David Bradshaw

The distinction between the divine essence and energies has long been recognized as a characteristic feature of Eastern Orthodox theology, one sharply at odds with traditional Western understandings of divine simplicity. Yet attempts by Orthodox theologians to explain the distinction have sometimes exaggerated its distinctively Orthodox character by a failure to attend to its historical sources. This paper argues that the distinction was a natural and reasonable consequence of the synthesis between Greek philosophy and Biblical thought executed by the Church Fathers, particularly the Cappadocians of the fourth century.

From the standpoint of belief in divine freedom (or, more precisely, divine free choice), the medieval Aristotelian understanding of divine simplicity is deeply problematic. This is for two reasons. First, if the divine will and wisdom are identical, it would seem that God’s action must be wholly determined by His rational apprehension of the good. Second, if the divine will is identical with the divine essence, it would seem that for God to be able to do other than He does would mean that the divine essence could be different. This paper focuses on two leading medieval Jewish Aristotelians, Maimonides and Gersonides, to ascertain their approach to these issues.

Is the divine glory a creature, or is it God? The awkwardness of the question suggests that there is something wrong with the dichotomy in terms of which it is posed. A similar question can be asked about the divine "energies" (erzergeiai) in the New Testament. Both of these Scriptural themes challenge us to rethink our preconceptions about the nature of God and the relationship between creatures and Creator. In this paper I describe the interpretation of the divine glory and divine energies given by the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century. I argue that their view is both philosophically cogent and Scripturally sound, and is one that Christian philosophers today would do well to recover.