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139Theory structuralism in a rigid frameworkSynthese 187 (2): 693-713. 2012.This paper develops the first parts of a logical framework for the empirical sciences, by means of a redefinition of theory structuralism as originally developed by Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller, and others, in the context of a ‘rigid’ logic as based on a fixed (therefore rigid) ontology. The paper defends a formal conception of the empirical sciences that has an irreducible ontological basis and is unable, in general, to provide purely structural characterizations of the domain of a theory.…Read more
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132Caught in the Middle: Philosophy of Science between the Historical Turn and Formal Philosophy as Illustrated by the Program of “Kuhn Sneedified”Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 62-82. 2014.This article is concerned with the development of philosophy of science in the 1970s. The explanatory framework is the picture of two fundamental split-offs: the controversial establishment of history and sociology of science and of formal philosophy of science as independent disciplines, against the background of more traditional “conceptual” varieties of philosophy of science. I illustrate these developments, which finally led to somewhat “purified” versions of the respective accounts, by exam…Read more
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101Rudolf Carnap and Wilhelm Dilthey:“German” Empiricism in the AufbauIn Richard Creath (ed.), Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism, Springer Verlag. pp. 67--88. 2012.Rudolf Carnap’s formative years as a philosopher were his time in Jena where he studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy, among others, with Gottlob Frege, the neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch, and Herman Nohl, a pupil of Wilhelm Dilthey.2 Whereas both the influence of Frege and of the neo-Kantians is quite well known,3 the importance of the Dilthey school for Carnap’s intellectual development was recently highlighted by scholars, such as Gottfried Gabriel and Hans-Joachim Dahms.4 Although Carnap him…Read more
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159Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist frameworkSynthese 191 (10): 2195-2213. 2014.In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, …Read more
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