Francesco Coniglione (eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School, Rodopi. pp. 207-231. 1993.
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32Abstraktion ohne abstrakte GegenstandeZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (1): 114-129. 2012.
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Truth on a Tight Budget: Tarski and NominalismIn Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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192Extended SimplesThe Monist 87 (3): 371-384. 2004.I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough…Read more
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