-
88
-
66The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and EpistemologyPhilosophical Topics 38 (2): 181-204. 2010.An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical anti-realism is to stress that the traditional arguments for that position work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that claim, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose…Read more
-
109Quine on EthicsTheoria 64 (1): 84-98. 1998.W.V. Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is ‘methodologically infirm’. The reason is that while science is responsive to observation, and therefore ‘retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth’ (p. 63), ethics lacks such responsiveness. This in turn leads Quine to contrast moral judgments with judgments that …Read more
-
28Disagreement, MoralIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
-
26
-
43DAVIDSON, DONALD: Problems of Rationality Oxford: Clarendon, 2004, pp. xx + 280. ISBN 0-19-823754-Theoria 72 (3): 233-239. 2006.
-
34A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon KirchinInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4): 333-337. 2015._ Source: _Page Count 5
-
381The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscienceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3). 2008.A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in ce…Read more
-
63Intuitional DisagreementSouthern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4): 639-659. 2012.Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main p…Read more
-
119Crispin Wright on moral disagreementPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 359-365. 1998.Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropr…Read more