Jan Westerhoff

This paper has two main aims. I first argue that ontological nihilism, that is, the view that there are no things is a consistent position. Second, I discuss an argument for the view that nihilism is not just possible but actually true, that is that there actually are no things (This paper is not meant as an addition to the considerable literature on the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Of course, any attempt to answer this question would have to presuppose the conclusion of the first section, that is, that nihilism is a consistent position. But if the argument in the second section goes through the question we would then have to answer is not why there is something rather than nothing, but why there is nothing rather than something). My argument is based on two main premisses, eliminativism (‘only the fundamental exists’) and non-foundationalism (‘it’s dependence all the way down’) which jointly entail ontological nihilism. I conclude with some reflections on the consequences of the nihilist position for the project of constructing a fundamental metaphysical theory.

The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One of the most influential interpretations of Nagarjuna's difficult doctrine derives from the commentary of Candrakirti (6th ct CE). In view of its special soteriological role, much attention has been devoted to explaining the nature of the ultimate truth; less, however, has been paid to understanding the nature of conventional truth, which is often described as "deceptive," "illusion," or "truth for fools." But because of the close relation between the two truths in Madhyamaka, conventional truth also demands analysis. Moonshadows, the product of years of collaboration by ten cowherds engaged in Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, provides this analysis. The book asks, "what is true about conventional truth?" and "what are the implications of an understanding of conventional truth for our lives?" Moonshadows begins with a philosophical exploration of classical Indian and Tibetan texts articulating Candrakati's view, and uses this textual exploration as a basis for a more systematic philosophical consideration of the issues raised by his account.

A set of parameters for classifying composition operations is introduced. These parameters determine whether a composition operation is 1) universal, 2) determinate, 3) whether there is a difference between possible and actual compositions, 4) whether there can be singleton compositions, 5) whether they give rise to a hierarchy, and 6) whether components of compositions can be repeated. Philosophical implications of these parameters, in particular in relation to set theory and mereology are discussed. © 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

The aim of this paper is to assess the relation between causation and the notion of emptiness described in Buddhist philosophy. While the Madhyamaka school argues that some entity’s being caused implies its being empty, some contemporary authors have argued that there is a ‘Humean’ regularity account of causation that can both be understood as a plausible model of the earlier Buddhist Abhidharma account of causation and also block the Madhyamaka inference from causation to emptiness. After describing the Abhidharma account of causation, the ‘Humean’ regularity account and the Madhyamaka argument from causation to emptiness, we assess some ways in which this argument may be developed, with particular focus on the ‘ladder of causation’ and on the Madhyamaka account of time. The debate about the relation between causation and emptiness, it appears, is a facet of a more comprehensive metaphysical debate between a (moderate) foundationalism and a thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism.

The Indian philosopher Acarya Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 CE) was the founder of the Madhyamaka (Middle Path) school of Mahayana Buddhism and arguably the most influential Buddhist thinker after Buddha himself. Indeed, in the Tibetan and East Asian traditions, Nagarjuna is often referred to as the "second Buddha." This book presents a survey of the whole of Nagarjuna's philosophy based on his key philosophical writings. His primary contribution to Buddhist thought lies in the further development of the concept of sunyata or "emptiness." For Nagarjuna, all phenomena are without any svabhava, literally "own-nature" or "self-nature," and thus without any underlying substance. Particular emphasis is put on discussing Nagarjuna's thinking as philosophy. The present discussion shows how his thoughts on metaphysics, epistemology, the self, language, and truth present a unified theory of reality with considerable systematic appeal. The book offers a systematic account of Nagarjuna's philosophical position. It reads Nagarjuna in his own philosophical context, but also shows that the issues of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy have at least family resemblances to issues in European philosophy.

Recent developments in contemporary natural science (including the evolutionary study of perception, cognitive science, and interpretations of quantum physics) incorporate central idealist positions relating to the nature of representation, the role our minds play in structuring our experience of the world, and the properties of the world behind our representations. This paper first describes what these positions are, and how they are introduced in the relevant theories in terms of precisely formulated scientific analogues. I subsequently consider how this way of looking at philosophical idealism through selected parts of contemporary science can help us to pursue new ways of developing key idealist questions in a way that is integrated with a naturalistically supported endeavour to understand central features of reality.

Madhyamaka and Yogacara are the two principal schools of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. While Madhyamaka asserts the ultimate emptiness and conventional reality of all phenomena, Yogacara is usually considered to be idealistic. This collection of essays addresses the degree to which these philosophical approaches are consistent or complementary. Indian and Tibetan doxographies often take these two schools to be philosophical rivals. They are grounded in distinct bodies of sutra literature and adopt what appear to be very different positions regarding the analysis of emptiness and the status of mind. Madhyamaka-Yogacara polemics abound in Indian Buddhist literature, and Tibetan doxographies regard them as distinct systems. Nonetheless, scholars have tried to synthesize the two positions for centuries. This volume offers new essays by prominent experts on both these traditions, who address the question of the degree to which these philosophical approaches should be seen as rivals or as allies. In answering the question of whether Madhyamaka and Yogacara can be considered compatible, contributors engage with a broad range of canonical literature, and relate the texts to contemporary philosophical problems.

In Tibetan monasteries depictions of eight Indian Buddhist philosophers collectively referred to as the “six ornaments and two supreme ones” are often found. These “six ornaments” are Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti. These paintings are usually grouped around a central representation of Buddha Śākyamuni. This iconographic set gives a straightforward way of dividing Indian Buddhist philosophical thought into four intellectual streams: Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and what is often referred to as the epistemological‐logical school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Each of these four schools constitutes a philosophical system of considerable complexity dealing with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of logic and language, ethics, and so forth.

In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome ..

When the relation between Buddhism and contemporary natural science is discussed there is usually at least one elephant in the room: the Buddhist conception of rebirth. This appears to constitute a clear example of a situation where Buddhism asserts the existence of something that science considers to be simply not there. The reason for this is obvious. If we accept the widespread contemporary belief that the mind is what the brain does, or, somewhat more cautiously, that the human mind could do nothing without the human brain also doing something at the same time then the destruction of the human brain during and after the process of death must mean the cessation of the human mind. This paper will discuss a number of strategies for addressing this tension.

The concept of an ontological category is central to metaphysics. Metaphysicians argue about which category an object should be assigned to, whether one category can be reduced to another one, or whether there might be different equally adequate systems of categorization. Answers to these questions presuppose a clear understanding of what precisely an ontological category is, an issue which is rarely addressed; Jan Westerhoff presents the first in-depth analysis both of the use made of ontological categories in the metaphysical literature, and of various attempts at defining them. He also develops a new theory of ontological categories which implies that there will be no unique system, and that the ontological category an object belongs to is not an essential property of that object. Systems of ontological categories are structures imposed on the world, rather than reflections of a deep metaphysical reality already present. All metaphysicians should find Westerhoff's book highly stimulating.

Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world, to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.

The Indian philosopher Acharya Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 CE) was the founder of the Madhyamaka (Middle Path) school of Mahayana Buddhism and arguably the most influential Buddhist thinker after Buddha himself. Indeed, in the Tibetan and East Asian traditions, Nagarjuna is often referred to as the 'second Buddha.' His primary contribution to Buddhist thought lies is in the further development of the concept of sunyata or 'emptiness.' For Nagarjuna, all phenomena are without any svabhaba, literally 'own-nature' or 'self-nature', and thus without any underlying essence. In this book, Jan Westerhoff offers a systematic account of Nagarjuna's philosophical position. He reads Nagarjuna in his own philosophical context, but he does not hesitate to show that the issues of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy have at least family resemblances to issues in European philosophy.

This paper attempts to dissolve an apparent difficulty arising in the philosophy of language as discussed by the Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka school. On the one hand Madhyamaka seems to be claiming that every entity is fundamentally linguistic in nature, on the other hand it also asserts that language does not exist. I argue that the difficulty is to be dissolved by distinguishing two different senses of language appealed to by the Mādhyamikas. They argue that one specific understanding of language is deficient (and that therefore language thus understood does not exist), but this is not the same sense of language according to which everything is linguistic in nature. The apparent contradiction is thereby resolved.

In the past the study of Asian philosophical traditions has often been approached by asking how the theories developed within these nonWestern cultures would help us to solve problems in contemporary Western philosophy. The present account, which summarizes results of a research project funded by the John Templeton foundation in 2015, attempts to reverse this way of studying Asian philosophy by investigating which theories, approaches and models from contemporary Western philosophy can be used to support, analyse, refine and advance insights into key questions discussed by Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka. Our discussion concentrates on six key philosophical areas that can contribute in important ways to the analysis and development of Madhyamaka thought: metaphysics, logic, semantics, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and ethics.

The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the key points of Nāgārjuna’s discussion of problems relating to the philosophy of language. We will focus on two works from Nāgārjuna’s yukti-corpus that address these matters most explicitly, the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa. The discussion will concentrate on four topics: Nāgārjuna’s views on semantics, the problem of empty names, the relation between language and momentariness, and the implications of Madhyamaka views on parts and wholes for the existence of language.

Madhyamaka philosophy has been frequently characterized as nihilism, not just by its Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, but also by some contemporary Buddhologists. This characterization might well strike us as surprising. First, nihilism appears to be straightforwardly inconsistent. It would be curious if a philosophical school holding such an obviously deficient view would have acquired the kind of importance Madhyamaka has acquired in the Asian intellectual landscape over the last two millenia. Second, Madhyamaka by its very name proclaims to tread the “middle way”, and what if anything would count as an extreme position but the view that there is nothing? This essay addresses both the systematic status of nihilist theories as well as the historical contexts in which Madhyamaka has been characterized as nihilistic, aiming to throw some light on plausible and implausible ways of understanding the Madhyamaka intellectual enterprise.

Although a considerable degree of precision has been introduced both into the formulation and the discussion of ontological theories by the use of formal methods there is still a remarkable indefiniteness about foundational issues. In particular it is not clear what an ontological category is and why we regard something as an ontological category. This is amazing given that the notion of ontological category is in fact the most basic of the whole of ontology: it is what this discipline is about.

A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the world questioned is very much the understanding of the world everybody has. It is the understanding that there is a world out there —independent of our minds — and that when we speak and think about this world we mostly get it right. But the Madhyamaka thinkers under discussion here deny that there is a world out there and claim that our opinions about it are to the greatest part fundamentally and dangerously wrong.

The so-called `no-thesis' view is without a doubt one of the most immediately puzzling philosophical features of Nāgārjuna's thought and also largely responsible for ascribing to him either sceptical or mystical leanings (or indeed both). The locus classicus for this view is found in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī: “If I had some thesis the defect [just mentioned] would as a consequence attach to me. But I have no thesis, so this defect is not applicable to me.” That this absence of a thesis is to be regarded as a positive feature is stressed in a passage from the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, where Nāgārjuna remarks about the Buddhas: “For these great beings there is no position, no dispute. How could there be another's [opposing] position for those who have no position?” Now it is important to observe that when considered in isolation it is very hard to make any coherent sense of these passages. For even if we assume that the Buddhas do not hold any philosophical position anymore (having perhaps passed beyond all conceptual thinking), how are we to make sense of the first quotation which, in the middle of a work full of philosophical theses claims that there is no such thesis asserted at all?

Amongst its many other merits this collection of essays demonstrates the growing maturity of the study of the Indian philosophical tradition. Much of the good scholarship done on non-Western, and in particular on Indian philosophy over the last decades has attempted to show that these texts hailing from east of Suez contain interesting and sophisticated discussions in their own right, discussions that have to be understood against the Ancient Indian intellectual and cultural context rather than evaluated by how closely they can be seen as conforming to current fashions in the Western philosophical debate. While this approach has helped much in alerting us to the difficulties of forcing an ancient intellectual tradition on the procrustean bed of the philosophical interests and concerns of the current day,[...]

This paper discusses a somewhat neglected reading of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, arguing that the main focus of a crucial part is a particular theory of properties and their relation to individuals they instantiate, rather than the refutation of specific assumptions about the nature of space and time. Some of Nāgārjuna’s key arguments about motion should be understood as argument templates in which notions other than mover, motion, and so forth could be substituted. The remainder of the discussion of motion does not serve quasi-Zenonian purposes either but uses motion as a principal example of change and considers the soteriological problems of the subject moving (gati) through transmigratory existence (saṃsāra). I attempt to show how this interpretation coheres with Nāgārjuna’s overall philosophical project.