Nick Trakakis

The History of Western Philosophy of Religion brings together an international team of over 100 leading scholars to provide authoritative exposition of how history's most important philosophical thinkers - from antiquity to the present day - have sought to analyse the concepts and tenets central to Western religious belief, especially Christianity. Divided chronologically into five volumes, The History of Western Philosophy of Religion is designed to be accessible to a wide range of readers, from the scholar looking for original insight and the latest research findings to the student wishing for a masterly encapsulation of a particular philosopher's views. Together these volumes provide an indispensable resource for anyone conducting research or teaching in the philosophy of religion and related fields, such as theology, religious studies, the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas. Volume 3 covers the early modern period which witnessed a revolution in science and natural philosophy that swept away two millennia of Aristotelian certainty in a human-centred universe. Covering some of the most important figures in the history of Western thought - notably Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant - Early Modern Philosophy of Religion charts the philosophical understanding of religion at a time of intellectual and spiritual revolution.

The Medieval period was one of the richest eras for the philosophical study of religion. Covering the period from the 6th to the 16th century, reaching into the Renaissance, "The History of Western Philosophy of Religion 2" shows how Christian, Islamic and Jewish thinkers explicated and defended their religious faith in light of the philosophical traditions they inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans. The enterprise of 'faith seeking understanding', as it was dubbed by the medievals themselves, emerges as a vibrant encounter between - and a complex synthesis of - the Platonic, Aristotelian and Hellenistic traditions of antiquity on the one hand, and the scholastic and monastic religious schools of the medieval West, on the other. "Medieval Philosophy of Religion" will be of interest to scholars and students of Philosophy, Medieval Studies, the History of Ideas, and Religion, while remaining accessible to any interested in the rich cultural heritage of medieval religious thought.

One of those rare questions in philosophy that is not only technically recalcitrant but also engages the hearts and minds of the broad community is the so-called ‘problem of evil’: how can the existence of an absolutely perfect God be reconciled with the existence of suffering and evil? This problem has exercised the finest minds across the centuries, from ancient to modern times. In contemporary philosophy, however, the debate has petrified into a select number of entrenched and defensive strategies. This volume opens the way for a wholesale reconsideration of the problem of evil. Eight prominent philosophers of religion have been invited to engage in critical but friendly dialogue, and to develop and contest both traditional and relatively unorthodox approaches. What emerges from these exchanges is a diversity of fruitful and innovative ways of thinking about God and evil, proving that the problem of evil is far from exhausted.

I argue for a significant slowing down in philosophy. In today’s hectic world, the ‘slow movement’ has had a salutary effect in a variety of domains, from mental health to food and music. But the academic world, philosophy included, has yet to catch on. And this, in spite of the fact that university culture has become increasingly focused on productivity and performance, thus creating a managerialist ethos and an “academic Darwinism” where scholars are placed under pressure to “publish or perish”, with little opportunity to allow their thoughts to mature organically. In response to this commodification of philosophy, I offer an alternative: ‘slow philosophy’. Inspired by the Greco-Roman ideal of philosophy as a ‘way of life’, the goal in such philosophizing is not only to inform but to transform every aspect of one’s being, to achieve the kind of wisdom which brings peace of mind and inner freedom, as well as deeper understanding. But this requires a slowing down: taking time with the texts we read and write, making time to read and re-read, not forcing the meaning or desiring immediate comprehension, not philosophizing in haste but in grace, in a wondering spirit of contemplative open-endedness and receptivity to the other – thereby opposing the current regime of seeking to get everything done at once.

Taking as its starting-point Eva Illouz's sociological study Why Love Hurts, this paper develops a philosophical framework for understanding love and marriage, particularly in their contemporary manifestations. To begin with, premodern practices in love and marriage during the ancient Greek and Byzantine eras are outlined and contrasted with modern forms of love, whose overriding features are suffering and disappointment. To cast some light upon this great transformation in the fortunes of love the discussion takes an axiological and metaphysical turn by placing the transformation within the context of the kind of relational morality and metaphysics proposed by many idealist philosophers.

The problem of evil is regularly regarded as posing a serious threat to theistic belief. However, contemporary philosophers of religion have overlooked the ways in which this problem has been, or could be, handled by theists committed to the metaphysics of idealism. In seeking to redress this lacuna, I turn to the systems of the British idealists, popular in the late nineteenth century though now out of favour, and in particular the work of F.H. Bradley, while also drawing parallels with the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. The central argument of this paper is that these idealist traditions have greater resources to adequately deal with the problem of evil than comparatively mainstream theist views. While standard forms of theism struggle to make sense of the facts of evil, or are even resoundly defeated by them, the conception of divinity suggested or developed by the British idealists offers possibilities for innovative and fruitful ways of thinking about the relationship between God and evil.

An aspect of the question of the relationship between reason and faith concerns the compatibility between philosophy and religious commitment. I begin by considering some attempts that have been made in both the analytic and Continental traditions to divorce philosophy from the life of religious faith as far as possible: in particular, I discuss Martin Heidegger’s critique of the very idea of a ‘Christian philosophy’ and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Aquinas for not living up to the Socratic ideal of following the argument wherever it leads. I then seek further to develop these criticisms by reviewing the current debate around the problem of evil in philosophy of religion as a case study of the dangers and drawbacks of religious commitment in philosophy. I conclude with some comments on the connection between ideology and philosophy, and claim that much of what passes as Christian philosophy is ideological as opposed to rational or truth-seeking in character.

Metaphilosophy is typically concerned with such questions as the goals of philosophy, the relations between philosophy and the arts and sciences, the methods of argumentation and tools of analysis employed by philosophers, major trends and schools of thought, the prospects for progress and future directions. But one topic that has been consistently overlooked in these discussions is that of the temporality, or pace and tempo, of philosophy. Initially this may seem a relatively insignificant topic and therefore one that has been justifiably passed over. The tempo of philosophy, however, relates in quite direct ways to the nature of philosophical practice and how this has been shaped by wider social currents and changes – matters that are of crucial concern to metaphilosophy. Most of us, for example, are keenly aware that modern life is fast and frenzied, and its busy-ness appears only to be accelerating. How has this impacted upon the ways in which philosophy is understood and produced? Does the fast pace of contemporary life compel us to reevaluate not only our ways of living but also our ways of thinking as philosophers? In response to such questions, I propose that philosophy is in urgent need of slowing down, and to this end I develop what might be called a ‘Slow Philosophy’.

This paper contests an important assumption guiding Alexander Pruss’ One Body, that marriage is intimately connected with love, including romantic love. This assumption, I argue, is the product in part of a distinctively modern understanding of marriage. To show this, Pruss’ position is set against the premodern, and in particular the Byzantine Christian, view and practice of marriage, where marriage was not grounded to any significant extent on love. Finally, some indication is provided as to why romantic love was disassociated from marriage in medieval Christian culture.

Philosophy of religion, in both its analytic and Continental streams, has been undergoing a renewal for some time now, and I seek to explore this transformation in the fortunes of the discipline by looking at how truth – and religious truth in particular – is conceptualised in both strands of philosophy. I begin with an overview of the way in which truth has been commonly understood across nearly all groups within the analytic tradition, and I will underscore the difficulties and shortcomings of the analytic approach by comparing it with a Continental, and specifically Heideggerian, approach. I then proceed to a conception of truth that is even further removed from the analytic tradition, one that is prominent in the theology of Christianity and which identifies truth with Christ. The point of this detour through divergent understandings of truth is to show how philosophy of religion, whether analytic or Continental, remains entrenched in forms of thinking that will need to be overcome if it is to have a credible future.

A theodicy is the attempt to discern God's reasons for permitting evil, whereas the antitheodicy view rejects all such attempts outright. This chapter explores two sets of arguments that could be offered in support of antitheodicy. The first group of arguments concerns the morality of theodicy, and seeks to show that theodicy‐making conflicts with or undermines central aspects of morality – for example, the motivation to fight against gratuitous evil. The second group of arguments point out nonmoral (e.g., conceptual or metaphysical) failings in theodicy, such as the unduly anthropomorphic notion of God usually at work in theodicies.

Timothy Knepper’s book is divided into two parts, the first and more critical of which seeks to uncover the limits and weaknesses of analytic and continental philosophy of religion, while the second and more constructive section seeks to develop an alternative and more fruitful way of practising philosophy of religion, “one that is historically grounded and religiously diverse” (p. xiii). Much of the impetus behind the book derives from feelings of dismay and dissatisfaction, familiar especially to religious studies scholars, over the fact that “philosophy of religion often takes as its primary object of inquiry either ahistorical theism or postmodern philosophy, not the religions of the world in their historical complexity and cultural diversity” (p. ix). I found this to be a clear, well-argued and often provocative book, but also one flawed in some respects in its attempt to renew and reconceive the philosophy of religion.The starting-point of Chapter 1 (The End and Ends of Philosoph

Questions of style are often deemed of marginal importance in philosophy, as well as in metaphilosophical debates concerning the analytic/Continental divide. I take issue with this common tendency by showing how style – suitably conceived not merely as a way of writing, but as a form of expression intimately linked to a form of life – occupies a central role in philosophy. After providing an analysis of the concept of style, I take a fresh look at the analytic/Continental division by examining the various stylistic differences between philosophers on each side. Despite these differences, I argue, both sides of the divide suffer from a common stylistic deficiency, and if this deficiency were rectified the gulf separating the two traditions may not appear as insurmountable as it presently does. To show this, I draw principally from the philosophy of religion, a field that has recently experienced a renewal in both the analytic and Continental traditions.