Ladislav Kvasz

Cieľom predkladanej state je pokus o upresnenie Kuhnovej teórie vedeckých revolúcií. Navrhujem rozlíšiť pojem vedeckej revolúcie, ktorý označuje sociologický fakt zmeny postoja vedeckého spoločenstva vo vzťahu k určitej teórii a pojem epistemickej ruptúry, ktorý označuje lingvistický fakt diskontinuity jazykového rámca, v ktorom je táto teória formulovaná. Analýzou zmien jazykového rámca možno získať klasifikáciu epistemických ruptúr na štyri typy, nazvané ideácia, re-prezentácia, objektácia a re-formulácia. V stati je každý z týchto typov epistemických ruptúr ilustrovaný na sérii príkladov z dejín fyziky. Uvedené typy epistemických ruptúr úzko súvisia s vedeckými revolúciami. Klasifikácia epistemických ruptúr sa tak dá použiť ako východisko pri klasifikácii vedeckých revolúcií. Jednotlivé revolúcie možno klasifikovať podľa toho, akého druhu je epistemická ruptúra, ktorá príslušnú revolúciu sprevádza.

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben.

This paper offers an epistemological reconstruction of the historical development of algebra from al-Khwrizm, Cardano, and Descartes to Euler, Lagrange, and Galois. In the reconstruction it interprets the algebraic formulas as a symbolic language and analyzes the changes of this language in the course of history. It turns out that the most fundamental epistemological changes in the development of algebra can be interpreted as changes of the pictorial form of the symbolic language of algebra. Thus the paper develops further the method of reconstruction which the author introduced for the analysis of the development of geometry

The aim of this paper is to introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of the form of a language into geometry and to show how it can be used to achieve a better understanding of the development of geometry, from Desargues, Lobachevsky and Beltrami to Cayley, Klein and Poincaré. Thus this essay can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Picture Theory of Meaning, from the Tractatus. Its basic idea is to use Picture Theory to understand the pictures of geometry. I will try to show, that the historical evolution of geometry can be interpreted as the development of the form of its language. This confrontation of the Picture Theory with history of geometry sheds new light also on the ideas of Wittgenstein.

The paper attempts to summarize the debate on Kant’s philosophy of geometry and to offer a restricted area of mathematical practice for which Kant’s philosophy would be a reasonable account. Geometrical theories can be characterized using Wittgenstein’s notion of pictorial form . Kant’s philosophy of geometry can be interpreted as a reconstruction of geometry based on one of these forms — the projective form . If this is correct, Kant’s philosophy is a reasonable reconstruction of such theories as projective geometry; and not only as they were practiced in Kant’s time, but also as architects use them today

There are many interpretations of the birth of modern science. Most of them are, nevertheless, confined to the analysis of certain historical episodes or technical details, while leaving the very notion of mathematization unanalyzed. In my opinion this is due to a lack of a proper philosophical framework which would show the process of mathematization as something radically new. Most historians assume that the world is just like it is depicted by science. Thus they are not aware of the radical novelty of the mathematization of nature and focus their attention on the details of this process. Phenomenology by its radical questioning of the traditional interpretations of reality provides an ideal means for the reconstruction of the process of mathematization of nature and the birth of mathematical natural science. In a series of papers I tried to show the power of Husserl 's concept of mathematization by filling in the historical details into his interpretation. In the present article I want to compare Husserl 's approach with the approach of Heidegger. I believe that by comparing these two phenomenological theories of mathematization the advantages of Husserl 's approach will come to the fore. _German_ Es gibt mehrere Interpretationen der Entstehung der modernen Wissenschaft. Die meisten von ihnen beschränken sich allerdings auf die Analyse bestimmter historischer Episoden oder technischer Details, während der Begriff der Mathematisierung unanalysiert bleibt. Meiner Meinung nach ist dies auf das Fehlen eines richtigen philosophischen Rahmens zurückzuführen, der den Prozess der Mathematisierung als etwas radikal Neues zeigen würde. Die meisten Historiker gehen davon aus, dass die Welt so ist, wie sie von der Wissenschaft dargestellt wird. So verkennen sie die Radikalität der Mathematisierung der Natur und konzentrieren ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die Details dieses Prozesses. Die Phänomenologie bietet dank ihrer radikalen Kritik der traditionellen Interpretationen der Realität ein ideales Mittel für die Rekonstruktion des Prozesses der Mathematisierung der Natur und der Geburt der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft. In einer Reihe von Arbeiten habe ich versucht, die Stärke der Husserlschen Interpretation der Mathematisierung zu zeigen, indem ich die historischen Details in seine Interpretation einfügte. Im vorliegenden Artikel möchte ich Husserls Ansatz mit dem Ansatz von Heidegger vergleichen. Durch diesen Vergleich der beiden phänomenologischen Theorien der Mathematisierung der Natur werden die Vorteile von Husserls Ansatz in den Vordergrund treten

The nature of changes in mathematics was discussed recently in Revolutions in Mathematics. The discussion was dominated by historical and sociological arguments. An obstacle to a philosophical analysis of this question lies in a discrepancy between our approach to formulas and to pictures. While formulas are understood as constituents of mathematical theories, pictures are viewed only as heuristic tools. Our idea is to consider the pictures contained in mathematical text, as expressions of a specific language. Thus we get formulas and pictures into one linguistic framework, and so we are able to analyse their interplay in the course of history.

The aim of the paper is to clarify Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. We propose to discriminate between a scientific revolution, which is a sociological event of a change of attitude of the scientific community with respect to a particular theory, and an epistemic rupture, which is a linguistic fact consisting of a discontinuity in the linguistic framework in which this theory is formulated. We propose a classification of epistemic ruptures into four types. In the paper, each of these types of epistemic ruptures is illustrated by examples from physics. The classification of epistemic ruptures can be used as a basis for a classification of scientific revolutions and thus for a refinement of our view of the progress of science.

The aim of the paper is to answer some arguments raised against mathematical structuralism developed by Michael Resnik. These arguments stress the abstractness of mathematical objects, especially their causal inertness, and conclude that mathematical objects, the structures posited by Resnik included, are inaccessible to human cognition. In the paper I introduce a distinction between abstract and ideal objects and argue that mathematical objects are primarily ideal. I reconstruct some aspects of the instrumental practice of mathematics, such as symbolic manipulations or ruler-and-compass constructions, and argue that instrumental practice can secure epistemic access to ideal objects of mathematics.

The latest book of Reviel Netz presents a highly erudite analysis of the style of Hellenistic mathematics. Besides the Introduction and Conclusion the book is composed of four chapters. Before turning to more general remarks I would like first to outline the contents of the book.The Introduction starts with the presentation of Archimedes’ Spiral lines. In a condensed form, the author outlines his approach and calls attention to the stylistic peculiarities of that work. Most of the themes discussed in more detail in the following chapters, such as the analysis of the narrative structure of the treatise, its working with surprise, the exposition of the rhetorical devices, the discussion of technical tools, and the breaking of genre-boundaries emerge here side by side in a single treatise.The first chapter, called The carnival of calculation, starts with another work of Archimedes, the Stomachion, for which Netz offers a new interpretation as a treatise in geometrical combinatorics. Then he turns to Archimedes’ On the measurement of the circle, where, in a detailed analysis of the calculations made by Archimedes, Netz presents a pattern that he identifies in several other works of Hellenistic mathematics, a pattern he calls ‘asymptotic calculation’. It consists in a combination of strict geometric arguments with calculations of proportions, some precise, some only approximate, which together with rather arbitrary simplifications lead to a result that is achieved after an abrupt and unexpected halt. Netz shows that, according to the surviving testimonies, a similar pattern can be found in many Hellenistic authors, such as Aristarchus, Hipparchus, and Apollonius of Perga. "[I]n many Hellenistic mathematical works we see calculations that give rise to values that are big and unwieldy, or else are only asymptotically found. Such calculations end up not with the satisfaction of having simplified … "

The aim of the paper is to describe the main epistemolo­gi­cal ruptures in the history of modern physics. Our ap­proach is based on the re­construction of the formal language of physical theories. We examine how particular aspects of the formal language, such as its analytical, expressive, or explanatory power, as well as its analytical and expressive boundaries, have changed in the course of the historical development of physics. In the closing part of the paper we discuss the results of our historical reconstruc­tion from several viewpoints

The aim of the present paper is to offer a new analysis of the multifarious relations between mathematics and reality. We believe that the relation of mathematics to reality is, just like in the case of the natural sciences, mediated by instruments . Therefore the kind of realism we aim to develop for mathematics can be called instrumental realism. It is a kind of realism, because it is based on the thesis, that mathematics describes certain patterns of reality. And it is instrumental realism, because it pays atten-tion to the role of instruments by means of which mathematics identifies these patterns. The article concludes by offering solutions to some famous semantic paradoxes based on the diagonal construction as corroboration for this claim

The aim of this paper is to compare two approaches to semantics, namely the standard Tarskian theory and Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning. I will compare them with respect to an unusual subject matter, namely to geometrical pictures. The choice of geometry rather than arithmetic or set theory as the basis, on which this comparison will be made has two reasons. One reason is related to Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning. This theory was developed more or less as a metaphor, comparing the language to a picture. Nevertheless, if we take pictures themselves in the role of the language to which we apply Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, this theory stops being a metaphor and starts to work in a technical way. I believe that in this way we can create a new approach to semantics in geometry. The other reason for taking geometry as the basis for our investigation is that the Tarskian approach to semantics does not work in geometry as we would wish

The aim of the paper is to argue for the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed by ancient authors to Thales. These results are late ascriptions and so it is difficult to say anything certain about them on philological grounds. I will seek characteristic features of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales by comparing them with Galilean physics. This might seem at a first sight a rather unusual move. Nevertheless, I suggest viewing the process of turning geometry into an axiomatic-deductive science as a process of idealization in mathematics that is parallel to the process of idealization in physics. In Kvasz I offered an epistemological reconstruction of the process of idealization in physics during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. In the present paper I try to employ these epistemological insights in the process of idealization in physics and propose a reconstruction of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales, who can, on the basis of these ascriptions, be seen as one of the initiators of idealization in mathematics.

Mathematics is traditionally considered being an apriori discipline consisting of purely analytic propositions. The aim of the present paper is to offer arguments against this entrenched view and to draw attention to the experiential dimension of mathematical knowledge. Following Husserl’s interpretation of physical knowledge as knowledge constituted by the use of instruments, I am trying to interpret mathematical knowledge also as acknowledge based on instrumental experience. This interpretation opens a new view on the role of the logicist program, both in philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of science

The aim of the paper is to present a theoretical framework which would make it possible to embed the conflict between the natural and human sciences into a broader historical context. With the help of categories such as paradigmatic disciplines, mixed discipline of the paradigm, metaphorical realm of the paradigm, and elusive realm of the paradigm we describe the dynamics of changes in the classification of scientific disciplines which accompany a scientific revolution. Our approach is thus an alternative to T. S. Kuhn’s sociological theory of scientific revolutions. Instead by a social conflict between the proponents and opponents of the new paradigm we interpret the scientific revolution as a cognitive conflict between the mixed disciplines and the metaphorical realm of the old paradigm

Coming from a mathematical background, I was always puzzled by Popper’s view, according to which, after the falsification of a scientific theory its degree of corroboration becomes zero. Most of the scientific theories taught in the physics departments have already been falsified, and what is the point of teaching theories, whose degree of corroboration is zero? The first important observation to make is that not all cases of falsification are the same. In some cases, as for instance in the case of the theory of phlogiston, the falsification happened in agreement with the Popperian picture. Scientists discarded the falsified theory and opted for its alternative. Therefore, nowadays nobody tries to make a scientific contribution to the theory of phlogiston. Nevertheless, there are cases, and Newtonian mechanics is surely the most important among them, when the behaviour of the scientists after the falsification of the theory is from the Popperian point of view incomprehensible. Many scientists were not ready to discard the falsified theory, and not for irrational reasons. Some of the deepest discoveries in Newtonian mechanics as for instance the famous Kolmogorov, Arnold, Moser theorem were made many years after this theory was falsified. I think that Andrej Kolmogorov, Vladimir Arnold or Jürgen Moser cannot be compared to an Aristotelian philosopher, who adheres to his pet theory after its falsification. What these three mathematicians did was a fundamental contribution to modern science

The aim of this paper is a philosophical generalisation of the results, which we obtained through the analysis of the development of synthetic geometry. I our papers Náčrt analytickej teórie subjektu and Topológia versus teória množín we proposed a method of analysis of the development of geometry based on Wittgensteinś Picture theory of meaning from the Tractatus. It turned out, that the concept of the form of language can be effectively used to characterise the changes, which occured in the course of development of geometry. In the present paper we would like to generalize our approach and outline a universal approach to epistemology, which we call formal epistemology

Cieľom článku je osvetliť niektoré historické okolnosti vzniku analytickej filozofie. Prvou z nich je zrod novovekej fyziky, ktorý viedol k rozšíreniu nového, empirického prístupu ku skutočnosti. Snažíme sa ukázať úlohu, ktorú v procese vzniku novovekej fyziky zohrala scholastická filozofia spolu s kartezianizmom. Ďalšia časť state objasňuje niektoré aspekty subjektivizmu, ktorý zohral významnú úlohu v novovekej filozofii. V jadre subjektivizmu leží podľa nášho názoru dezinterpretácia Descartovej filozofie. Prekonanie subjektivizmu analytickou filozofiou možno potom interpretovať ako návrat na miesto, na ktorom Descartes pôvodne stál