Jose Juan Moreso

The author discusses a question related to a certain aspect of justification of legal decisions, often so-called internal justification-a legal decision is internally justified if and only if it can be deduced from the norm(s) applicable to the case, and from the statement(s) describing the facts of the case. According to this notion, infinite irrelevant logical consequences are justified. To avoid this counterintuitive conclusion, the author analyzes three notions of relevance: Sperber-Wilson's notion, Anderson-Belnap's notion, and Schurz's notion. The author presents a reconstruction of the notion of relevance very close to Schurz's notion, extended to make it suitable to the particular characteristics of deontic logic. Finally, this notion of relevance is used to discuss some aspects of the concept of normative system, conceived as a deductive system, that is, a system containing all its logical consequences.

This paper intends to show that it is possible to take convincingly into account the platitudes which underlie our moral practice. It deals with the articulation of an indirect strategy to answer the arguments of moral scepticism: if we can generate a conceptual space that takes such platitudes into account, perhaps we could ignore the sceptic doubts.Several metaethical conceptions can ecumenically carry out this task. Particularly, even if moral realism implies cognitivism and objectivism, moral objectivism –the plausibility of rational agreement in morals- does presuppose necessarily neither realism nor cognitivism.An argument against moral relativism is also presented. It is argued that there are several ways of pluralism compatible with the very field of moral objectivity.The conclusion maintains that only an objectivist account of our moral practice is apt to make sense of our institutional designs that acknowledge universal human rights

This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law.

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence.

En esta contribución intentaré mostrar que el criterio lex superior derogat legi inferiori conduce a una consecuencia que, al menos en lo que conozco, no ha sido todavía advertida. Si las normas de la máxima jerarquía de un sistema jurídico, verbigracia, normas constitucionales constituyen un conjunto consistente, entonces necesariamente el sistema jurídico es consistente. Dicho de otra manera, lex superior preserva necesariamente la consistencia. Si las normas del nivel más alto son miembros de un conjunto consistente, los niveles inferiores de la jerarquía no podrían admitir normas contradictorias con las superiores. Más aún, habida cuenta que de una contradicción se sigue cualquier norma, en virtud del principio lógico ex falso quodlibet, de dos normas contradictorias que pertenecen a algún nivel inferior se derivan algunas normas en contradicción con normas del nivel superior; así normas contradictorias no podrían ser admitidas en los niveles inferiores. In this contribution, I shall intend to show that the criterion lex superior derogat legi inferiori has a consequence which, as far as I know, has not been noted yet: if the higherlevel norms in a legal system, i.e. constitutional norms, configure a consistent set, then necessarily the legal system is consistent. Lex superior preserves necessarily the consistency, as it were. If higher-level norms are members of a consistent set, then the lower-levels could admit no norm in contradiction with the higher-level norms. Moreover, given that from a contradiction follows anything, in virtue of the logical principle ex falso quodlibet, from two contradictory lower-level norms follow some norms in contradiction with norms of the higher-level, thus contradictory norms could never be admit in the lower-levels

Algunos de los más relevantes filósofos del derecho de los últimos años, como Carlos S. Nino y Ronald Dworkin, han defendido que hay una pluralidad de conceptos de Derecho. Scott Shapiro ha sostenido una posición especialmente relevante acerca de ello: la palabra ‘Derecho’ es sistemáticamente ambigua, pues a veces designa un conjunto de normas y otras veces una organización social. Esta es precisamente la tesis criticada en el trabajo. Se argumenta, basándose en determinada literatura filosófica acerca de los conceptos, que los conceptos de objetos sociales de carácter intencional contienen una dimensión social y una dimensión significativa, normativa en el caso del derecho. El mismo concepto de Derecho expresa una dimensión social y una normativa imbricadas entre sí. Some of the most relevant legal philosophers in the last decades, as Carlos S. Nino and Ronald Dworkin, have defended the idea that there is a plurality of concepts of law. Scott Shapiro has sustained this account in a particularly relevant way: the word ‘law’ displays a ubiquitous ambiguity, sometimes designates a set of norms and other a social organization. This is precisely the thesis which is criticized in the paper. It is argued, from a certain philosophical literature about the concepts, that concepts of social objects of intentional character contain a social dimension and a meaning dimension, normative in the case of the law. That is to say, the concept of law expresses a social dimension and a normative dimension intertwined