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65From outcomes to acts: A non-standard axiomatization of the expected utility principleJournal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4): 361-378. 2004.This paper presents an axiomatization of the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the independence axiom or sure-thing principle. Perhaps more importantly the new axiomatization is based on an ex ante approach, instead of the standard ex post approach. An ex post approach utilizes the decision maker's preferences among risky acts for generating a utility and a probability function, whereas in the ex ante approach a set of preferences among potential outcomes are on the …Read more
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64An argument for the principle of maximizing expected utilityTheoria 68 (2): 112-128. 2002.The main result of this paper is a formal argument for the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the law of large numbers. Unlike the well-known arguments by Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern, this argument does not presuppose the sure-thing principle or the independence axiom. The principal idea is to use the concept of transformative decision rules for decomposing the principle of maximizing expected utility into a sequence of normatively reasonable subrules. It is …Read more
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64Consequentialism in infinite worldsAnalysis 80 (2): 240-248. 2020.We show that in infinite worlds the following three conditions are incompatible: The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is more costl…Read more
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62Multi-dimensional consequentialismRatio 25 (2): 177-194. 2012.This article introduces and explores a distinction between multi-dimensional and one-dimensional consequentialist moral theories. One-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on just one aspect of the act, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces, or the sum total of priority- or equality-adjusted wellbeing. Multi-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on more than one aspect. They may, for instance, believe that the sum…Read more
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59Pure Time Preference: Reply to Johansson and RosenqvistPacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1): 442-445. 2017.Johansson and Rosenqvist reject our argument for the rational permissibility of pure time preferences. Johansson and Rosenqvist's main objection is that where two options, X and Y, have equal intrinsic value, there will be a reason to be indifferent between X and Y, and therefore a reason to not hold a PTP for X or Y. In this reply, we argue that if two options have equal intrinsic value, it does not follow that you have a reason to be indifferent. Rather, the two equally large intrinsic values …Read more
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58Is the Precautionary Principle a Midlevel Principle?Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1): 34-48. 2019.In this article, we defend two claims about the precautionary principle. The first is that there is no ‘core’ precautionary principle that unifies all its different versions. It is more plausible to think of the different versions as being related to each other by way of family resemblances. So although precautionary principle x may have much in common with precautionary principle y, and y with z, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that unify all versions of the principle. Ou…Read more
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58Transformative decision rules, permutability, and non-sequential framing of decision problemsSynthese 139 (3): 387-403. 2004.The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or `editing' phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules are applied.It is argued that in order to be normatively reasonable, sets oftransf…Read more
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56The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Reply to Schmidt, Brown, Howard-Snyder, Crisp, Andric and Tanyi, and GertkenEthical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1): 71-82. 2016.In this article I respond to comments and objections raised in the special issue on my book The Dimensions of Consequentialism. I defend my multi-dimensional consequentialist theory against a range of challenges articulated by Thomas Schmidt, Campbell Brown, Frances Howard-Snyder, Roger Crisp, Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi, and Jan Gertken. My aim is to show that multi-dimensional consequentialism is, at least, a coherent and intuitively plausible alternative to one-dimensional theories such as u…Read more
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51Order-Independent Transformative Decision RulesSynthese 147 (2): 323-342. 2005.A transformative decision rule alters the representation of a decision problem, either by changing the set of alternative acts or the set of states of the world taken into consideration, or by modifying the probability or value assignments. A set of transformative decision rules is order-independent in case the order in which the rules are applied is irrelevant. The main result of this paper is an axiomatic characterization of order-independent transformative decision rules, based on a single ax…Read more
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51Can we Use Conceptual Spaces to Model Moral Principles?Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2): 373-395. 2020.Can the theory of conceptual spaces developed by Peter Gärdenfors and others be applied to moral issues? Martin Peterson argues that several moral principles can be construed as regions in a shared similarity space, but Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Gert-Jan Lokhorst question Peterson’s claim. They argue that the moral similarity judgments used to construct the space are underspecified and subjective. In this paper, we present new data indicating that moral principles can indeed be construed as …Read more
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49Do pragmatic arguments show too much?European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2): 165-172. 2016.Pragmatic arguments seek to demonstrate that you can be placed in a situation in which you will face a sure and foreseeable loss if you do not behave in accordance with some principle P. In this article I show that for every P entailed by the principle of maximizing expected utility you will not be better off from a pragmatic point of view if you accept P than if you don’t, because even if you obey the axioms of expected utility theory it is possible to place you in a situation in which you will…Read more
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47Jonathan Dancy, ethics without principles oxford university press 2004, 229 pp. isbn 0199270023 (review)Theoria 72 (2): 162-165. 2006.
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46Indeterminate PreferencesPhilosophical Studies 130 (2): 297-320. 2006.It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi ’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities …Read more
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44Prospectism and the weak money pump argumentTheory and Decision 78 (3): 451-456. 2015.Hare proposes a view he calls prospectism for making choices in situations in which preferences have a common, but problematic structure. I show that prospectism permits the decision-maker to make a series of choices she knows in advance will lead to a sure loss. I also argue that a theory that permits the decision-maker to make choices she knows in advance will lead to a sure loss should be rejected.
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43Why computer games can be essential for human flourishingJournal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 11 (2): 81-91. 2013.PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing.Design/methodology/approachThe authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all pe…Read more
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41How to depolarise the ethical debate over human embryonic stem cell research (and other ethical debates too!)Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (8): 496-500. 2012.The contention of this paper is that the current ethical debate over embryonic stem cell research is polarised to an extent that is not warranted by the underlying ethical conflict. It is argued that the ethical debate can be rendered more nuanced, and less polarised, by introducing non-binary notions of moral rightness and wrongness. According to the view proposed, embryonic stem cell research—and possibly other controversial activities too—can be considered ‘a little bit right and a little bit…Read more
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40Introduction: Values and norms in modelingStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 1-2. 2014.
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40The Deontic Transfer PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (5): 1185-1195. 2021.The Deontic Transfer Principle states that if it is permissible for a person A to cause another person B harm H then, other things being equal, it is permissible for A to impose a risk of harm H on B. In this article we show that the Deontic Transfer Principle is vulnerable to counterexamples, and that the same is true of a range of closely related principles. We conclude that the deontic status of a risk imposition is not directly inherited from the deontic properties of deterministic acts.
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38The Ethics of Technology: Response to CriticsScience and Engineering Ethics 24 (5): 1645-1652. 2018.The Ethics of Technology: A Geometric Analysis of Five Moral Principles proposes five moral principles for analyzing ethical issues related to engineering and technology. The objections raised by several authors to the multidimensional scaling technique used in the book reveal a lack of familiarity with this widely used technique.
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34Moral Rightness Comes in DegreesJournal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4): 645-664. 2022.This article questions the traditional view that moral rightness and wrongness are discrete predicates with sharp boundaries. I contend that moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees: Some acts are somewhat rightandsomewhat wrong. My argument is based on the assumption that meaning tracks use. If an overwhelming majority of competent language users frequently say that some acts are a bit right and a bit wrong, this indicates that rightness and wrongnessaregradable concepts. To support the em…Read more
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29A Generalization of the Pasadena PuzzleDialectica 67 (4): 597-603. 2013.By generalizing the Pasadena puzzle introduced by Nover and Hájek (2004) we show that the sum total of value produced by an act can be made to converge to any real number by applying the Riemann rearrangement theorem, even if the scenario faced by the decision maker is non-probabilistic and fully predictable. A wide range of solutions put forward in the literature for solving the original puzzle cannot solve this generalized version of the Pasadena puzzle
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29Animals and Friendship: A Reply to RowlandsJournal of Animal Ethics 1 (2): 187-189. 2011.Can humans be friends with animals? If so, what would the moral implications of such friendship be? In a previous issue of this journal, we argued that humans can indeed be friends with animals and that such friendships are morally valuable. The present article is a comment on Mark Rowlands’s reply to our original article. We argue that our original argument is not undermined by Rowlands’s attack.
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27New Technologies Should not be Treated as Social ExperimentsEthics, Policy and Environment 16 (3): 346-348. 2013.Van de Poel argues that nuclear power should be treated as an ongoing social experiment that needs to be continuously monitored and evaluated. In his reports (2009; Jacobs, Van de Poel, & Os...
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26What is the Point of Thinking of New Technologies as Social Experiments?Ethics, Policy and Environment 20 (1): 78-83. 2017.In this paper I respond to van de Poel’s claim that new technologies should be conceived as ongoing social experiments, which is an idea originally introduced by Schinzinger and Martin in the 1970s. I discuss and criticize three possible motivations for thinking of new technologies as ongoing social experiments.
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Alumnus, 2003
College Station, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Technology Ethics |
Consequentialism |
Decision-Theoretic Frameworks |
St. Petersburg Paradox |