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142The Commonsense Case for Ethical VegetarianismBetween the Species: A Journal of Ethics 19 (1): 2-31. 2016.The article defends ethical vegetarianism, which, for present purposes, is stipulatively taken to be the view that it is morally wrong to eat animals when equally nutritious plant-based foods are available. Several examples are introduced to show that we all agree that animals deserve some direct moral consideration and to help identify and clarify several commonsense moral principles—principles we all accept. These principles are then used to argue that eating animals is morally wrong. Since yo…Read more
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1856VegetarianismEncyclopedia of Global Bioethics. 2016.Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism is morally required. The principal reasons offered in support of ethical vegetarianism are: (i) concern for the welfare and well-being of the animals being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment, (iii) concern over global food scarcity and the just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern for future generations. Each of these reasons is explored in turn, starting with a historical look at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of animals.
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859Epistemic LuckInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1-41. 2011.Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; for example, an optimist’s belief that it will not rain may luckily tu…Read more
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112The problem of other minds: A reliable solutionActa Analytica 11 87-109. 1996.Paul Churchland characterizes the "epistemological problem" in philosophy of mind as the problem "concerned with how we come to have knowledge of the internal activities of conscious, intelligent minds." This problem is itself divided into two separate, but related problems: (1) the problem of self-consciousness -- that of determining how one comes to have knowledge of one's own mental states, and (2) the problem of other minds -- that of explaining how one can ever come to know that something o…Read more
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4Review of Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2). 2009.
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3The Commonsense Case against Animal ExperimentationIn Jeremy R. Garrett (ed.), The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy, Mit Press. pp. 215-236. 2012.
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45Bernstein on Moral Status and the Comparative Value of LivesJournal of Animal Ethics 7 (2): 204. 2017.By stipulation, the Human Superiority Thesis [HST] consists of two claims: (1) the interests of humans should be given preferential consideration relative to the like interests of nonhuman animals, and (2) the lives of humans are more valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In his recent book, Mark Bernstein argues that both claims are false. I present and assess Bernstein’s main arguments, pointing out where they succeed and where they fall short. I then suggest ways of shoring up and stre…Read more
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126The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World SkepticismSouthwest Philosophy Review 21 (1): 163-178. 2005.
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88Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of KnowledgeDissertation, The University of Arizona. 1988.Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that …Read more
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Zebras and Cleverly Disguised MulesIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A companion to epistemology, second edition, Blackwell. pp. 788-793. 2010.
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2Epistemic LuckIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A companion to epistemology, second edition, Blackwell. pp. 336-340. 2010.
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5The Philosophy of Animal Rights: A Brief Introduction for Students and TeachersLantern Books. 2010.The book also contains an extensive bibliography of references and philosophical resources.
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3Review of Practical Ethics, 3rd Edition by Peter Singer1 (review)American Journal of Bioethics 11 (12): 73-75. 2011.
DeKalb, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |