Somogy Varga

This article suggests that an account of pretence based on the idea of shared intentionality can be of help in understanding autism. In autism, there seems to be a strong link between being able to engage in pretend play, understanding the minds of others and having adequate access to own mental states. Since one of the first behavioral manifestations of autism is the lack of pretend play, it therefore seems natural to investigate pretence in order to identify the nature of the central impairment in question. In mainstream theories, this has been identified as an impaired ‘theory of mind module’ or ‘mentalizing’ capacities. This paper points to some difficulties encountered by such accounts and – by drawing on research by Tomasello and Rakoczy – seeks to develop an alternative account of pretence and social cognition.

Cognitive Theory (CT) is widely acknowledged framework used to understand the psychological processes involved in affective disorders and to conceptualize the adequate psychotherapy. The purpose of this paper is to assess the philosophical assumptions that CT rests upon. It will be argued that CT must be revised due to significant flaws in many of these philosophical assumptions. The last part of the paper will contain suggestions as to how these problems could be overcome in a manner that would secure philosophical coherence, while also providing an account that is better suited to explaining some of the cognitive, emotional and bodily manifestations of affective disorders.