Nick Trakakis

In this exchange, Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis discuss the problem of natural evil in the light of the recent Asian tsunami disaster. The exchange begins with an extract from a newspaper article written by Coghlan on the tsunami, followed by three rounds of replies and counter-replies, and ending with some final comments from Trakakis. While critical of any attempt to show that human life is good overall despite its natural evils, Coghlan argues that instances of natural evil, even horrific ones, can be justified as the unavoidable by-product of a natural system on which human life and culture depends. Trakakis, however, rejects this view, counselling instead a degree of skepticism about our ability to construct a plausible theodicy for horrific evil.

Nicholas Rescher is well-known for the breadth of his philosophical corpus, covering fields as diverse as medieval Arabic logic, process metaphysics, philosophy of science, and value theory. But one of his greatest preoccupations and passions throughout his career has been the life and thought of G.W. Leibniz. Indeed, as a result of his intimate familiarity with Leibniz and Leibniz’s historical milieu, Rescher invariably provides us with a clear, rigorous, and sympathetic treatment of Leibniz’s texts, and the present book under review is no exception.

Both critics and advocates of evidential arguments from evil often assume that theistic belief is not compatible with gratuitous evil. It is often assumed, in other words, that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being would not permit an evil unless he had a morally sufficient reason to permit it. However, this cornerstone of evidential arguments from evil has come under increasing fire of late, in particular by Peter van Inwagen. The aim of this paper is to outline and then assess van Inwagen’s attempt to reconcile theism with gratuitous evil

This paper examines the evidential argument from evil put forward by William Rowe during his early and middle periods . Having delineated some of the important features of Rowe’s argument, it is then assessed in the light of “the skeptical theist critique.” According to skeptical theists, Rowe’s crucial inference from inscrutable evil to pointless evil can be exposed as unwarranted, particularly by appealing to the disparity between our cognitive abilities and the infinite wisdom of God. However, by relating the problem of evil to that of divine hiddenness, the adverse consequences and hence the highly dubious nature of this skeptical theist position are brought to light.