Jouko A Vaananen

The concept of a generalized quantifier of a given similarity type was defined in [12]. Our main result says that on finite structures different similarity types give rise to different classes of generalized quantifiers. More exactly, for every similarity typetthere is a generalized quantifier of typetwhich is not definable in the extension of first order logic by all generalized quantifiers of type smaller thant. This was proved for unary similarity types by Per Lindström [17] with a counting argument. We extend his method to arbitrary similarity types.

We study descriptive set theory in the space $^{\omega_1}\omega_1$ by letting trees with no uncountable branches play a similar role as countable ordinals in traditional descriptive set theory. By using such trees, we get, for example, a covering property for the class of $\Pi^1_1$-sets of $^{\omega_1}\omega_1$. We call a family $\mathscr{U}$ of trees universal for a class $\mathscr{V}$ of trees if $\mathscr{U} \subseteq \mathscr{V}$ and every tree in $\mathscr{V}$ can be order-preservingly mapped into a tree in $\mathscr{U}$. It is well known that the class of countable trees with no infinite branches has a universal family of size $\aleph_1$. We shall study the smallest cardinality of a universal family for the class of trees of cardinality $\leq\aleph_1$ with no uncountable branches. We prove that this cardinality can be 1 (under $\neg$CH) and any regular cardinal $\kappa$ which satisfies $\aleph_2 \leq \kappa \leq 2^{\aleph_1}$ (under CH). This bears immediately on the covering property of the $\Pi^1_1$-subsets of the space $^{\omega_1}\omega_1$. We also study the possible cardinalities of definable subsets of $^{\omega_1}\omega_1$. We show that the statement that every definable subset of $^{\omega_1}\omega_1$ has cardinality $

We show that the categoricity of second-order Peano axioms can be proved from the comprehension axioms. We also show that the categoricity of second-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms, given the order type of the ordinals, can be proved from the comprehension axioms. Thus these well-known categoricity results do not need the so-called “full” second-order logic, the Henkin second-order logic is enough. We also address the question of “consistency” of these axiom systems in the second-order sense, that is, the question of existence of models for these systems. In both cases we give a consistency proof, but naturally we have to assume more than the mere comprehension axioms

A logical approach to Bell's Inequalities of quantum mechanics has been introduced by Abramsky and Hardy [2]. We point out that the logical Bell's Inequalities of [2] are provable in the probability logic of Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo [4]. Since it is now considered empirically established that quantum mechanics violates Bell's Inequalities, we introduce a modified probability logic, that we call quantum team logic, in which Bell's Inequalities are not provable, and prove a Completeness Theorem for this logic. For this end we generalise the team semantics of dependence logic [7] first to probabilistic team semantics, and then to what we call quantum team semantics.

Oikkonen, J. and J. Väänänen, Game-theoretic inductive definability, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 65 265-306. We use game-theoretic ideas to define a generalization of the notion of inductive definability. This approach allows induction along non-well-founded trees. Our definition depends on an underlying partial ordering of the objects. In this ordering every countable ascending sequence is assumed to have a unique supremum which enables us to go over limits. We establish basic properties of this induction and examine examples where it emerges naturally. In the main results we prove an abstract Kleene Theorem and restricted versions of the Stage-Comparison Theorem and the Reduction Theorem

We study definability in terms of monotone generalized quantifiers satisfying Isomorphism Closure, Conservativity and Extension. Among the quantifiers with the latter three properties - here called CE quantifiers - one finds the interpretations of determiner phrases in natural languages. The property of monotonicity is also linguistically ubiquitous, though some determiners like an even number of are highly non-monotone. They are nevertheless definable in terms of monotone CE quantifiers: we give a necessary and sufficient condition for such definability. We further identify a stronger form of monotonicity, called smoothness, which also has linguistic relevance, and we extend our considerations to smooth quantifiers. The results lead us to propose two tentative universals concerning monotonicity and natural language quantification. The notions involved as well as our proofs are presented using a graphical representation of quantifiers in the so-called number triangle

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle.

A fundamental notion in a large part of mathematics is the notion of equicardinality. The language with Hartig quantifier is, roughly speaking, a first-order language in which the notion of equicardinality is expressible. Thus this language, denoted by LI, is in some sense very natural and has in consequence special interest. Properties of LI are studied in many papers. In [BF, Chapter VI] there is a short survey of some known results about LI. We feel that a more extensive exposition of these results is needed. The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the present knowledge about the language LI and list a selection of open problems concerning it. After the Introduction $(\S1)$ , in $\S\S2$ and 3 we give the fundamental results about LI. In $\S4$ the known model-theoretic properties are discussed. The next section is devoted to properties of mathematical theories in LI. In $\S6$ the spectra of sentences of LI are discussed, and $\S7$ is devoted to properties of LI which depend on set-theoretic assumptions. The paper finishes with a list of open problem and an extensive bibliography. The bibliography contains not only papers we refer to but also all papers known to us containing results about the language with Hartig quantifier. Contents. $\S1$ . Introduction. $\S2$ . Preliminaries. $\S3$ . Basic results. $\S4$ . Model-theoretic properties of $LI. \S5$ . Decidability of theories with $I. \S6$ . Spectra of LI- sentences. $\S7$ . Independence results. $\S8$ . What is not yet known about LI. Bibliography