Patti Tamara Lenard

Across North America, Europe and Latin America, multiple sub-state jurisdictions have declared themselves to be migrant “sanctuaries”. By adopting sanctuary status, sub-state jurisdictions signal their welcoming attitude towards migrants as well their opposition to the state-level policies that target them for exclusion. In this article, I examine the place of sanctuary in the broader literature of political resistance and opposition in democratic states, and then whether it can be justified all things considered. I locate my examination in the political theory of federalism, to identify an expectation of cooperation – which, it appears, sanctuary jurisdictions are refusing to accept, usually with respect to immigration enforcement efforts. I refer to this form of opposition as “democratic non-cooperation” and identify its key features. I describe a “cooperation continuum”, to suggest that non-cooperation takes four main forms – evasion, non-engagement, disruption and obstruction – which I describe both in general terms and in relation to sanctuary practices in particular. Finally, I observe that the form of opposition that sanctuary is, is not limited to sanctuary: that is, there are other cases of this form of opposition in other policy domains, and moreover, not all of the objectives taken by those who deploy this form of opposition are progressive. Ultimately, this article's central contribution is to fleshing out modes of opposition in democratic spaces in general, by examining the morality of sanctuary actions taken around the world.

This chapter takes issue with Lenard’s defense of minority rights. Three issues are focused on. The first is her stretching of “political inclusion” to seemingly fit all cases, as well as the risks of relying too heavily upon it (it may actually push against minority accommodation instead of leading to it). The second is Lenard’s argument for a shared public culture to counteract the potential fragmenting that may occur because of multicultural accommodation. Not only that she takes this concern too seriously and seems to forget about the state, but there are nonidentity ways of achieving social cooperation. The third is the fact that many of Lenard’s examples seem to involve no minority rights at all, and so seem to actually support the argument for neutrality as the best way of gaining minority accommodation.

In this chapter, Patti Tamara Lenard responds to Peter Balint’s neutralist rejection of minority rights claims. The chapter examines Balint’s claim that culture is too hard to define, and rejects it, on the grounds that it is possible for culture to matter even if there are disputes about what should count as a culture; tricky definitional questions about culture do not undermine the real importance that cultures play in the lives of individuals. The chapter then examines the “domination” worry that Balint highlighted, the worry that if cultural groups are permitted preservation rights, the more powerful community members will dominate those who are less powerful. To do so, the chapter considers the political participation rates of Orthodox Jewish communities in the United States, to show that political inclusion can travel with community separation. Finally, the chapter expresses skepticism of the role that toleration can play in sustaining solidarity in a diverse political space, as Balint claimed.

This chapter concludes Part II of the book. It explains how neutrality is the friend, not enemy of disadvantaged minorities, and how neutrality, when properly realized, is critical of a status quo that privileges majority ways of life. This means that neutrality is the best way to achieve minority accommodation. But while multicultural minority rights and active indifference are both neutralizing of majority privilege, these two forms of neutrality are not equal. If the problem is majority privilege, the solution should be removing that privilege rather than adding new forms of privilege. This form of neutrality is both fair and accommodating of minority ways of life, and at least in multicultural contexts, can avoid the problems associated with minority rights and provide its own freedom-enhancing benefits.

This chapter looks at the role of citizens in accommodating minorities. Two different multicultural virtues are examined: respect and appreciation of difference and tolerance of difference. Despite its initial appeal, respect and appreciation of difference is not as accommodating as tolerance of difference. Tolerance, by focusing on behavior and not attitude, accommodates a much broader range of ways of life than respect and appreciation of difference. Tolerance is also much more neutral toward the different ways of life that exist in contemporary diverse societies.

This chapter provides the main argument against multicultural minority rights. A narrower understanding of neutrality, called “active indifference,” is introduced which can accommodate minority ways of life without granting minority rights. If majority privilege is the problem, then that privilege should be removed rather than adding new balancing forms of privilege in the form of multicultural minority rights. Active indifference not only avoids the problems of multicultural minority rights—problems such as reification and essentialism that are acknowledged by the advocates of multicultural minority rights—but has the added advantages of offering more freedom, both in terms of less restrictions and more opportunities.

This chapter examines the question of Indigenous peoples and other national minorities. While the argument so far has been against multicultural minority rights, nothing has been said about Indigenous peoples and other national minorities. While there is significant overlap between multicultural minority rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples and other national minorities, these issues are distinct. This is mainly because national minorities usually have additional grounds for claiming rights, commonly in the form of issues of sovereignty, historical injustice, and a desire for political autonomy. Where there is relative institutional disadvantage, active indifference may still play a role, but because there are additional—non-multicultural—grounds for differentiated rights, they may still be granted. But just because they may be granted in some cases for national minorities does not justify their need in the case of multicultural minorities.

This chapter introduces and explains the concept of neutral institutions. If the aim is to address the relative institutional disadvantage commonly faced by minorities, then neutral institutions are required. It is commonly thought that neutrality and minority rights are opposed, with multicultural minority rights uniquely being the pathway to minority accommodation. But neutrality can be achieved in two broad ways: one where majority advantage is simply removed, and another where minority rights are added to counter relative majority advantage. This means that multicultural minority rights are a form of neutrality, even if many of its proponents remain critical of neutrality.

This chapter introduces Balint’s argument against multicultural minority rights. Balint explains that he is for minority accommodation, but thinks that liberal neutrality is better than multicultural minority rights in achieving this important end. The problem of minority accommodation is one of relative majority privilege, especially in the case of key public institutions. It is this privilege that should be removed, and thus neutralized, instead of adding the new forms of minority privilege proposed by multicultural minority rights advocates.

This chapter examines the worry that acknowledging cultural claims serves to emphasize how citizens differ from each other rather than what they share in common and therefore undermines the solidarity that is meant to bind together members of a diverse democratic community. According to this view, not only does a robust multiculturalist approach undermine solidarity, but any attempt to build solidarity violates the commitments that multiculturalism is to supposed hold. In response to these worries, this chapter argues that communal solidarity is important to a well-functioning democracy _and_ that attempts to build solidarity both can and must be sensitive to the cultural diversity that characterizes democratic states. It offers an account of the content of a _shared public culture_ on which communities can build robust multicultural solidarity.

This chapter examines cultural preservation claims and explains why they have, previously, been treated as controversial in democratic states. Critics of multiculturalism have argued that cultural preservation rights lead to the separation of cultural groups from the larger society. In response to this claim, the chapter argues in general that claims for cultural preservation ought to be accommodated, because they too serve to enhance political inclusion by enabling members of minority cultures to raise their voices. It makes this case through the in-depth examination of three cases: public support for ethnically exclusive organizations, culturally specific schools, and the revitalization of Indigenous self-determination.

This chapter examines special cases of “cultural preservation” requests, where minority groups ask for noninterference. These claims cannot be justified in terms of a commitment to political inclusion. The chapter examines two cases: exemption from mandatory education, as requested by Amish and Orthodox Jewish communities, and exemption from majority state conflict-resolution procedures, as requested by many religious communities. The chapter argues that the majority’s response ought to be framed in terms of how best to keep opportunities for political inclusion open and available over the long term and that the choice made with respect to requested exemptions may well require compromise on both sides. The host community must proceed by protecting the basis for trust relations between culturally segregated groups and the majority community, on the grounds that this trust will sometimes be required to facilitate political cooperation in times of emergency. To illustrate the latter, the challenges faced in New York City as it combated the spread of Covid-19 in Orthodox Jewish communities are examined.

This chapter outlines the vast range of cultural accommodation claims that are made in democratic states. They are exemption claims; assistance claims; affirmative claims; special representation claims; self-determination claims; and recognition claims. The chapter suggests that on the grounds of political inclusion, these are claims are nearly all justified. The chapter then considers cultural preservation claims and argues, against critics of multiculturalism, that most preservation claims can and should be accommodated because they permit and encourage political inclusion. They do not, as critics have claimed, support segregation nor do they manifest a failure to integrate.

This chapter offers an account of culture and then defends cultural claims on the ground that culture matters to people. Culture is defined as essentially dynamic and the product of negotiation among its members, who vary in their attachment to it. The chapter then defends a voice-centric account of political inclusion and then argues that democratic states, because committed to the full and equal inclusion of all citizens, ought in general to accommodate cultural and religious practices as a result. Full and equal inclusion has four dimensions: the equal protection of rights, adequate representation, substantive access to political spaces, and a commitment to _listening_ to all speakers, regardless of their background. These dimensions together ensure the trust on which collaborative democratic politics in diverse states rely. The chapter distinguishes political inclusion from substantive integration, and argues that the former can be achieved without the latter.

This chapter introduces Patti Tamara Lenard’s defense of multiculturalism. The five steps of her part of the book are outlined: she begins with an account of culture and political inclusion, and argues that trust is at the centre of a collaborative democratic politics; she outlines the range of accommodation claims that are made in democratic states, including those based in equality of opportunity and reparations; she outlines the tricky cases she will consider in more depth, including culturally separate schools and Indigenous self-determination; she considers cultural groups that request exclusion rather than accommodation, including orthodox religious communities; and finally she defends the adoption of a shared public culture in diverse states.

The introduction to _Debating Multiculturalism_ outlines the main defenses and objections to multicultural accommodation in the political theory literature. It situates these debates in the context of real-world political controversies over whether and when to accommodate the cultural and religious practices of minorities in democratic states. It outlines the two positions defended over the course of the book: Patti Tamara Lenard’s defense of a robust multiculturalism which grants minority rights because of the importance of political inclusion, and Peter Balint’s defense of neutrality among ways of life as the guiding principle for democratic politics in diverse states, and which does not require minority rights.

In the wake of major terrorist attacks, calls for ever more draconian policies to prevent further outrages are common. Such responses raise the pressing question: is it possible to effectively fight terrorism while respecting democratic values of equality and trust? Examining recent examples of terrorist atrocities – from the murder of Muslims in New Zealand and Jews in Pittsburgh to the Charlie Hebdo attacks – Patti Tamara Lenard considers how democracies should tackle terrorism within the constraints imposed by democratic principles. For many, the tension between liberty and security necessarily means that the only way to protect security is to sacrifice liberty—but Lenard rejects this claim, and instead argues that security’s goal should be to keep all citizens equally secure in the face of terrorist threats. Critiquing existing policies, from exile to racial profiling, she outlines what ethical counter-terrorism policies should look like, arguing for strategies that respect equality and thereby maintain trust among diverse communities in democratic states. This erudite guide to how states might ethically fight terrorism will be essential reading for any student or scholar of public affairs, security, counter-terrorism, and democratic governance.

In this article, I argue that there are good reasons to permit states to engage in their own forms of prioritization of refugees for admission, if doing so enables more refugees overall to find safety. I identify three distinct clusters of programs that states operate, those that emphasize contribution-based reciprocity, those that emphasize anticipated benefit, and those that elevate cultural considerations. I assess the legitimacy of these programs separately, and then consider them together, to defend the view that – overall, considering the profound need for resettlement spots – they warrant our normative support. At least at first glance, the reason that these programs are legitimate is that they are all underpinned by principles in moral philosophy that in general command widespread support. In the final section, I examine the discomfort they generate, and suggest that the discomfort has three related sources: (i) that there is something wrong with considering the benefits refugees may bring when at issue is simply whether states are carrying out their moral duties towards them; (ii) that the result of permitting such prioritization is that those who are most vulnerable are left behind; and (iii) that cultural considerations can easily slide into racist considerations. While I agree that we must be attentive to how these programs operate in practice, and whether they generate harm (in particular, more harm than good), I believe that in the current context, these objections can be adequately countered so that we should in general offer these programs our cautious, and conditional, support.

My focus is on how democratic states restrict, constrain and shape the movement of citizens and residents across their territory. My central claim is that a focus on equal relations between them, as relational egalitarians emphasize, can show where restrictions on movement are permissible or problematic. Over the course of the discussion, I offer many examples, as well as four cases in which I assess specific movement-related policies for whether they are violations of relational equality: exclusionary zoning, eminent domain, resettlement of isolated communities and no-fly lists. These analyses are neither extensive nor exhaustive, but I hope they are sufficient to demonstrate that relational egalitarians should be concerned with whether citizens and residents can move freely and to indicate how a relational egalitarian can evaluate movement-related policies as to whether they support or undermine the ability of citizens and residents to interact as social equals.

Calls to expand temporary work programmes come from two directions. First, as global justice advocates observe, every year thousands of poor migrants cross borders in search of better opportunities, often in the form of improved employment opportunities. As a result, international organizations now lobby in favour of expanding ‘guest-work’ opportunities, that is, opportunities for citizens of poorer countries to migrate temporarily to wealthier countries to fill labour shortages. Second, temporary work programmes permit domestic governments to respond to two internal, contradictory political pressures: (1) to fill labour shortages and (2) to do so without increasing rates of permanent migration. Temporary work programmes permit governments to appear ‘tough’ on migration, while responding to employer pressure to locate workers willing to work in low-skilled, poorly remunerated positions. The coincidence of national self-interest and global justice generates a strong case in favour of expanding guest-work. We evaluate the moral benefits and burdens of expanding guest-work opportunities, and conclude that although there are benefits to be gleaned from the perspective of global wealth redistribution, at present, temporary work programmes are generally unjust. We will argue that just temporary work programmes, in time, permit temporary workers to attain citizenship. This spells the end of traditional temporary work programmes, which require that workers return to their home country in time; instead, what is temporary is the employment obligation that must be fulfilled as a requirement to access citizenship. As long as this requirement is met, we endorse guest-work programmes as a tool to respond to global inequality