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107Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Ratio 27 (4): 369-392. 2014.Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been underexplored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree. There are many different variants of representationalism, and differences between these variants that some people have taken to be inconsequential turn out to be key factors in whether the sense-data theory is a form of representationalism. Chief among these are wheth…Read more
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183A disjunctive theory of introspection: A reflection on zombies and Anton's syndromePhilosophical Issues 20 (1): 226-265. 2010.Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemo…Read more
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207Representational Theories of Phenomenal CharacterDissertation, University of Stirling. 2000.This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are …Read more
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375Taxonomising the SensesPhilosophical Studies 153 (1): 123-142. 2011.I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the sen…Read more
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41Review of M. Tye 'Consciousness, Color and Content' (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213): 619-621. 2003.
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248Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to StrawsonJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 72-89. 2006.This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plau…Read more
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706Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect MechanismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 24-62. 2011.Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away …Read more
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203Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experienceElectronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6. 1998.[1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological an…Read more
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139The power of natural selectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8): 30-35. 2002.Some naturalistic theories of consciousness give an essential role to teleology.1 This teleology is said to arise due to natural selection. Thus it is claimed that only certain states, namely, those that have been selected for by evolutionary pro- cesses because they contribute to (or once contributed to) an organism’s fitness, are conscious states. These theories look as if they are assigning a creative role to natural selection. If a state is conscious only if it has been selected for, then se…Read more
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236Perfect Pitch and the Content of ExperienceAnthropology and Philosophy 3 (2): 89-101. 1999.This paper examines the representationalist view of experiences in the light of the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. Two main kinds of representationalism are identified - environment-based and cognitive role-based. It is argued that to explain the relationship between the two theories a distinction should be drawn between various types of implicit and explicit content. When investigated, this distinction sheds some light on the difference between the phenomenology of perfect and relativ…Read more
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396Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivismIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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1001XV—Cross‐Modal ExperiencesProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3): 429-468. 2011.This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena
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208The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An IntroductionIn Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 1-38. 2013.An overview of the philosophy and psychology of hallucination and its relevance to the philosophy of perception.
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133Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology (edited book)MIT Press. 2013.Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
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42Review of P. Jacob What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World (review)Philosophical Books 40 (3): 184-185. 1999.
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129Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith (review)Philosophical Books 45 (3): 255-257. 2004.
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71Introduction: The Admissible Contents of ExperienceIn Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley. 2011.Forthcoming (2011) in K. Hawley and F. Macpherson (eds.) The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley‐Blackwell. The Admissible Contents of Experience Fiona Macpherson This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this volume. The debate is one that takes place among advocates of a certain way of thinking of perceptual experiences: that they are states that represent the world. For to say that…Read more
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285Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating ...
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663Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on LupyanReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 571-584. 2015.The main aim of Lupyan’s paper is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be …Read more
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152The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive codingConsciousness and Cognition 47 6-16. 2017.If beliefs and desires affect perception—at least in certain specified ways—then cognitive penetration occurs. Whether it occurs is a matter of controversy. Recently, some proponents of the predictive coding account of perception have claimed that the account entails that cognitive penetrations occurs. I argue that the relationship between the predictive coding account and cognitive penetration is dependent on both the specific form of the predictive coding account and the specific form of cogni…Read more
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690Perception, Philosophical PerspectivesIn Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2009.This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
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277Novel colours and the content of experiencePacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1): 43-66. 2003.I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore t…Read more
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