Jouko A Vaananen

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small.

We define a logic capable of expressing dependence of a variable on designated variables only. Thus has similar goals to the Henkin quantifiers of [4] and the independence friendly logic of [6] that it much resembles. The logic achieves these goals by realizing the desired dependence declarations of variables on the level of atomic formulas. By [3] and [17], ability to limit dependence relations between variables leads to existential second order expressive power. Our avoids some difficulties arising in the original independence friendly logic from coupling the dependence declarations with existential quantifiers. As is the case with independence friendly logic, truth of is definable inside . We give such a definition for in the spirit of [11] and [2] and [1]

We discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory and second-order logic are not radically different: the latter is a major fragment of the former

A fundamental notion in a large part of mathematics is the notion of equicardinality. The language with Hartig quantifier is, roughly speaking, a first-order language in which the notion of equicardinality is expressible. Thus this language, denoted by LI, is in some sense very natural and has in consequence special interest. Properties of LI are studied in many papers. In [BF, Chapter VI] there is a short survey of some known results about LI. We feel that a more extensive exposition of these results is needed. The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the present knowledge about the language LI and list a selection of open problems concerning it. After the Introduction $(\S1)$ , in $\S\S2$ and 3 we give the fundamental results about LI. In $\S4$ the known model-theoretic properties are discussed. The next section is devoted to properties of mathematical theories in LI. In $\S6$ the spectra of sentences of LI are discussed, and $\S7$ is devoted to properties of LI which depend on set-theoretic assumptions. The paper finishes with a list of open problem and an extensive bibliography. The bibliography contains not only papers we refer to but also all papers known to us containing results about the language with Hartig quantifier. Contents. $\S1$ . Introduction. $\S2$ . Preliminaries. $\S3$ . Basic results. $\S4$ . Model-theoretic properties of $LI. \S5$ . Decidability of theories with $I. \S6$ . Spectra of LI- sentences. $\S7$ . Independence results. $\S8$ . What is not yet known about LI. Bibliography

In so-called full second-order logic, the second-order variables range over all subsets and relations of the domain in question. In so-called Henkin second-order logic, every model is endowed with a set of subsets and relations which will serve as the range of the second-order variables. In our Boolean-valued second-order logic, the second-order variables range over all Boolean-valued subsets and relations on the domain. We show that under large cardinal assumptions Boolean-valued second-order logic is more robust than full second-order logic. Its validity is absolute under forcing, and its Hanf and Löwenheim numbers are smaller than those of full second-order logic

In this paper (except in Section 5) all quantifiers are assumedto be so called simple unaryquantifiers, and all models are assumedto be finite. We give a necessary and sufficientcondition for a quantifier to be definablein terms of monotone quantifiers. For amonotone quantifier we give a necessaryand sufficient condition for beingdefinable in terms of a given set of bounded monotonequantifiers. Finally, we give a necessaryand sufficient condition for a monotonequantifier to be definable in terms of agiven monotone quantifier.Our analysis shows that the quantifierat least one half and its relatives behavedifferently than other monotone quantifiers.

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle.

We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L, a logic introduced in [5] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy.

Let U and B be two countable relational models of the same first order language. If the models are nonisomorphic, there is a unique countable ordinal α with the property that $\mathfrak{U} \equiv^\alpha_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B} \text{but not} \mathfrak{U} \equiv^{\alpha + 1}_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B},$ i.e. U and B are L ∞ω -equivalent up to quantifier-rank α but not up to α + 1. In this paper we consider models U and B of cardinality ω 1 and construct trees which have a similar relation to U and B as α above. For this purpose we introduce a new ordering T ≪ T' of trees, which may have some independent interest of its own. It turns out that the above ordinal α has two qualities which coincide in countable models but will differ in uncountable models. Respectively, two kinds of trees emerge from α. We call them Scott trees and Karp trees, respectively. The definition and existence of these trees is based on an examination of the Ehrenfeucht game of length ω 1 between U and B. We construct two models of power ω 1 with 2 ω 1 mutually noncomparable Scott trees