Peter Simons

From the time of _Begriffsschrift_ onwards, Frege treated functions of two or more places on a par with those of one place. This included the treatment of relations (_Beziehungen_) as a special case of polyadic functions in the way that concepts (_Begriffe_) were a special case of monadic functions. By the time of _Grundgesetze_ (and unlike in _Begriffsschrift_), Frege dealt with relations largely through their extensions, which were what he called “double value-ranges” (_Doppelwerthverläufe_). This is in some ways a misnomer, since double value-ranges are simply a special case of single or ordinary value-ranges, namely value-ranges of functions derived from the value-ranges of monadic functions with additional saturated places. Frege’s treatment of the extensions of relations (which he came to call simply “_Relationen_”) thus embodies a move analogous to the treatment of polyadic functions as functions of functions, a device invented in 1920 by Moses Schönfinkel and since (unfairly) known in combinatory logic as “currying”. This paper considers the details of Frege’s _Grundgesetze_ treatment of relations via their extensions, exhibits its grammar, and indicates its formal elegance by comparing it with other possible treatments.

Al-Farahr’s commentarv and short treatise on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Introduction and translation from Arabic by F. Zimmerman. Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1987. clii + 287 pp. of English. £22.50 Johann Andreas Segner, Specimen logicae universaliter demonstrate. Appendices: Two dissertations De syllogismo. Edited by Mirella Capozzi. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB, 1990. clxxii + 281 pp. 85 000 Lire M. Borga, P. Fregugua And D. Palladino, I contribua fondazionali della scuola di Peano. Milano: Franco Angeli, 1985, 257 pp. No price stated F. Cavaliere. La logica formale in Unione Sovietica. Gli anni del dibattito 1946-1965. Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1990. ix + 140pp. Lire 42000 William S. Hatcher, Logic and logos. Essays on science, religion and philosophy. Oxford: George Ronald, 1990. x + 147 pp. £4.50/$9.50 E. J. Lowe, Kinds of being: a study of individuation, identity and the logic of sortal terms. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989. £25.00/$550.00 Reinhardt Grossmann, The fourth way. A theory of knowledge. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. 312 pp.$35.00 J. Etchemendy. The concept of logical consequence. Cambridge, Mass, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1990. vi 4- 174 pp. £19.95 Bernard Bolzano, Las paradojas del infinito. Translated from the German by L. Felipe Segura. Introduction by J. Sebestik. Mexico City: Faculty of Sciences, University of Mexico, 1991. 163 pp. No price stated W. Stantfy Jfvons, Pure logic and other minor works. Photoreprinted Bristol: Thoemmes, 1991. xxiii + 299 pp. No price stated Felix Kaufmann, L’infinito in matematica. Translated from the German, with an introduction, by L. Albertazzi. Gardolo di Trento: Luigi Reverdito Editore, 1990. 297 pp. L. 32.000 Massimo Libardi, Teorie de lie parti e delVintero. Mereologie estensionali. Trento: Centro Studi per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea, Quaderni 4-6, 302 pp. 22,000 lire M. S. Burcjin and V. I. Kuznetsoff, Aksio-logichcskiye aspekîi nauchnikh teorii. Kiev; Naukova Dymka, 1991. 184 pp. 3 roubles Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, Handbook of metaphysics and ontology. 2 vols. Munich: Philosophia, 1991. 1005 pp. 650 DM

Bob Hale championed the view that some objects exist of necessity, most prominently, mathematical objects like numbers. In contrast, this chapter upholds radical contingentism, the view that no object exists necessarily, and seeks to undermine the idea that the best possible candidates for necessary existence, the natural numbers, exist necessarily, despite there being in fact many contingent objects. Even the best neo-Fregean arguments for the existence of natural numbers depend on assumptions a nominalist may reject. A positive account of cardinalities as belonging to multitudes shows that every finite cardinality is exemplified only if there are two or more individuals, but that there are at least two individuals is not a necessary truth. Hence, even if numbers were admitted to abstract existence contingently upon their being exemplified—which the chapter denies—they would not exist necessarily.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LOGIC RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestiones super Priscianum minorern. Introduction and critical edition by H.W. Enders and J. Pinborg. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980. 460 pp. 2 fascicules. DM 168 per fascicule. PAUL VINCENT SPADE, Peter of Ailly: concepts and insolubles. An annotated translation. (Synthese Historical Library, Volume 19.) Dordrecht, Holland: Boston, U.S.A.: London, England: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. xii + 193 pp. Df1.60/$31.40. VINCENT FERRER, Tractatus de suppositionibus. Introduction and critical edition by J.A. Trentman. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977. 188 pp. No price stated. GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, Late scholastic and humanist theories of the proposition. Amsterdam, Oxford and New York: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980. 237 pp. Dfl.75.00/$36.50. LARRY HICKMAN, Modern theories of higher level predicates: second intentions in the Neuzeit. (Analytica. Investigations in Logic, Ontology and the Philosophy of Language.) Miinchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1980. 191 pp. DM 98. GERMAN TRADITIONS IN LOGIC JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift fiir seine Zuhörer (1794). Einleitung und Register von Wilhem G. Jacobs. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1979 (third edition). xxviii +272 pp. DM 23. GOTTHARD GUNTHER, Grundziige einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels’ Logik. Zweite Auflage. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978. xx+226 pp. DM 26. DIEGO MARCONI (ed.), La formalizzazione della dialettica. Turin: Rosemberg &Sellier, 1979. 474pp. No price stated. SUBSTANCE >M.J. Loux, Substance and attribute: a study in ontology. (Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, volume 14.) Dordrecht, Boston and London: Reidel, 1978. xi + 187 pp. $29.00 (cloth)/$11.95 (paper). DAVID WIGGINS, Sameness and substance. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. xi + 238 pp. £12.50. EDITIONS OF FREGE GOTTLOB FREGE, Posthumous writings. Translated by P. Long and R. White, with the assistance of R. Hargreaves. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. viii+288pp. £15.00. GOTTLOB FREGE, Philosophical and mathematical correspondence. Translated by Hans Kaal, abridged by Brian McGuinness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xviii +214 pp. £15.00. G. FREGE, Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem NachlaB mit Einleitung, Anmerkungen, Bibliographie und Register herausgegeben von G. Gabriel. 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner 1978. xxx + 224 pp. DM 25. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ERNEST NAGEL, The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, paperback edition 1979. xiii + 618 pp. £4.95 (paper). JENNIFER TRUSTED, The logic of scientific inference: an introduction. Foreword by Sir Peter Medawar. London: The MacMillan Press, 1979. xii + 145 pp. £8.00. G. TORALDO DI FRANCIA (ed.) Problems in the foundations of physics. (Proceedings of the International School of Physics ‘Enrico Fermi’, Course LXXII, Varenna, Italy, 25th July-6th August 1977.) Amsterdam and New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 1979. xvii + 500 pp. US $87.75/dfl.180.00. A.-F. SCHMID, Une philosophie de savant. Henri Poincar6 et la logique mathématique. Paris: Maspéro, 1978. 175 pp. No price stated. LOGIC AND LANGUAGE LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Notebooks 1914-16. Second edition. Edited by G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. 231 pp. £8.95 SAUL A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity. Revised and enlarged edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1980. 172 pp. £7.95. M.A.E. DUMMETT, Truth and other enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978. lvii + 470 pp. £24.00. MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS JAAKKO LOUNELA, Die Logik im XVII. Jahrundert in Finnland. (Annales Academiae Fennicae. Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum, no. 17.) Helsinki: Suomlainer Tiedeakatemia, 1978. vi + 188 pp. No price stated. BERNARD BOLZANO, Grundlegung der Logik. (Selections and synopses from Volumes I and I1 of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, second edition.) Edition and introduction by Friedrich Kambartel. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978. lxxi + 380 pp. DM 38 (paper). HERBERT MEHRTENS, Die Entstehung der Verbandstheorie. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1979. ix + 363 pp. DM 42. JANE BRIDGE [KISTER], Beginning model theory. The completeness theorem and some consequences. (Oxford Logic Guides.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. viii + 143 pp. $10.00.

This study relates to the theory of truth-making and offers a detailed overview of the relationships that exist between propositions and the criteria that make propositions true. The paper explores six possible ways in which truth may be supported by specific factors (truth-makers). Some elements of the theory of truth-making are in line with the proposals that Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Among the factors that support truths the author explains specific truth-makers, plausible truth-makers and unexpected truth-makers and suggests that there are degrees of truths. Finally, the author examines the duality of truth and the problem of falsehood.

We only need to think for a moment about surfaces and other interfaces to realise their enormous importance in everydaylife. There are numerous branches of physics, chemistry, biology, and materials science concerned wholly or largely with surfaces, and one sometimes comes across the expression ‘surface science’ Among the natural phenomena connected with surfaces which have aroused scientific interest are surface tension, surface waves, photoelectric emission, reflection, refraction, evaporation, adsorption, adhesion, thin films, detergents, catalysts, cell membranes, skin. All of these phenomena are complex, interesting, and some of them are still far from completely understood. Are surfaces important for philosophy? An epistemologist might well answer affirmatively, thinking of Quine’s "surface irritations" as the basis of our knowledge of the physical world, or Berkeley’s theory of vision, or the view that we perceive a material object in virtue of suitable causal interaction with its surfaces. But at first sight it seems that there is not much of interest for an ontologist. In his work on surfaces, especially in the book of that name, Avrum Stroll has shown to the contrary that there is much ontological interest in surfaces} Every ontologist delights in a newly discovered or hitherto neglected member of the ontological zoo: surfaces are not exactly new, but they have been neglected, and we can be grateful to Stroll for bringing them to greater prominence

For most of the history of metaphysics, the subject has been dominated by the concept of substance. There is an everyday commonsense notion of substance which is perfectly harmless and which I shall defend against attempts to remove it or revise it away. But I deny that substance has to be construed as a primitive even in everyday terms. Borrowing Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, I press the legitimate claims of revisionary metaphysics and argue that there is no place for a fundamental concept of substance within it, although aspects of the concept are likely to find their place therein.

_The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics_ is an outstanding, comprehensive and accessible guide to the major themes, thinkers, and issues in metaphysics. The _Companion _features over fifty specially commissioned chapters from international scholars which are organized into three clear parts: History of Metaphysics Ontology Metaphysics and Science. Each section features an introduction which places the range of essays in context, while an extensive glossary allows easy reference to key terms and definitions. _The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics_ is essential reading for students of philosophy and anyone interested in surveying the central topics and problems in metaphysics from causation to vagueness and from Plato and Aristotle to the present-day.

_The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics_ is an outstanding, comprehensive and accessible guide to the major themes, thinkers, and issues in metaphysics. The _Companion _features over fifty specially commissioned chapters from international scholars which are organized into three clear parts: History of Metaphysics Ontology Metaphysics and Science. Each section features an introduction which places the range of essays in context, while an extensive glossary allows easy reference to key terms and definitions. The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics is essential reading for students of philosophy and anyone interested in surveying the central topics and problems in metaphysics from causation to vagueness and from Plato and Aristotle to the present-day.

alone, in a reclining posture in his drawing-room. He was lean, ghastly, and quite of an earthy appearance. … He was quite different from the plump figure which he used to present … He seemed to be placid and even cheerful … He said he was just approaching to his end … I had a strong curiosity to be satisfied if he persisted in disbelieving a future state even when he had death before his eyes. I was persuaded from what he said, and from his manner of saying it, that he did persist. I asked him if it was not possible that there might be a future state. He answered it was possible that a piece of coal put upon the fire would not burn; and he added that it was a most unreasonable fancy that we should exist for ever … I asked him if the thought of annihilation never gave him any uneasiness. He said not the least; no more than the thought that he had not been, as Lucretius observes. … He said he had no pain, but was wasting away. I left him with impressions which disturbed me for some time.

There is more than one way in which objects can occupy locations. Whether the locations are places, times, or spacetime regions obviously makes a difference, but even within a single type of location there are different modes of occupation. Whereas a continuant such as a chair occupies each time at which it exists _intensively_, as a whole, an occurrent such as a football game occupies its time _extensively_: it is spread out over the time at which it occurs, with different temporal parts occurring at the different times. Both continuants and occurrents occupy space extensively, but types or universals occupy space intensively. There may further be items which are extensive occupants, spread out, but not in virtue of their parts. Order may be brought into this apparent chaos by considering a number of equivalence relations and their invariants, over a basis of extensive occupants of spacetime regions.

Compulsion and Surprise Two phenomena conspire to convince people that the physical world exists independently of them. One is its recalcitrance, or insusceptibility to control. It resists and constrains our actions. Much as we might wish to do so, we cannot lift heavy boulders, walk through walls, jump rivers, breathe under water, or fly (unaided) over mountains. The other feature, which is connected to the first, is the world’s propensity to surprise us. The sights and sound, pressures and pains of the world force themselves upon us in perception whether we want them to or not, and are often unexpected and surprising. An unusual bird appears in the garden, a stranger calls at the door and reveals he is a long-lost cousin, the post brings an invitation out of the blue, the car won’t start (surprises may be unpleasant as well as pleasant). These two phenomena, recalcitrance and surprise, form a large part of the platonist’s case for the existence of an independent mathematical reality. The recalcitrance of mathematical reality indeed appears to be stronger than that of the physical: the necessity with which mathematical results follow from assumptions is stricter than the physical necessity by which a wall resists attempts to walk through it. This has rarely been put more eloquently than by Jan Łukasiewicz. Speaking in particular of mathematical logic, he wrote..

Suppose you hold the following opinions in the philosophy of logic. First-order predicate logic is expressively inadequate to regiment concepts of mathematic and natural language; logicism is plausible and attractive; set theory as an adjunct to logic is unnatural and ontologically extravagant; humanly usable languages are finite in lexicon and syntax; it is worth striving for a Tarskian semantics for mathematics; there are no Platonic abstract objects. Then you are probably already in cognitive distress. One way to decease your unhappiness, short for embracing Platonism, is to accept higher-order logic and look, as did Arthur Prior, for a plausible way to neutralize the ontological commitment to abstract entities that this acceptance appears to entail.

Batı’da teorik felsefe; Analitik Felsefe (AF), Kıta Felsefesi (KF) ve Felsefe Tarihi (FT) olmak üzere üçe ayrılır. Fakat üçünde de işler yolunda değildir. AF, felsefenin bir bilim olabileceği iddiasından kuşku duyduğu için gerçek dünyayla ilgilenmiyorken başından beri uygun bir teorik yöntem izlemeyen Kıta Felsefesinin uygulanışı, belirli politik ve etik yargılara hizmet edecek şekilde özelleştirilmiştir. FT çalışmalarının gidişatı ise eldeki eserin nesnel değerinden daha çok ilgili filozofun ait olduğu ulus veya kültüre göre bölgesel bir temelde gelişmiştir. Felsefede ilerleme sağlanacaksa bu ancak bahsi geçen tuzaklardan kaçınılarak gerçekleşebilir.