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45Preserved Aspects of Consciousness in Disorders of Consciousness A Review and Conceptual AnalysisJournal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4): 3-4. 2012.The last decade has seen impressive and intriguing advances in the exploration of vestiges of consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness . Consciousness is an extremely complex area of research so it is difficult to provide unequivocal interpretations of these new findings from DOC-studies. This review therefore provides a conceptual analysis of a series of key studies in this area of research. The main upshot is that different studies of preserved consciousness in DOC are best se…Read more
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207Explanation and two conceptions of the physicalErkenntnis 62 (1): 71-89. 2005.Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russells notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for thi…Read more
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175The Predictive MindOxford University Press UK. 2013.A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictiv…Read more
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58Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Conceptual, methodological and philosophical perspectivesWorld Journal of Biological Psychiatry 6 (3): 192-197. 2005.Cognitive neuropsychiatry attempts to understand psychiatric disorders as disturbances to the normal function of human cognitive organisation, and it attempts to link this functional framework to relevant brain structures and their pathology. This recent scientific discipline is the natural extension of cognitive neuroscience into the domain of psychiatry. We present two examples of recent research in cognitive neuropsychiatry: delusions of control in schizophrenia, and affective disorders. The …Read more
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42Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion FormationPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 65-70. 2004.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion fo…Read more
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224After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the…Read more
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67Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approachPacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3): 235-52. 2002.Many people argue that privileged self–knowledge is incompatible with semantic externalism. I develop a contextualist approach to self–knowledge, and examine what this approach should lead us to say about the apparent incompatibility. Though such contextualism compels us to re–think the notion of privilege associated with self–knowledge, it can contain the damage wreaked by the externalist doctrine.
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55Attenuated self-tickle sensation even under trajectory perturbationConsciousness and Cognition 36 147-153. 2015.
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7IntroductionEducational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5): 585-590. 2008.This essay reflects upon certain aspects of Wittgenstein's own practices as a teacher. Doing philosophy always took priority for Wittgenstein, whether this was in oral or written form: it was important to show the deep puzzles in our language as a step toward dissolving them. In this respect, one can teach only as a guide; it is a matter of showing more than saying. Wittgenstein's approach suggests a model that I will call tacit teaching. Tacit teaching refers to the many forms of informal instr…Read more
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188Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien controlMind and Language 20 (2): 141-162. 2005.Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we add…Read more
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1569The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2): 428-438. 2009.It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that…Read more
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153Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: What happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?
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20Studies of the neural correlates of consciousness can do better, but are on the right trackJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 45-51. 2004.
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1468Movement under uncertainty: The effects of the rubber-hand illusion vary along the nonclinical autism spectrumNeuropsychologia. forthcoming.Recent research has begun to investigate sensory processing in relation to nonclinical variation in traits associated with the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We propose that existing accounts of autistic perception can be augmented by considering a role for individual differences in top-down expectations for the precision of sensory input, related to the processing of state-dependent levels of uncertainty. We therefore examined ASD-like traits in relation to the rubber-hand illusion: an experi…Read more
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3269Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: an epistemological reviewCognition 108 (3): 687-701. 2008.
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85In rubber hand illusions and full body illusions, touch sensations are projected to non-body objects such as rubber hands, dolls or virtual bodies. The robustness, limits and further perceptual consequences of such illusions are not yet fully explored or understood. A number of experiments are reported that test the limits of a variant of the rubber hand illusion. Methodology/Principal Findings A variant of the rubber hand illusion is explored, in which the real and foreign hands are aligned in …Read more
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960The Self‐Evidencing BrainNoûs 50 (2): 259-285. 2016.An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the b…Read more
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161Can neuroscience explain consciousness?Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8): 180-198. 2004.Cognitive neuroscience aspires to explain how the brain produces conscious states. Many people think this aspiration is threatened by the subjective nature of introspective reports, as well as by certain philosophical arguments. We propose that good neuroscientific explanations of conscious states can consolidate an interpretation of introspective reports, in spite of their subjective nature. This is because the relative quality of explanations can be evaluated on independent, methodological gro…Read more
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83The experience of mental causationBehavior and Philosophy 32 (2): 377-400. 2004.subjects mean when they report their mental states it is useful to be guided by a sound grasp of their concepts for mental events. <sup>3</sup> Though this is often ignored in favor of libertarian notions of free will, in which free action is seen as completely undetermined by the subject
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131Rationality and schizophrenic delusionMind and Language 15 (1): 146-167. 2000.The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning pro‐cedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, how‐ever, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theor…Read more
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191Phenomenal Variability and Introspective ReliabilityMind and Language 26 (3): 261-286. 2011.There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the ev…Read more
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42Can you tickle yourself if you swap bodies with someone else?Consciousness and Cognition 23 1-11. 2014.The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated “tickle” sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do n…Read more
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117Internalized meaning factualismPhilosophia 34 (3). 2006.The normative character of meaning creates deep problems for the attempt to give a reductive explanation of the constitution of meaning. I identify and critically examine an increasingly popular Carnap-style position, which I call Internalized Meaning Factualism (versions of which I argue are defended by, e.g., Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich and Huw Price), that promises to solve the problems. According to this position, the problem of meaning can be solved by prohibiting an external perspective o…Read more
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37When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. By G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham (review)SATS 3 (2): 158-162. 2002.
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1916Delusions, Illusions and Inference under UncertaintyMind and Language 28 (1): 57-71. 2013.Three challenges to a unified understanding of delusions emerge from Radden's On Delusion (2011). Here, I propose that in order to respond to these challenges, and to work towards a unifying framework for delusions, we should see delusions as arising in inference under uncertainty. This proposal is based on the observation that delusions in key respects are surprisingly like perceptual illusions, and it is developed further by focusing particularly on individual differences in uncertainty expect…Read more
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37Consciousness. We have come to expect science to be able to explain all sorts of phenomena in the world (global warming, hereditary diseases, life – you name it). Consciousness is an anomaly in the success story of science for there is a real question whether science, in particular neuroscience, can explain much about what consciousness is. A good question to ask is how and to what extent consciousness resists scientific explanation. That might tell us something about what is special about consc…Read more
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Monash UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative StudiesProfessor
Clayton, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |