• Robert Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation (review)
    Philosophy in Review 10 177-180. 1990.
  •  29
    Beyond Inference in Perception
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982. 1982.
    The controversy over inference in perception turns on the nature of the processes that intervene between the stimulus and the perceptual experience or percept. Should the processes be viewed as something like inference and computation, or should they be viewed as psychologically primitive mechanisms whose workings are best accounted for at a neurological or physiological level? It is argued that the view that computational and inference-like processes play a role in perceptual processes should b…Read more
  •  240
  •  290
    The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 2005.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Co…Read more
  •  58
    Philosophy and WEIRD intuition
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 110-111. 2010.
    From Plato to the present, philosophers have relied on intuitive judgments as evidence for or against philosophical theories. Most philosophers are WEIRD, highly educated, and male. The literature reviewed in the target article suggests that such people might have intuitions that differ from those of people in other groups. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that they do
  •  8
    Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis
    The Monist 61 (4): 573-591. 1978.
    A venerable view, still very much alive, holds that human action is to be explained at least in part in terms of beliefs and desires. Those who advocate the view expect that the psychological theory which explains human behavior will invoke the concepts of belief and desire in a substantive way. I will call this expectation the belief-desire thesis. Though there would surely be a quibble or a caveat here and there, the thesis would be endorsed by an exceptionally heterogeneous collection of psyc…Read more
  •  49
    What every speaker knows
    Philosophical Review 80 (4): 476-496. 1971.
  •  1
  •  1
    Philosophy and Connectionist Theory
    with William Ramsey and David E. Rumelhart
    . 1991.
  •  60
    The 20th century has been a tumultuous time in psychology – a century in which the discipline struggled with basic questions about its intellectual identity, but nonetheless managed to achieve spectacular growth and maturation. It’s not surprising, then, that psychology has attracted sustained philosophical attention and stimulated rich philosophical debate. Some of this debate was aimed at understanding, and sometimes criticizing, the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies prevailing …Read more
  • Deconstructing the Mind
    Oup Usa. 1996.
    In this book, Stich unravels - or deconstructs - the doctrine called "eliminativism". Eliminativism claims that beliefs, desires, and many other mental states we use to describe the mind do not exist, but are fiction posits of a badly mistaken theory of "folk psychology". Stich makes a u-turn in his book, opening up new and controversial positions.
  •  1
  •  230
    Moral judgment
    with Jennifer Ellen Nado and Daniel Kelly
    In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge. 2009.
    Questions regarding the nature of moral judgment loom large in moral philosophy. Perhaps the most basic of these questions asks how, exactly, moral judgments and moral rules are to be defined; what features distinguish them from other sorts of rules and judgments? A related question concerns the extent to which emotion and reason guide moral judgment. Are moral judgments made mainly on the basis of reason, or are they primarily the products of emotion? As an example of the former view, Kant held…Read more
  •  38
    The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2003.
    Comprising a series of specially commissioned chapters by leading scholars, this comprehensive volume presents an up-to-date survey of the central themes in the philosophy of mind. It leads the reader through a broad range of topics, including Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness, Dualism, Emotions, Folk Psychology, Free Will, Individualism, Personal Identity and The Mind-Body Problem. Provides a state of the art overview of philosophy of mind. Contains 16 newly-commissioned articles, all of w…Read more
  •  111
    Sosa’s topic is the use of intuitions in philosophy. Much of what I have written on the issue has been critical of appeals to intuition in epistemology, though in recent years I have become increasingly skeptical of the use of intuitions in ethics and in semantic theory as well.
  •  187
    Could man be an irrational animal?
    Synthese 64 (1): 115-35. 1985.
    1. When we attribute beliefs, desires, and other states of common sense psychology to a person, or for that matter to an animal or an artifact, we are assuming or presupposing that the person or object can be treated as an intentional system. 2. An intentional system is one which is rational through and through; its beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography…. Its desires are those it ought to have, given its biological needs and t…Read more
  • Replies
    In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 261-278. 1986.
  • 2007
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press. pp. 1. 2005.
  •  5
    On the ascription of content
    In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object, Oxford University Press. 1982.
  •  15
    The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical Import
    with Jerrold J. Katz
    Philosophical Review 83 (2): 259. 1974.