Anat Biletzki

This concluding chapter reflects on what we may learn from engagement with Wittgenstein about how philosophy communicates with its times. One aspect, the authors suggest, is that Wittgenstein’s work undermines the idea of political philosophy as a separable field of study with pregiven problems. A further claim is that Wittgenstein may help us reimagine routine conceptions of political practice and of where, when and how politics and philosophy happen and how the two meet. One pivotal notion is that Wittgenstein, through his study of the foundations of reason, brings to the fore interdependences among dialogical engagement, formation of self and building political community. It follows, the authors argue, that Wittgenstein helps us overcome the divide in much of modern political theory between “atomistic” and “communicative” views of the relation between the freedom of individuals and democracy. From the perspective of Wittgenstein, there is a unity of philosophy and a democratic form of life due to the equally primordial role dialogical philosophy has to play in the search for understanding of oneself and of others.

Travelling between “democracy” and “form of life,” this chapter adopts a nuanced reading of the latter, suggested by Juliet Floyd, as an all-encompassing norm of elucidation for human life and merges it with Chantal Mouffe’s intricate application of Wittgensteinian mores to our understanding of democracy (as contextual rather than universal, substantial rather than procedural, and pluralistic rather than consensual). A Wittgensteinian portrayal of the democratic form of life is used as a guideline and is subsequently compared with military and religious forms of life, both of which provide conjectured contraries to it. With real-life exemplars of sometimes unsettling narratives in Israel, it is argued that, for essential reasons, neither military nor religious forms of life stand to be fully democratic. The open question remains – whether we can countenance either of them alongside the democratic form of life.

This volume demonstrates how Wittgenstein's philosophy can illuminate our understanding of politics and open new ways of conceptualizing democratic theory and practice. Its focus is on language, reason and communication as central to identifying present confusions in our understanding of democracy. The book seeks to engage Wittgenstein's philosophical insights, aiming to go beyond the dichotomous oppositions and conceptual entanglements pervading existing frameworks of social and political theories of democracy. Its key topic is the irreplaceable role of dialogue in civic democratic engagement as a condition for the understanding of self and others and, hence, for political life in which reason has a role. Indeed, it presents concrete examples of how Wittgenstein can be constructively applied to current political discourse. Part I of the volume focuses on the general idea of applying Wittgenstein's philosophy to political and democratic theory and explains the deep and intrinsic relation between Wittgenstein's thought and politics. Part II discusses Wittgenstein's concrete concepts as illuminating for understanding selected aspects of democratic politics. Part III deals with a possible exchange between Wittgenstein and other political thinkers, especially Hannah Arendt. Wittgenstein and Democratic Politics will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on Wittgenstein's philosophy, political philosophy, and democratic theory.

This article motions to a real contradiction between online security and civil rights. It traverses semantic and conceptual elaborations of both security and human rights, narrowing their range to national security and human rather than civil rights, and suggests that the concept of security itself, whether online or not, is a rhetorical instrument in the hands of interested parties, mostly states and militaries. This instrument is used to undermine human rights precisely by means of its association and even identification with military and national settings. Asking whether the same ethics applies in the case of online security (vs. human rights), our tentative conclusion is that a similar moral determination rules in the case of online security, which may be exponentially more complex, but no less ethically compelling.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.1 (2000) 59-73 [Access article in PDF] Thomas Hobbes: Telling the Story of the Science of Politics Anat Biletzki Science and storytelling First, the traditional commonplaces: Science does not tell stories. Disciplines purporting to be sciences eschew their storytelling aspects in favor of axiomatic, deductive, demonstrative, or whatnot essentials of science. Those deeming the story itself essential give up (happily or less willingly) the label of science and locate themselves under other institutionalized labels such as Humanities. 1 Then there are the disciplines that wobble on the fence, desiring, for various reasons that are more readily analyzed by historical sociologists, the epithet of Science, yet not always achieving such recognition. Chief players in this game are history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science. And if my rendition of this conflict between pretensions and performance seem blatantly pejorative, let me rephrase it: their own practitioners--historians, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists--believe the issue of their scientific status a problem of no small import. It is, indeed, the question "Are we a science?" that figures in the most fundamental debates concerning the purpose, essence, and methodology of these disciplines.By use of a case study, I will try to support a seemingly conciliatory thesis: social sciences are, by definition and therefore of necessity, on the fence. On one side of the fence lies Science, the monolithic framework that enslaves its method to a grand purpose--knowledge of reality. On the other lies Humanism, a far less easily defined area about which I would hesitate to use the word framework, but through which one meets a no-less-grandiose focus--knowledge of the human. Why then does it seem natural to foster storytelling on the humanistic side of the fence? Or, alternatively, one can ask about the "why not" of narrative in the sciences.Narrative is storytelling; and stories are about heroes; and heroes conduct their actions in a place through a time. So these three building blocks-- [End Page 59] hero, time, and place--point to a pattern of knowledge that, it seems obvious, cannot, and definitely should not, belong to science in its idealized form. There is, of course, a stronger thesis deriving from the intricacies in (post?)modern discussions: that even the exact and natural sciences use narrative while still remaining sciences. This idea--that science does countenance narrative and, indeed, may even use it beneficially--thereby becomes forceful, since science, with its universalistic airs, pretends to ignore heroes in specific times and places.What of the social sciences? Their claim to science is based on that same universalistic end coupled with an attempt to develop a methodology to fit that end. The rub lies in the subject matter of the social sciences, the human being and society. A strictly positivistic view of such subject matter, or even a generally scientific one, must abstract from any and all "humanistic" traits of the human being and society and objectively treat them on a par with any other "neutral" (some might say, even material) object of research. My weak thesis merely claims that such abstraction is inherently impossible and, furthermore, that an attempt at such abstraction waylays the ultimate end of these "sciences." 2 Yet, such a thesis must contribute more than it eliminates. If the social sciences cannot live up to the original scientific ideal of one side of the fence, and if their product can be valued as more than (or at least different from) a mere story on the other side, a more fruitful characterization than just "sitting on the fence" is called for. It is here that narrative makes its essential contribution: narrative is that pattern of knowledge which can encompass the social sciences, given their necessary turn to the human being. Looked at from the receiving end, the social sciences have no option but to turn to narrative in order to buttress their scientific ideal of explanation. The phenomena they claim to explain are human and social phenomena and, as such, cannot be distanced from narrative. 3I shall try to illustrate my...

This volume, in memory of Ruth Manor, consists of articles presented at her memorial conference at Tel Aviv University. The articles, by colleagues and students, friends and family represent the wide range of interest and expertise that Manor brought to her teaching and research - from formal logic to pragmatics, and from rhetoric to ethics. The collection includes articles by Jaakko Hintikka, Arnon Avron, Oron Shagrir, Eli Dresner, Eran Guter, Amnon Wolman, Anat Matar, and Anat Biletzki. Emblematic of Manor's hugh panoply of philosophical themes, the diversity and variety of subjects covered also portray her analytical profundity and logical proficiency at always seeing connections'.

(Over)Interpreting Wittgenstein will be read by philosophers investigating Wittgenstein and by scholars, interpreters, students, and specialists, in both analytic and continental philosophy. It will intrigue readers interested in issues of interpretation and cultural studies. This book tells the story - as yet untold - of Wittgenstein interpretation during the past eighty years. It provides different interpretations, chronologies, developments, and controversies. It aims to discover the (socio-cultural rather than psychological) motives and motivations behind the philosophical community's project of interpreting Wittgenstein. As a cultural history of ideas, it traces the parallelism between Wittgenstein interpretation and the move from metaphysics, to language, to postmodernism effected in the twentieth century.