•  32
    Reasons Internalism
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 324-339. 2017.
  •  31
    Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2): 476-487. 2020.
  •  23
    There are parallel debates in metaethics and aesthetics about the rational merits of deferring to others about ethics and aesthetics. In both areas it is common to think that there is something amiss about deference. A popular explanation of this in aesthetics appeals to the importance of aesthetic acquaintance. This kind of explanation has not been explored much in ethics. This chapter defends a unified account of what is amiss about ethical and aesthetic deference. According to this account, d…Read more
  •  23
    From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2): 365-377. 2014.
    Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for conciliationism appeal to a principle Christensen [2011] dubs Independence. Independence says that evaluations of the beliefs of those with whom one disagrees should not be made on the basis of one's initial reasoning about p. In this paper, I show that this principle is false. I also show that two weaker pri…Read more
  •  22
    Précis of The Importance of Being Rational
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2): 452-456. 2020.
  •  20
    The Nature of Perceptual Expertise and the Rationality of Criticism
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. 2019.
  •  19
    Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10. 2015.
    Objectivists about obligation hold that obligations are determined by all of the normatively relevant facts. Perspectivalists, on the other hand, hold that only facts within one’s perspective can determine what we are obligated to do. This chapter argues for a perspectivalist view. It argues that what you are obligated to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess. This view is anchored in the thought that our obligations have to be action-guiding in a certain sense—we have to be able…Read more
  •  16
    The real symmetry problem for wide-scope accounts of rationality
    Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 443-464. 2014.
    You are irrational when you are akratic. On this point most agree. Despite this agreement, there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is. Narrow-scopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrow-scope conditional requirement. You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x. Wide-scopers disagree. They think that a conditional you are required to make true is false…Read more
  •  12
    Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. forthcoming.
    Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.
  •  6
    Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas
    In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.
  •  6
    This paper is about the epistemology of perceptual experiences that have enriched high-level content. Enriched high-level content is content about features other than shape, color, and spatial relations that has a particular etiology. Its etiology runs through states of the agent that process other perceptual content and output sensory content about high-level features. My main contention is that the justification provided by such experiences (for claims about the high-level content) is not foun…Read more
  •  1
    On Suspending Properly
    In Luis Oliveria & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification, Routledge. forthcoming.
    We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.