Adam Briggle

The empirical turn has been framed far too much in terms of what philosophers say and not to whom they speak. I apply the logic of the empirical turn to the very philosophers who carry its banner. I argue that once we look at them through their own lens, we discover that the empirical turn is not such a revolutionary thing after all. It is a turn within the disciplinary model of knowledge production. In other words, its own material culture and political economy look just the same as so-called classical philosophy of technology. In contrast, I sketch out what a policy turn looks like, which is a turn toward a new model of philosophical research, one that begins with real-world problems as they are debated in public and cashes out its value in real-time with a variety of stakeholders. I conclude by sketching some of the main ramifications of taking a policy turn in the philosophy of technology.

In this essay, we reply to the five commentaries offered of our 2016 book, Socrates Tenured: The Institutions of 21st Century Philosophy. We argue that, in a recursive fashion, those commentaries exemplify the thesis of our book – that contemporary philosophy has a blind spot concerning the philosophical priors of its status as an institution. That is, 20th and now 21st century philosophy has limited metaphilosophy to being an exclusively theoretical exercise, neglecting to also pursue a ‘philosophy of philosophy’ in its material, bureaucratic, and Marxist dimensions. After making these points in the introduction, the article is divided into three parts that deal, in turn, with comments that are facile, earnest, and provocative. We then conclude by noting the unintentional irony of our contemporary situation, where the vast majority of philosophy departments are inhabited by sophists rather than philosophers.

This paper looks at the question of sustainability through the prism of a collective action problem fundamentally driven by human desires and needs. It ftrst characterizes the problem of non-sustainability by combining environmental ethics with the philosophy of technology. The paper then considers four basic strategies for resolving the collective action problem: virtue, regulation, price, and innovation. Each solution has its own set of weaknesses and strengths, meaning that achieving sustainability will remain a difficult balancing act.

Modern technology has changed the way we live, work, play, communicate, fight, love, and die. Yet few works have systematically explored these changes in light of their implications for individual and social welfare. How can we conceptualize and evaluate the influence of technology on human well-being? Bringing together scholars from a cross-section of disciplines, this volume combines an empirical investigation of technology and its social, psychological, and political effects, and a philosophical analysis and evaluation of the implications of such effects.

The demand for greater public accountability is changing the nature of ex ante peer review at public science agencies worldwide. Based on a four year research project, this essay examines these changes through an analysis of the process of grant proposal review at two US public science agencies, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). Weaving historical and conceptual narratives with analytical accounts, we describe the ways in which these two agencies struggle with the question of incorporating considerations of societal impact into the process of peer review. We use this comparative analysis to draw two main conclusions. First, evaluation of broader societal impacts is not different in kind from evaluation of intellectual merit. Second, the scientific community may actually bolster its autonomy by taking a broader range of considerations into its peer review processes

Natural science and economics are regularly used as means for adjudicating environmental controversies. But can these become stalking-horses for other concerns? Might some environmental controversies be aesthetic in nature and likely to resist resolution unless and until we acknowledge this? This paper uses the case study of a proposed wind farm to examine the relationships between the humanities, sciences, and stakeholders in environmental decision making. After providing background on wind power and the proposed Nantucket Sound wind farm, it addresses four questions: What does “aesthetics” mean? Howwere aesthetic concerns expressed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and what were the shortcomings of the EIS process? How could it be improved? This last question raises issues about how to rationally adjudicate matters of aesthetics in environmental policy making. The paper concludes with some thoughts on why this is such an important (and thorny) issue and what role humanists should play in environmental disputes.

While education in ethics and the responsible conduct of research is widely acknowledged as an essential component of graduate education, particularly in the STEM disciplines, little consensus exists on how best to accomplish this goal. Recent years have witnessed a turn toward the use of games in this context. Drawing from two NSF-funded grants, this paper takes a critical look at the use of games in ethics and RCR education. It does so by: setting the development of research and engineering ethics games in wider historical and theoretical contexts, which highlights their promise to solve important pedagogical problems; reporting on some initial results from our own efforts to develop a game; and reflecting on the challenges that arise in using games for ethics education. In our discussion of the challenges, we draw out lessons to improve this nascent approach to ethics education in the STEM disciplines.

The theme of this volume is the multi-faceted 'computational turn' that is occurring through the interaction of the disciplines of philosophy and computing. In computer and information sciences, there are significant conceptual and methodological questions that require reflection and analysis. Moreover, digital, information and communication technologies have had tremendous impact on society, which raises further philosophical questions. This book tries to facilitate the task to continuously work to ensure that its diversity of perspectives and methods proves a source of strength and collaboration rather than a source of instability and disintegration. The first three contributions explore the phenomenon of virtual worlds. The next four focus on robots and artificial agents. Then a group of chapters discusses the relation between human mentality and information processing in computers and the final section covers a broad range of issues at the interface of computers and society.

Are citizens of contemporary technological society authors of their own lives? With Alasdair MacIntyre, Bruno Latour and Albert Borgmann, we discuss the shortcomings of traditional liberalism in terms of its ability to answer this question. MacIntyre argues that biological vulnerabilities and social interdependencies establish meaningful parameters within which reason and willing emerge. But MacIntyre ignores technologies as a third parameter. Latour defines humans as nodes in a socio-technical network, in which technologies are actors on par with humans. However, Latour adopts a purely external perspective, ignoring human intentions, desires, and reasons. Borgmann argues that although freedom of choice is severely restricted, sometimes one can still resist the rule of technology. But Borgmann denies the pluralism of modern societies. Although all three schools have their shortcomings, combined, they provide us with a valuable palette of insights on human agency in a technological culture.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework to aid in understanding and evaluating love online. The framework maps the territory of online love by identifying important issues and providing a mechanism for combining relevant theoretical perspectives.Design/methodology/approachInterdisciplinary literature is reviewed and related through normative and descriptive conceptual analysis.FindingsA diverse and complex set of practices, technologies, intentions, and behaviors comprise love online. Theoretical works on love and mediation can be combined to improve conceptual clarity.Practical implicationsThe framework provides a simple but powerful tool for making sense of and critiquing the existing literature as well as outlining avenues for future research.Originality/valueThe framework puts diverse strands of scholarly work into an interdisciplinary discussion about an important phenomenon in new media societies.

This essay argues that political, economic, and cultural developments have made the twentieth century disciplinary approach to philosophy unsustainable. It (a) discusses the reasons behind this unsustainability, which also affect the academy at large, (b) describes applied philosophy as an inadequate theoretical reaction to contemporary societal pressures, and (c) proposes a dedisciplined and interstitial approach??field philosophy??as a better response to the challenges facing the twenty-first century philosophy

Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews’ article “Unreal Friends” argues that the formation of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts, including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness to and precision about one’s own and one’s friend’s character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet. Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews.

Several presidents have created bioethics councils to advise their administrations on the importance, meaning and possible implementation or regulation of rapidly developing biomedical technologies. From 2001 to 2005, the President's Council on Bioethics, created by President George W. Bush, was under the leadership of Leon Kass. The Kass Council, as it was known, undertook what Adam Briggle describes as a more rich understanding of its task than that of previous councils. The council sought to understand what it means to advance human flourishing at the intersection of philosophy, politics, science, and technology within a democratic society. Briggle's survey of the history of U.S. public bioethics and advisory bioethics commissions, followed by an analysis of what constitutes a "rich" bioethics, forms the first part of the book. The second part treats the Kass Council as a case study of a federal institution that offered public, ethical advice within a highly polarized context, with the attendant charges of inappropriate politicization and policy irrelevance. The conclusion synthesizes the author's findings into a story about the possible relationships between philosophy and policy making. "Adam Briggle has written a rich and sympathetic account of the President's Council on Bioethics led by Leon Kass. It puts in historical context the efforts of this council to move beyond the limited 'instrumentalist' approaches to bioethics taken by earlier commissions, toward a more philosophically serious effort to deliberate on the human goods put in play by modern biomedicine. In the process it answers many of the charges of politicization and corrects the record concerning the council's work." --_Francis Fukuyama, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies_ "What an eloquent, humane, and wise book. Briggle discovers an imperfect yet fascinating effort to bring the world of biomedical research into the domain of public philosophy. His scholarship and generosity make clear that a democratic society need not be morally shackled to the realm of the possible that science is constantly expanding." --_Daniel Sarewitz, Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes, Arizona State University _ "This is the most persuasive and thoughtful reconstruction of the Kass Council's goals and rationale that I have seen. Adam Briggle's account of the notion of a 'richer' bioethics is comprehensive an well-reasoned." --_Jonathan D. Moreno, University of Pennsylvania _ "Adam Briggle has written a fine book on a complex, controversial topic. He shows the wisdom of the approach to bioethics taken by the Kass Council, sets right the unfair and often nasty attacks on the council and Kass himself, and offers a perceptive and wide-ranging look at the terrain of ethics." --_Daniel Callahan, The Hastings Center _.

Philosophers view themselves as critical thinkers par excellence. But they have overlooked the institutional arrangements that govern their lives. The early twentieth-century research university disciplined philosophers, placing them in departments, where they wrote for and were judged by their disciplinary peers. Oddly, this change has been unremarked upon, or has been treated as simply part of the necessary professionalization of an academic field of research. The department has been tacitly assumed to be a neutral space from which thought germinates; it is not itself an object of reflection. We find no explorations of the effects that departmentalization might have on philosophical theorizing, or speculations about where else philosophers could be housed, or how, by being located elsewhere, they might develop alternative accounts of the world or have come up with new ways of philosophizing.