Stephen Wilkinson

It is argued that there are good reasons for believing that commercial surrogacy is often exploitative. However, even if we accept this, the exploitation argument for prohibiting (or otherwise legislatively discouraging) commercial surrogacy remains quite weak. One reason for this is that prohibition may well 'backfire' and lead to potential surrogates having to do other things that are more exploitative and/or more harmful than paid surrogacy. It is concluded, therefore, that those who oppose exploitation should concentrate on: (a) improving the conditions under which paid surrogates 'work'; and (b) changing the background conditions (in particular, the unequal distribution of power and wealth) which generate exploitative relationships. (edited).

There is widespread anxiety about the commercialisation and commodification of human tissue. The aims of this paper are: (a) to analyse some of these concerns, and (b) to see whether some of the main ethical arguments that lie behind them are sound. Part 1 looks at 'inducement arguments' against paying individuals for their tissue and concludes that these are generally quite weak. Part 2 examines some ethical objections to third parties (e.g. biotechnology companies and researchers) commercially exploiting human tissue. Firstly, it is argued that prospective tissue donors should be given very full information about the extent to which their tissues will be commercially exploited and about the financial interests of tissue collectors and researchers, since this is an essential component of valid consent. Secondly, some doubt is cast upon the (widely held) view that while 'the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain', intellectual property based on human tissue research is generally acceptable1.

Michelle Taylor-Sands rejects the argument ‘commonly used to justify selective reproduction, that it is better to be born than not’.1 The supposed inadequacy of this position is one of the things that pushes her towards an alternative ‘relational’ approach. Here, I consider briefly her three main objections: 1. The Non-Identity Problem does not apply to all the risks associated with the preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) process. 2. The ‘life not worth living’ standard applied in wrongful life cases is not suitable for selective reproduction. 3. The reasoning described above has ‘morally objectionable’ implications. One of Taylor-Sands’ most interesting suggestions is that there might be a difference between selecting a (future) child because it is congenitally deaf and some other forms of selective reproduction. Taylor-Sands accepts thatAn embryo selected because it is deaf could only ever become a deaf child. There are no other options for that child apart from becoming a deaf child, apart from non-existence (p. 18).1 But what goes for the deafness case does not, she claims, apply to the whole of selective reproduction… additional risks of harm associated with the PGD process (which involves ART and embryo biopsy) … could be avoided if the child is born naturally. The non-identity problem is not relevant to these risks of harm because there is another option for the child—to be born as a result of natural conception (p. 18).1 It is difficult, however, to see much difference between the deafness case and the saviour sibling case in this respect. In the choosing deafness case, the parents have a choice between several embryos, one of …

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and some prenatal screening programmes have been criticized for being 'eugenic'. This paper aims to analyse this criticism and to evaluate one of the main ethical arguments lying behind it. It starts with a discussion of the meaning of the term 'eugenics' and of some relevant distinctions: for example, that between objections to eugenic ends and objections to certain means of achieving them. Next, a particular argument against using preimplantation genetic diagnosis to 'screen out' disability is considered, one based on the Equal Value Principle, which says that we should value disability and non-disability equally. It is argued that present practice and policy probably do violate the Equal Value Principle, but that this principle is itself unsound