-
111Responding to NormativityIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. pp. 220-239. 2007.This paper defends the view that normative force depends on desire, by sketching an Argument from Voluntary Response which attempts to establish this dependence by appeal to the autonomous character of our experience of normative authority, and the voluntary character of our responses to it. I first offer an account of desiring as mentally aiming intrinsically at some end. I then argue that behaviour is only voluntary if it results from such aiming; hence all voluntary behaviour is produced by d…Read more
-
101What might but must not beAnalysis 80 (4): 647-656. 2020.We examine an objection to analysing the epistemic ‘might’ and ‘may’ as existential quantifiers over possibilities. Some claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to the quantifier analysis, they are necessarily false, since there are no possibilities in which the proposition is true. We explain such cases pragmatically, relying on the fact that ‘might’-sentences are standardly used to convey that the speaker takes a proposition as a serious option in re…Read more
-
94Review of John F. Horty, Reasons as Defaults (review)Philosophical Review 124 (2): 286-289. 2015.Review of J.F. Horty, REASONS AS DEFAULTS.
-
90Review: Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (review)Ethics 125 (4): 1219-1225. 2015.
-
89Deontic Modality Today: IntroductionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4): 421-423. 2014.Introduction to a special issue of PPQ of papers from a conference on deontic modality held at USC in 2013.
-
89Reply to Worsnip, Dowell, and KoehnAnalysis 80 (1): 131-147. 2020.This paper responds to comments on my 2014 book Confusion of Tongues by Alex Worsnip, Janice Dowell, and Glen Koehn. I first address Worsnip’s case for contextualism without relativism. Next I address Dowell’s and Worsnip’s scepticism about whether COT succeeds in providing an analytic reduction of the normative, and Dowell’s recommendation to pursue an alternative, synthetic method. I then consider Worsnip’s comments on COT’s implications for normative ethical theory, and end by responding to …Read more
-
79The Pragmatics of Normative DisagreementIn Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge (eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 124-148. 2014.Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem because normative sentences are relativized to different information in contexts of deliberation and advice. This paper argues that a relational theory provides a pragmatic solution that accounts for some disagreements as involving inconsistent preferences rather than beliefs. This is shown to be superior to the semantic solution offered by expre…Read more
-
65Review of Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4). 2006.
-
57What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of ValueDissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 2001.Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called "value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that s…Read more
-
43OughtIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.Encyclopedia article on the meaning of 'ought'.
-
39Correction to: What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach itSynthese 200 (3): 1-2. 2022.
-
36Price, A. W., Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, xxxiv + 208, US$70 (cloth) (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 187-190. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
-
30Reasons as Defaults (review)Philosophical Review 124 (2): 286-289. 2015.Review of Jeff Horty's book REASONS AS DEFAULTS (OUP 2012)
-
13Correction: The Conversational Practicality of Value JudgementThe Journal of Ethics 27 (2): 231-232. 2023.
-
Against all reason? : scepticism about the instrumental normIn Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on motivation and virtue, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
Oakleigh, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normativity |
Practical Reason |
Moral Psychology |