• English speakers should use "I" to refer to themselves
    In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  103
    Names, fictional names, and 'really'
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1). 1999.
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives no…Read more
  •  599
    The essence of reference
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), he Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    People use words and concepts to refer to things. There are agents who refer, there are acts of referring, and there are tools to refer with: words and concepts. Reference is a relation between people and things, and also between words or concepts and things, and perhaps it involves all three things at once. It is not just any relation between an action or word and a thing; the list of things which can refer, people, words and concepts, is probably not complete ; and a complete account would nee…Read more
  •  14
    Russell
    Philosophical Review 91 (1): 121. 1982.
  •  60
    Is There Higher-order Vagueness?
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163): 167-182. 1991.
    I argue against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries. This conception cannot properly account for "higher-order vagueness." I discuss in detail claims by Crispin Wright about "definitely," and its connection with higher-order vagueness. Contrary to Wright, I argue that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp. I suggest a new conception of classification: many concepts classify without drawing boundarie…Read more
  •  1
    Rejoinder To S A Rasmussen's Sainsbury On A Fregean Argument
    Analysis 44 (June): 111-113. 1984.
  • GRATTAN-GUINNESS, I. "Dear Russell-Dear Fourdain" (review)
    Mind 88 (n/a): 604. 1979.
  •  114
    Review: Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4). 1996.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth\nand Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a\npluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not\nentail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to\ndifferent things for different kinds of subject matter no\nmore entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence\namounts to different things for different kinds of entity.\nTurning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially\nsatisfied: if I judge that p…Read more
  •  2
    Evans, G. "The Varieties of Reference" (review)
    Mind 94 (n/a): 120. 1985.
  •  22
    Bertrand Arthur William Russell
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 20 217-218. 1986.
    Bertrand Russell , born in Trelleck, Wales, was the grandson of the first Earl Russell, who introduced the Reform Bill of 1832 and served as prime minister under Queen Victoria. He studied mathematics and philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge, 1890–1894, was a Fellow of Trinity College, 1895–1901, a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1908, and was a lecturer in philosophy, 1910–1916. Among his publications in philosophy in this period were An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry , A Critical Expo…Read more
  • Language and meaning
    In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues in Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
  •  795
    Two ways to smoke a cigarette
    Ratio 14 (4). 2001.
    In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist …Read more
  •  71
    Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth
    Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3): 97-106. 1986.
    No abstract
  •  51
    Semantics by Proxy
    Analysis 37 (2). 1977.
    Many theories provide semantics for English by proxy of semantics for the "logical form" of English sentences. The paper presents a dilemma: if there is no algorithm for moving between English and logical form, English itself has not been given a semantic theory. But if there is an algorithm, it can be incorporated in the theory, which would then apply directly to English. In the worst case, logical form is an obstacle to providing semantics for English. In the best case, it is unnecessary.
  •  597
    Representing unicorns: how to think about intensionality
    In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics, College Publications. 2012.
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of re…Read more
  •  73
    IX*—Understanding and Theories of Meaning
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1): 127-144. 1980.
    R. M. Sainsbury; IX*—Understanding and Theories of Meaning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pages 127–144, https://doi.
  •  60
    Russell on Acquaintance
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 219-244. 1986.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy (PP), acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.
  •  76
    Fiction and Acceptance-Relative Truth, Belief and Assertion
    In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction, Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--137. 2010.
  •  4
    Philosophical logic
    In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: a guide through the subject, Oxford University Press. 1995.
  •  35
    Evans envisaged a language containing both Russellian and descriptive names. A language with descriptive names, which can contribute to truth conditions even if they have no bearer, needs a free logical truth theory. But a metalanguage with this logic threatens to emasculate Russellian names. The paper details this problem and shows, on Evans's behalf, how it might be resolved.
  •  117
  •  37
    Austerity and Openness
    In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and his critics, Blackwell. pp. 6--1. 2006.
    Article
  •  16
    III*—Tolerating Vagueness
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 33-48. 1989.
    R. M. Sainsbury; III*—Tolerating Vagueness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 33–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.