Peter Bornedal

The work focuses on the transformation of the critical theories of Classicism and Romanticism. It does so with respect to how one discusses art and the artist, and with respect to the epistemological changes in these discussions. Thus, the work is not simply a historical account of the development of criticism. It examines the epistemology of criticism, and pursues how criticism on a fundamental structural level develops and changes. As such, the approach is more structural than historical. In comparing the two major paradigms, the different organization of knowledge about art and the artist is emphasized, and the fundamental rationale for this organization is exposed. This is represented according to how the included texts themselves account for this situation. The thesis is that art gradually disconnects itself from the practical purposes and the codified language conducting the task of the classical artist. Art becomes a sphere where 'truth' presumably is enunciated. Poetry changes from being 'a kind of language' into being 'a divine kind of language'--a language with a particular and exclusive relation to the truth of the human being and nature, and with the task to illuminate this relationship. ;Ultimately the concept of truth is targeted in the present work, especially the idea of a linkage between poetry and truth and the idea of the poet as a prophet and seer--as these ideas are established at some point in the transition period and legitimates most Romanticism, and still today enjoys some recognition. Against this conception, the ideals of Classicism and Neoclassicism are reevaluated and rehabilitated; poetry is understood as an object for rational discussion and judgment, and not as a medium beyond evaluation because it originates in inexpressible and unconscious depths of the human soul. This whole development is evaluated from a horizon that briefly and broadly could be characterized as 'after-metaphysical,' 'neo-rational,' and 'pragmatic.'

This article is a critique of the flawed logic Derrida employed in articulating his program of a Grammatology for “deconstructing” Western philosophy. I argue that Derrida in several instances built his arguments around what Kant called the “paralogism.” I look at an often cited case in order to substantiate my claim: Derrida’s reading of Saussure, where his argument is based on a paralogism. Derrida misinterprets Saussure by seeing his alleged rejection of graphical writing as a rejection of his own idiosyncratic notion of “writing”, which only corresponds to Saussure’s own notion of “linguistic value,” produced in a system of differences without positive terms