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117The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and RiskCambridge University Press. 2013.Consequentialism, one of the major theories of normative ethics, maintains that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the act's consequences and its alternatives. The traditional form of consequentialism is one-dimensional, in that the rightness of an act is a function of a single moral aspect, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces. In this book Martin Peterson introduces a new type of consequentialist theory: multidimensional consequentialism. According to this theory, …Read more
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62Multi-dimensional consequentialismRatio 25 (2): 177-194. 2012.This article introduces and explores a distinction between multi-dimensional and one-dimensional consequentialist moral theories. One-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on just one aspect of the act, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces, or the sum total of priority- or equality-adjusted wellbeing. Multi-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on more than one aspect. They may, for instance, believe that the sum…Read more
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267A New Twist to the St. Petersburg ParadoxJournal of Philosophy 108 (12): 697-699. 2011.In this paper I add a new twist to Colyvan's version of the Petrograd paradox.
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80Pure time preferencePacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4): 490-508. 2011.Pure time preference is a preference for something to come at one point in time rather than another merely because of when it occurs in time. In opposition to Sidgwick, Ramsey, Rawls, and Parfit we argue that it is not always irrational to be guided by pure time preferences. We argue that even if the mere difference of location in time is not a rational ground for a preference, time may nevertheless be a normatively neutral ground for a preference, and this makes it plausible to claim that the p…Read more
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26What is the Point of Thinking of New Technologies as Social Experiments?Ethics, Policy and Environment 20 (1): 78-83. 2017.In this paper I respond to van de Poel’s claim that new technologies should be conceived as ongoing social experiments, which is an idea originally introduced by Schinzinger and Martin in the 1970s. I discuss and criticize three possible motivations for thinking of new technologies as ongoing social experiments.
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17Review of Paul Weirich, Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
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105The Mixed Solution to the Number ProblemJournal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2): 166-177. 2009.You must either save a group of m people or a group of n people. If there are no morally relevant diff erences among the people, which group should you save? is problem is known as the number problem. e recent discussion has focussed on three proposals: (i) Save the greatest number of people, (ii) Toss a fair coin, or (iii) Set up a weighted lottery, in which the probability of saving m people is m / m + n , and the probability of saving n people is n / m + n . is contribution examines a fourth …Read more
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509A Computer Simulation of the Argument from DisagreementSynthese 184 (3): 387-405. 2012.In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we wo…Read more
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131Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge AscriptionsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4): 817-834. 2016.It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-à-vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of one’s epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis “a cat is a cat” is harder to improve than one’s position vis-à-vis “a cat is on the mat”, and consequent…Read more
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84Theory of decision under uncertainty , itzak Gilboa. Cambridge university press, 2009. XIV + 215 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 26 (2): 254-258. 2010.
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Alumnus, 2003
College Station, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Technology Ethics |
Consequentialism |
Decision-Theoretic Frameworks |
St. Petersburg Paradox |