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373Self-deception and the nature of mindIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 63--91. 1994.
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Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awarenessIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awarenessIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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53. Self-Deception and the Nature of MindIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 63-91. 1988.
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131Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our MindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2): 233-268. 2007.
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260Subjectivism and unmaskingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1): 187-201. 2004.Barry Stroud’s The Quest for Reality is a fine book that requires and repays several re-readings. Among the book’s many virtues is its appropriate skepticism towards the metaphysical ambition to treat some basic physical science as a fundamental ontology, an exhaustive account of what there is and how it hangs together. When Galileo concluded that mathematics was the key to the labyrinth of nature, he was prepared to treat all qualitative aspects of reality as sensational effects produced in us …Read more
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2Postscript: Visual experienceIn Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color, Mit Press. 1997.
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179Is affect always mere effect?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1): 225-228. 2001.Ralph Wedgwood balks at my argument at three significant points. I have some brief, and I hope helpful, reactions to the resistance that he offers.
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140Is There a Problem About Persistence?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1): 107-156. 1987.
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217Are manifest qualities response-dependent?The Monist 81 (1): 3--43. 1998.The world-view to which the long arc of modern philosophy since Descartes bends is Materialism With A Bad Conscience, a Materialism continually bedeviled by the need to deal with apparently irreducible mental items. I believe this world-view to be the offspring of an introjective error; in effect, the mentalization of sensible form, finality and value. Hence the characteristic modernist accusation is that when we take sensible form, finality and value to be genuine features of the manifest we ar…Read more
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4Constitution and IdentityIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
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914The obscure object of hallucinationPhilosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 113-83. 2004.Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend wh…Read more
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747Particulars and PersistenceDissertation, Princeton University. 1983.The thesis is concerned with the outline of an ontology which admits only particulars and with the persistence of particulars through time. In Chapter 1 it is argued that a neglected class of particulars--the cases--have to be employed in order to solve the problem of universals, i.e., to give a satisfactory account of properties and kinds. In Chapter 2, two ways in which particulars could persist though time are distinguished. Difficulties are raised for the view that everything perdures throug…Read more
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14Relativism and the SelfIn Michael Krausz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, Notre Dame University Press. pp. 441-472. 1989.
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14Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationismIn John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130. 1993.
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96Constitution Is Not IdentityIn Michael Cannon Rea (ed.), Material Constitution: A Reader, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 44-62. 1997.
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