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487The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World SkepticismSouthwest Philosophy Review 21 (1): 163-178. 2005.
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224Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of KnowledgeDissertation, The University of Arizona. 1988.Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that …Read more
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Zebras and Cleverly Disguised MulesIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition, Oxford. pp. 788-793. 2010.
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2Epistemic LuckIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition, Blackwell. pp. 336-340. 2010.
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111The Philosophy of Animal Rights: A Brief Introduction for Students and TeachersLantern Books. 2010.The book also contains an extensive bibliography of references and philosophical resources.
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20Review of Practical Ethics, 3rd Edition by Peter Singer1 (review)American Journal of Bioethics 11 (12): 73-75. 2011.
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214Is epistemic luck compatible with knowledge?Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 59-75. 1992.
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6727The Immorality of Eating MeatChapter in The Moral Life 856-889. 2000.Unlike other ethical arguments for veganism, the argument advanced is not predicated on the wrongness of speciesism, nor does it depend on your believing that all animals are equal or that all animals have a right to life, nor is it predicated on some highly contentious metaethical theory which you reject. Rather, it is predicated on your beliefs. Simply put, the argument shows that even those of you who are steadfastly committed to valuing humans over nonhumans are nevertheless committed to the…Read more
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54Do Animals Have Rights and Does It Matter if They Don't?In Mylan Engel & Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals, Lexington. pp. 39-64. 2016.
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The Kiefer ArgumentIn Wolfgang Leopold Gombocz (ed.), Philosophy of Religion, D. Reidel [distributor]. 1984.
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94Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress ProblemMetaphilosophy 45 (2): 146-160. 2014.As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type-(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxast…Read more
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398A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic dataActa Analytica 20 (2): 56-79. 2005.The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp -falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies [NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies [PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rul…Read more
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Paul Warren TaylorIn Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 2, Gale Cengage Learning. pp. 302-304. 2008.
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42Russellizing Russell: A reply to his “a critique of Lehrer's coherentism”Philosophical Studies 66 (1). 1992.
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15InconsistencyGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 113-130. 1991.The relationship between inconsistency and Lehrerian coherence is scrutinized. Like most coherence theorists of epistemic justification, Lehrer contends that consistency is necessary for coherence. Despite this contention, minimally inconsistent belief-sets prove coherent and rationally acceptable on Lehrer's account of coherence. Lehrer is left with the following dilemma: If consistency is necessary for coherence, then (i) he must revise his account of coherence accordingly and, more importantl…Read more
DeKalb, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |