Ulf Hlobil

Here we reply to comments by Mark Jago (Making it Exact), Luca Incurvati (A Plea for Multilateralism), and Federico Pailos, Agustina Borzi & Joaquin S. Toranzo Calderón (Many More Reasons). We thank the commentators for their stimulating and constructive reactions. They not only raise illuminating worries about our view but often already gesture toward solutions. A case in point: Incurvati as well as Pailos, Borzi, and Toranzo Calderon worry that the range of speech acts (or attitudes) we consider is too narrow, yet they also propose remedies. Likewise, while Jago objects to our defining consequence by appeal to modal notions, he sketches a way to obtain a consequence relation with similar properties (in certain respects) without relying on modality. Before responding individually, we note that many comments point to possible extensions, variants, or modifications of our view. Exploring such suggestions is not only compatible with but wholly in the spirit of our book, and we encourage it enthusiastically. Whether or not we ultimately accept the philosophical motivations or implications of these developments, they are sure to deepen our understanding of a largely unexplored intellectual territory.

This paper extends implication-space semantics to include first-order quantification. Implication-space semantics has recently been introduced as an inferentialist formal semantics that can capture nonmonotonic and nontransitive material inferences. Extant versions, however, include only propositional logic. This paper extends the framework so as to recover classical first-order logic. The goal is to formulate a theory in which consequence relations can be nonmonotonic and supraclassical, while obeying the deduction-detachment theorem and disjunction simplification, while also including conjunctions that behave multiplicatively as premises and counterexamples to the usual quantifier rules. The paper explains these constraints and shows how they can be met jointly. The result is a first-order version of implication-space semantics that has all the virtues for which inferentialists and inferential expressivists praise propositional implication-space semantics.

This paper develops a broadly neo-Aristotelian account of how virtues and institutions shape practical thought, focusing in particular on which options virtuous agents consider in deliberation. The central claim is that virtues and institutions render some options what I call “practically impossible” for an agent. Options are practically impossible if the agent is disposed not to consider them (invisible options) or disposed to reject them immediately when they are pointed out (options that are out of the question). I argue that some virtues and some social institutions are partly constituted by certain options being invisible or out of the question for the agents who possess those virtues or participate in those institutions, respectively. Along the way, I contend that practical rationality is not a matter of choosing the most supported option from among all (objectively) available options. A further upshot is that participation in a social institution is, at least for some agents, not merely a matter of following certain norms but a matter of (not) perceiving the world, and in particular one’s options, in a certain way.

In Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons, we combine a way to think about the contents of declarative sentences, namely semantic inferentialism, a claim about logic, namely logical expressivism, and a way to think about representation, namely the broadly neo-Aristotelian idea that (in the ideal case) our thought and talk about the world shares its form, which we call its “rational form,” with the (perhaps not actual) parts of reality which it is about. We present all of these ideas in a setting that allows for the defeasibility of implication and incompatibility. In developing our ideas with formal rigor, we draw on bilateralist interpretations of sequent calculi, truthmaker semantics, and substructural logics.

This paper shows how an inferentialist notion of content can be developed in such a way that it allows for an analogue of Frege’s hierarchy of senses as a response to Mates’s Puzzle. I argue that any plausible inferentialist conception of the objects of belief that wants to take Mates’s Puzzle at face value must allow for failures of the Cut rule. This follows from two premises, namely: (A) To take Mates’s Puzzle at face value, one must acknowledge that there can be sentences of the form “ $$x$$ believes that $$\phi$$ ” and “ $$x$$ believes that $$\psi$$ ” that imply each other and, nevertheless, “ $$y$$ believes that $$x$$ believes that $$\phi$$ ” and “ $$y$$ believes that $$x$$ believes that $$\psi$$ ” do not imply each other. (B) According to any plausible inferentialist conception of the objects of belief, two sentences express the same object of belief if they can be replaced for each other as premises and as conclusions salva consequentia.

In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that reasoners can, in certain ways, rationally change which logic they use. The (alleged) problem is that if someone does not already infer in accordance with some fundamental logical principles (such as Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens), then they cannot rationally begin to do so: the “adoption” of these principles is either unnecessary or impossible. In the literature, three issues have emerged as especially contentious: (1) How should we understand the argument for the Adoption Problem? What exactly is the argument’s conclusion, and how is it established, if at all? (2) How could someone who thinks that the rational adoption of logic is possible respond to the Adoption Problem? (3) What are the consequences of the Adoption Problem for related issues in the philosophy of logic? In this paper, we address each question in turn. We suggest that the Adoption Problem is best understood in the form of an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding logical inference. We classify positions on logical adoption in terms of which of these theses is abandoned, and we show that such a taxonomy of positions is useful for delineating the scope and consequences of the Adoption Problem.

The paper explores responses to an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding rule-following. In addressing this inconsistent quartet, two lines of thought pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it can seem that rule-following cannot require acts that shape or guide themselves or acts that require infinitely many similar acts. On the other hand, rule-following seems to require that we are responsible for our acts of rule-following in a special way. It is difficult to see how these thoughts can be coherently combined.

I argue that logic is unlike science in its methodology, thus rejecting anti-exceptionalism about logic. Logic has a mathematical and a philosophical part. In its mathematical part, the methodology of logic is like that of mathematics, and no need to choose between theories arises in that part. In its philosophical part, the methodology of logic is like that of philosophy. Philosophy and mathematics are both unlike the empirical sciences in their methodology. So logic is unlike the empirical sciences in its methodology. I end by looking at disagreements about the liar paradox as an example.

Understanding academic gender gaps is difficult because gender-imbalanced fields differ across many features, limiting researchers’ ability to systematically study candidate causes. In the present preregistered research, we isolate two potential explanations—brilliance beliefs and fixed versus growth intelligence mindsets—by comparing two fields that have inverse gender gaps and historic and topical overlap: philosophy and psychology. Many more men than women study philosophy and vice versa in psychology, with disparities emerging during undergraduate studies. No prior work has examined the contributions of both self-perceptions of brilliance and fixed versus growth mindsets on choice of major among undergraduate students. We assessed field-specific brilliance beliefs, brilliance beliefs about self, and mindsets, cross-sectionally in 467 undergraduates enrolled in philosophy and psychology classes at universities in the United States and Canada via both in-person and online questionnaires. We found support for the brilliance beliefs about the self, but not mindset, explanation. Brilliance beliefs about oneself predicted women’s but not men’s choice of major. Women who believed they were less brilliant were more likely to study psychology (perceived to require low brilliance) over philosophy (perceived to require high brilliance). Findings further indicated that fixed versus growth mindsets did not differ by gender and were not associated with major. Together, these results suggest that internalized essentialist beliefs about the gendered nature of brilliance are uniquely important to understanding why men and women pursue training in different academic fields.

Feelings of belonging are integral in people’s choice of what career to pursue. Women and men are disproportionately represented across careers, starting with academic training. The present research focuses on two fields that are similar in their history and subject matter but feature inverse gender gaps—psychology (more women than men) and philosophy (more men than women)—to investigate how theorized explanations for academic gender gaps contribute to feelings of belonging. Specifically, we simultaneously model the relative contribution of theoretically relevant individual differences (empathizing, systematizing, and intellectual combativeness) as well as life goals (prioritization of family, money, and status) to feelings of belonging and majoring in psychology or philosophy. We find that men report higher intellectual combativeness than women, and intellectual combativeness predicts feelings of belonging and majoring in philosophy over psychology. Although systematizing and empathizing are predictive of belonging and, in turn, majoring in psychology and philosophy, respectively, when other factors are taken into account, women and men do not differ in empathizing and systematizing. Women, more than men, report prioritizing having a family, wealth, and status in choosing a career, and these directly or indirectly feed into feelings of belonging and majoring in psychology, in contrast to prior theory. Together, these findings suggest that students’ perceptions of their own combativeness and the extent to which they desire money and status play essential roles in women’s feeling they belong in psychology and men’s feeling they belong in philosophy.

Graham Priest has formulated the minimally inconsistent logic of paradox (MiLP), which is paraconsistent like Priest’s logic of paradox (LP), while staying closer to classical logic. We present logics that stand to (the propositional fragments of) strong Kleene logic (K3) and the logic of first-degree entailment (FDE) as MiLP stands to LP. That is, our logics share the paracomplete and the paraconsistent-cum-paracomplete nature of K3 and FDE, respectively, while keeping these features to a minimum in order to stay closer to classical logic. We give semantic and sequent-calculus formulations of these logics, and we highlight some reasons why these logics may be interesting in their own right.

The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is no clear philosophical significance of meta-inferences above the first level.

The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a naturalistically acceptable way by appeal to the broadly biological well-functioning of our innate capacities. As a test-case for teleo-inferentialism, I discuss how the view handles Kripkenstein-style meaning skepticism.

The paper aims to clarify the role of the meaning of life in Anselm Müller’s philosophy. Müller says that the ethically good life is the life of acting well, and acting well requires at least a rough conception of the meaning of life, or a conception of what makes a life go well. But why is such a conception required and what does it mean to have such a conception? I argue that such a conception cannot provide us with ultimate ends in our practical deliberations. Nor can its role be merely to provide a standard against which practical reasoning can be assessed. Rather, our conception of the meaning of life is, in the first instance, that which allows us, in our practical reasoning, to see certain considerations as good reasons for certain actions and to weigh reasons for and against different options. One upshot of my interpretation is that Müller should be more optimistic about philosophy’s ability to answer the question of the meaning of life than he allows himself to be.

Some think that logic concerns the “laws of truth”; others that logic concerns the “laws of thought.” This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative bilateralism to truth-maker theory, such as non-transitive solutions to paradox, and vice versa, such as notions of factual equivalence and containment.

The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin’s framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their evidence, prior beliefs, and epistemic standards may still differ in the explicit doxastic attitudes that they adopt. This can happen because two such subjects may be sensitive to different questions. Thus, differing intellectual interests can yield failures of uniqueness. This is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon.

The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I end by arguing that this version of the Guise of the Good withstands standard objections.

I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction.

So-called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimism, but it also allows us to see what is right about pessimism.

For semantic inferentialists, the basic semantic concept is validity. An inferentialist theory of meaning should offer an account of the meaning of "valid." If one tries to add a validity predicate to one's object language, however, one runs into problems like the v-Curry paradox. In previous work, I presented a validity predicate for a non-transitive logic that can adequately capture its own meta-inferences. Unfortunately, in that system, one cannot show of any inference that it is invalid. Here I extend the system so that it can capture invalidities.

We suggest a new neo-Aristotelian account of right action: An action A is right for an agent S in a situation C just in case it is possible for A in C to result from a good practical inference. A practical inference is good if people must have a disposition to make such practical inferences where a society is to flourish. One advantage of this account is that it applies to non-ideal agents. It thus blocks the right-but-not-virtuous objection to virtue ethics. Our account furthermore suggests a new way of thinking about the concept of a fully virtuous agent. Ideal agents, we argue, necessarily have certain unmanifested dispositions, and failure is a real possibility for them.

We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil.

While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here we want to begin to fill this lacuna.