Jerrold Levinson

The complex relationship between life and the arts has always Vbeen a crucial topic in philosophical discourse. The essays in this book discuss fundamental issues of modern and contemporary aesthetics, drawing upon the work of the French philosopher Jean- Pierre Cometti, a key fi gure in the studies of aesthetics, pragmatism, and Austrian philosophy. The volume covers a wide-range of topics, from the examination of fundamental principles of art and literary criticism to a new understanding of the Modernist notion of art. It proposes an anthropological aesthetics using Musil's The Man Without Qualities or the analysis of literary characters such as Tolstoj's Hadji Murat and Cervantes' Don Quixote as a tool to cast light on themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Editors Carla Carmona and Jerrold Levinson have brought together renowned voices in the field of philosophy to offer a window onto Cometti's philosophical work, as well as an in-depth analysis of contemporary artistic and aesthetic practices, in an effort to overcome what can sometimes appear as a gulf between art and life.

In this essay I try to identify what is specific to jazz – or at least, mainstream or core jazz – from the point of view of its expression. Along the way I address the vexing question of the essence of jazz, and briefly explicate the concept of musical expression of emotion that I am working with. I next postulate a Gestalt of jazz, which I attempt to circumscribe both through its underlying musical characteristics and the use of paradigm examples, and suggest that such a Gestalt comports well with the expression of certain emotions and comports ill with the expression of other emotions. Before concluding I discuss the question of the expressive specificity of all genres of music.

Résumé Pouvons-nous trouver une plaisanterie raciste ou sexiste à la fois drôle et moralement condamnable? Certains répondent « non », soit en tentant de montrer que l’immoralité disparaît dans le contexte de la plaisanterie, soit en soutenant que de telles plaisanteries ne sont pas réellement drôles ou ne devraient pas être trouvées telles. L’article soutient au contraire que oui! Et c’est de la mauvaise foi que de ne pas le reconnaître. La question est alors de savoir si leur immoralité nuit à leur drôlerie et, plus largement, à leur valeur. Encore oui! Dans un dialogue critique avec les travaux de Ted Cohen, de Berys Gaut et de Noël Carroll, il montre que nous rions de ces plaisanteries lorsque nous faisons nôtres, au moins provisoirement, les stéréotypes blâmables qu’elles véhiculent et que, en même temps, nous nous sentons coupables de le faire.