Somogy Varga

After some preliminary distinctions, this paper will discuss the merits of higher-order representational theory and same-order theory. A distinction will be introduced between a intrinsic conception of consciousness and a representational variant . It will be argued that the SOIT account of 'non-reflective self-awareness' can be applied to understanding aspects of psychopathology. However, a closer look at specific aspects of schizophrenic experience reveals that we might need to widen the scope of and 'situate' the SOIT of non-reflective selfawareness

This article seeks to defend two claims: Firstly, that Universalist ethics in Habermas and Rawls cannot function without some recourse to the Good Life, or human well-being. Secondly, that such ethical reflection must involve formal anthropological considerations. In other words, it must involve a consideration of the Good that also encompasses reflection on what we are as humans. As an example, the paper draws on Habermas’ recent thoughts on ‘species-ethics’. I will argue that 'species ethics' needs to be substantiated and expanded with the help of an 'anthropology of recognition'

Authenticity has become a widespread ethical ideal that represents a way of dealing with normative gaps in contemporary life. This ideal suggests that one should be true to oneself and lead a life expressive of what one takes oneself to be. However, many contemporary thinkers have pointed out that the ideal of authenticity has increasingly turned into a kind of aestheticism and egoistic self-indulgence. In his book, Varga systematically constructs a critical concept of authenticity that takes into account the reciprocal shaping of capitalism and the ideal of authenticity. Drawing on different traditions in critical social theory, moral philosophy and phenomenology, Varga builds a concept of authenticity that can make intelligible various problematic and potentially exhausting practices of the self