-
19Purple Haze: The Puzzle of ConsciousnessAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2): 245-246. 2002.Book Information Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Levine Joseph New York Oxford University Press 2001 204 Hardback £22.50 By Levine Joseph. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. 204. Hardback:£22.50
-
98Moral evil and human freedom: A reply to TiernoSophia 42 (2): 107-111. 2003.Many theists believe that the so-called ‘free will defence’ successfully undermines the antitheist argument from moral evil. However, in a recent issue of Sophia Joel Thomas Tierno provides the ‘adequacy argument’ in order to show an alleged difficulty with the free will defence. I argue that the adequacy argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of moral evil.
-
74God's point of view: A reply to ManderHeythrop Journal 44 (1). 2003.According to one antitheist argument, God cannot know what it is like to be me because He, who is necessarily unlimited and necessarily incorporeal, cannot have my point of view. In his recent article, William J. Mander tries to demonstrate that God can indeed have His own point of view and my point of view at the same time by providing examples that seem to motivate his claim. I argue that none of his examples succeeds in this task. I introduce a different objection to the antitheist argument t…Read more
-
64I have argued elsewhere that nearly all existing arguments against Anselmian theism—such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God’s inability to sin, and the problem of evil—can be refuted all at once by holding that God possesses the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence instead of insisting that He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Some critics suggest, however, that my strategy fails, at least with respect to the problem of evil, because that problem…Read more
-
121Anselmian TheismPhilosophy Compass 6 (8): 564-571. 2011.In this article, I discuss Anselmian theism, which is arguably the most widely accepted form of monotheism. First, I introduce the core theses of Anselmian theism and consider its historical and developmental origins. I contend that, despite its name, Anselmian theism might well be older than Anselm. I also claim, supporting my argument by reference to research in the cognitive science of religion, that, contrary to what many think, Anselmian theism might be a natural result of human cognitive d…Read more
-
204Salvation in HeavenPhilosophical Papers 33 (1): 97-119. 2004.The aim of this paper is to examine the difficulties that belief in a paradisiacal afterlife creates for orthodox theists. In particular, we consider the difficulties that arise when one asks whether there is freedom in Heaven, i.e. whether the denizens of Heaven have libertarian freedom in action. Our main contention is that this 'Problem of Heaven' makes serious difficulties for proponents of free will theodicies and for proponents of free will defences
-
178The best of all possible worldsSynthese 143 (3): 309-320. 2005.The Argument from Inferiority holds that our world cannot be the creation of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being; for if it were, it would be the best of all possible worlds, which evidently it is not. We argue that this argument rests on an implausible principle concerning which worlds it is permissible for an omnipotent being to create: roughly, the principle that such a being ought not to create a non-best world. More specifically, we argue that this principle is plausible only if we assum…Read more
-
47Omniscience and physicalism: A reply to Beyer (review)Sophia 44 (2): 55-58. 2005.In a recent issue ofSophia, Jason A. Beyer introduced objections to the antitheist arguments that purport to show the inconsistencies between God’s attributes. In this short response I argue that Beyer’s objections are untenable
-
676Divine omniscience and experience: A Reply to AlterArs Disputandi 3. 2003.According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they con ict with tradi…Read more
-
348The knowledge argument against dualismTheoria 68 (3): 205-223. 2002.Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson
-
67A further reply to Beyer on omniscienceSophia 46 (1): 65-67. 2007.I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His other attributes.
-
University of OklahomaDepartment of PhilosophyProfessor of Philosophy and Kingfisher College Chair of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics
Norman, Oklahoma, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Philosophy of Mind |
Applied Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
The Meaning of Life |