Patti Tamara Lenard

In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar offers us two concrete proposals for combatting the danger posed by the shifting border, especially to those crossing borders in search of safety. One proposal suggests that human rights travel with migrants, so that agents who control the border must take responsibility for protecting their human rights at the border. A second proposal, which forms the basis of my commentary below, asks that states consider alternative ways for migrants to seek protection safely. In responding to this second proposal, I make two proposals of my own that stem from Shachar's analysis: (1) her analysis offers us the resources we need in order to expand, not only the channels available to migrants for seeking protection, but also our sense of who should be involved in controlling admission, and (2) expanding the “who” that is involved in admission gives meaning to the concept of “moral proximity” which can help to overcome the territorial imperative that dominates the rules governing international migration, i.e., the imperative that protection travels with physical access to territory, only.

Multiculturalism has become a political touchstone in many countries around the world. While many of those on the right oppose it, and many of those on the left embrace it, things are not this simple. For those who defend them, multicultural policies are generally seen as key to the fair and successful integration of minorities, many of whom are immigrants, into diverse democratic societies. For those who oppose multiculturalism, who have become part of the so-called "backlash" against multiculturalism, they are charged with generating segregation rather than inclusion, undermining national cultures, reinforcing difference, and privileging minority groups. Around the world, we see failing attempts at migrant integration, persistent religious intolerance and racial and ethnic discrimination, resurgent national minorities, emboldened majorities, permanent minorities, continuing social isolation, and increasing extremism, including in the form of white nationalism. But is multiculturalism the solution to these problems or does it just make them worse? In this for-and-against book, two prominent scholars of multiculturalism put forward different answers to this important question. While Patti Tamara Lenard argues for minority rights as both the consequence of a right to culture and a way to redress the effects of nation-building, Peter Balint rejects minority rights altogether, instead arguing for a re-imagined liberal neutrality. This theoretical disagreement plays out in real-world policy disagreement. Lenard, for example, argues strongly in favor of exemptions from general rules for minority cultures including the right of Sikhs to be exempt from helmet laws, and for Jews and Muslims to be exempt from bans on male circumcision. She also defends the right of minority cultures to have government-supported separate spaces. Balint, on the other hand, argues directly against these types of exemptions and government support. He is opposed to any form of differentiation based on culture, religion, or ethnicity. The book uses a wide range of real-world examples to demonstrate their significant theoretical disagreement, and to recommend very different policy proposals.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 291-312, August 2022. Across North America, Europe and Latin America, multiple sub-state jurisdictions have declared themselves to be migrant “sanctuaries”. By adopting sanctuary status, sub-state jurisdictions signal their welcoming attitude towards migrants as well their opposition to the state-level policies that target them for exclusion. In this article, I examine the place of sanctuary in the broader literature of political resistance and opposition in democratic states, and then whether it can be justified all things considered. I locate my examination in the political theory of federalism, to identify an expectation of cooperation – which, it appears, sanctuary jurisdictions are refusing to accept, usually with respect to immigration enforcement efforts. I refer to this form of opposition as “democratic non-cooperation” and identify its key features. I describe a “cooperation continuum”, to suggest that non-cooperation takes four main forms – evasion, non-engagement, disruption and obstruction – which I describe both in general terms and in relation to sanctuary practices in particular. Finally, I observe that the form of opposition that sanctuary is, is not limited to sanctuary: that is, there are other cases of this form of opposition in other policy domains, and moreover, not all of the objectives taken by those who deploy this form of opposition are progressive. Ultimately, this article's central contribution is to fleshing out modes of opposition in democratic spaces in general, by examining the morality of sanctuary actions taken around the world.

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 594-600, July 2022. In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar offers us two concrete proposals for combatting the danger posed by the shifting border, especially to those crossing borders in search of safety. One proposal suggests that human rights travel with migrants, so that agents who control the border must take responsibility for protecting their human rights at the border. A second proposal, which forms the basis of my commentary below, asks that states consider alternative ways for migrants to seek protection safely. In responding to this second proposal, I make two proposals of my own that stem from Shachar's analysis: her analysis offers us the resources we need in order to expand, not only the channels available to migrants for seeking protection, but also our sense of who should be involved in controlling admission, and expanding the “who” that is involved in admission gives meaning to the concept of “moral proximity” which can help to overcome the territorial imperative that dominates the rules governing international migration, i.e., the imperative that protection travels with physical access to territory, only.

As far as immigration theory is concerned, the attempt to reconcile concern for all persons with the reality of state boundaries and exclusionary policies has proved difficult within the limits of normative liberal political philosophy. However, the realpolitik of migration in today's environment forces a major paradigm shift. We must move beyond standard debates between those who argue for more open borders and those who argue for more closed borders. This book aims to show that a realistic utopia of political theory of immigration is possible, but argues that to do so we must focus on expanding the boundaries of what are familiar normative positions in political theory. Theorists must better inform themselves of the concrete challenges facing migration policies: statelessness, brain drain, migrant rights, asylum policies, migrant detention practices, climate refugees, etc. We must ask: what is the best we can and ought to wish for in the face of these difficult migration challenges. Blake, Carens, and Cole offer pieces that outline the major normative questions in the political theory of immigration. The positions these scholars outline are challenged by the pieces contributed by Lister, Ottonelli, Torresi, Sager, and Silverman. These latter pieces force the reformulation of the central positions in normative political theory of immigration. This book was originally published as a special issue of New Challenges in Immigration Theory.

Democratic theory offers robust resources in order to defend the claim that noncitizens are, in many cases, entitled to the right to vote in their place of residence, regardless of their citizenship. On this, Avner de Shalit and I are in broad agreement. But the route we take to justify this right rests on substantially different argumentation: whereas I believe that residence is necessary and sufficient to justify the right to vote at the municipal and, more controversially, at the national level, de Shalit believes that noncitizens must also intend to reside in a city over the longer term in order to merit the right to vote on city matters. I will argue that this focus on intention is dangerous for the most vulnerable of city dwellers, who are most in need of the right to vote, even if only at the city level. In particular, I argue that the only way that the right to vote can play its protective role is if it is available to migrants on the basis of residence, regardless of their stated intention.

Are democratic states permitted to denationalize citizens, in particular those whom they believe pose dangers to the physical safety of others? In this article, I argue that they are not. The power to denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—is one that many states have historically claimed for themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the last several decades. Recent terrorist events have, however, prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider the role that denationalization can and perhaps should play in democratic states, in particular with respect to its role in protecting national security and in supporting the global fight against terror more generally. In this article, my objective is to show that denationalization laws have no place in democratic states. To understand why, I propose examining the foundations of the right of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong interests that individuals have in security of residence. I use this formulation of the right to respond to two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens who threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a democratic state or the ability of a democratic state to function as a democratic state, and (2) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens because they possess citizenship status in a second country that is also able to protect their rights.

The global space is in need of creative solutions to the challenges posed by those seeking, and deserving of, asylum. In some democratic states, experiments in permitting citizens to have a greater role in selecting refugees for admission are underway; in this article, I consider the conditions that must apply to any citizen‐selection scheme, in order for such a scheme to be morally acceptable. I begin with an account of the way in which citizen‐selection schemes – usually called ‘sponsorship programs’ – operate presently. I then offer a justification for engaging citizens in refugee resettlement in general, as well as in selecting specific refugees for admission in particular, and then identify several conditions that must attend any permissible citizen‐selection scheme. I defend this account from two objections: (1) that states should be the primary, and indeed only, agent that selects refugees for admission and (2) that citizens will inevitably use problematic criteria in selecting refugees for admission, so they should be denied the right to do so. I conclude with some proposals for how a citizen‐selection scheme can be crafted to respond to this latter worry, including an outline of an exception clause that permits citizens to make the case that some refugees ought to be resettled, even if not specially selected by the UNHCR for resettlement priority, including especially family members and friends.

Democratic institutions and practice depend on trust, in two ways. Citizens must trust each other to abide by shared rules and norms that together govern a political community; it is a feature of democratic states that they direct their resources not to enforcement of rule abidingness, but rather towards providing collective and public goods. Instead, states rely on the semi-voluntary compliance of citizens with these shared norms and laws. Citizens must also trust their political representatives, who via their election are granted discretion to make decisions that will have significant impact on the lives of those they represent. Yet, according to many scholars across many disciplines, this trust is at risk of being undermined, if it hasn’t yet been so. The possible reasons for weakened and broken trust are many, ranging from escalating wealth inequalities, to increasing cultural and ethnic diversity, to political incompetence of both voters and political representatives, to corruption among political representatives. In this article, I examine the trust that underpins the discretion accorded to elected representatives, to identify when the improper use of this discretion may reasonably be thought to be a source of distrust. In particular, I argue that where discretion is used arbitrarily, it may threaten to undermine the trust relations between citizens and their representatives, and therefore the efficient and effective running of democratic states.

Cosmopolitan principles of justice tell us that it is the responsibility of the wealthy to ensure the immediate transfer of resources to the poor. Yet, it cannot be denied that most countries, and most individual citizens, seem unwilling to act as these principles demand. At issue is motivation: although many people would agree that cosmopolitan principles of justice are right, at least to some extent, few seem motivationally inspired to act upon them. This paper evaluates one set of proposals for securing the transfer of resources from the wealthy to the poor, namely, those that suggest that the right way to achieve cosmopolitan objectives is to generate institutions that will, over time, produce cosmopolitans. I argue that we should focus, doubly, on the generation of supra-national institutions as a way to create a?global demos? and on harnessing the motivational resources available at the nation-state level.

One of the most significant challenges facing global egalitarian theorists is the motivational gap: there is a noted gap between the duties imposed by a global commitment to the equal moral worth of all people and the willingness of the wealthy to carry out these duties. For Pablo Gilabert, the apparent absence of motivation to act justly on a global scale presses us to consider the importance of feasibility in developing a persuasive account of global justice, part of which requires being attentive to what motivates us to act in support of global egalitarianism. In this article, I am critical of Gilabert’s account of the role that relationships between individuals play in conceiving our global justice duties. I begin with an account of some confusion in Gilabert’s account of the actual costs likely to be imposed on citizens of wealthy states as a result of the duties he demands of us and why it is important to resolve that confusion. I will then consider, and critique, Gilabert’s account of special responsibilities. I shall argue that, fundamentally, there is an ineliminable tension between the special responsibilities individuals legitimately possess and the duties they have to eradicate global poverty.

Increasingly, western democratic countries are bearing witness to immigrant protest, that is, protest by immigrants who are dissatisfied with their status in the host community. In protesting, the immigrants object to the ways in which various laws and practices have proved to be obstacles to their full integration. Because immigrants, upon entering, have consented to abide by the rules and regulations of the host state, it might be thought that these forms of civil disobedience are, effectively, contract violations. Immigrants might therefore be thought to have a particularly stringent duty to abide by the laws of their host state. This paper evaluates whether immigrants are indeed under a special duty to abide by the laws of their host state. First, it suggests that it is useful — although incomplete — to apply the device of the ‘contract’ to understanding the relationship between new immigrants and the host community. Second, it argues that there are limits to what can be demanded of and by immigrants as well as of and by host communities. It then turns to offering principles that help to evaluate the motivations of immigrant protestors, as well as that help guide their actions, when they believe that the community they have joined is treating them unjustly. These principles suggest that immigrant protest actions are subject to the restriction that they do not undermine the possibility of an inclusive democratic community.