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Mark Sainsbury

University of Texas at Austin
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University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1970
Homepage
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
M&E, Misc
1 more
  •  604
    Representing unicorns: how to think about intensionality
    In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics, College Publications. 2012.
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of re…Read more
    Intensionality and Opacity
  •  73
    IX*—Understanding and Theories of Meaning
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1): 127-144. 1980.
    R. M. Sainsbury; IX*—Understanding and Theories of Meaning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pages 127–144, https://doi.
    MeaningLogical Form
  •  51
    Semantics by Proxy
    Analysis 37 (2). 1977.
    Many theories provide semantics for English by proxy of semantics for the "logical form" of English sentences. The paper presents a dilemma: if there is no algorithm for moving between English and logical form, English itself has not been given a semantic theory. But if there is an algorithm, it can be incorporated in the theory, which would then apply directly to English. In the worst case, logical form is an obstacle to providing semantics for English. In the best case, it is unnecessary.
    Semantic Theories, Misc
  •  76
    Fiction and Acceptance-Relative Truth, Belief and Assertion
    In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction, Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--137. 2010.
    Assertion
  •  61
    Russell on Acquaintance
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 219-244. 1986.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy (PP), acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.