•  56
    Massive modularity is consistent with most forms of neural reuse
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 289-290. 2010.
    Anderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support
  •  15
    The Cognitive Basis of Science (edited book)
    with Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich, and Michael Siegal
    Cambridge University Press. 2002.
    The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns the question 'What makes science possible?' Specifically, what features of the human mind and of human culture and cognitive development permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scienti…Read more
  •  312
    Language in cognition
    In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    In E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, 2008.
  •  4
    Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1). 1998.
  •  282
    Conscious experience versus conscious thought
    In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference, Mit Press. 2006.
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking…Read more
  •  959
    We argue that Graziano and Kastner are mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed social perception account of consciousness. For the latter should not predict that neglect would result from damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is better explained in terms of damage to attentional mechanisms.
  •  51
    Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
    In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 89--107. 2009.
  •  95
    Perceiving mental states
    Consciousness and Cognition 36 498-507. 2015.
  •  183
    Creative action in mind
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (4). 2011.
    The goal of this article is to display the attractiveness of a novel account of the place of creativity in the human mind. This is designed to supplement (and perhaps replace) the widespread assumption that creativity is thought-based, involving novel combinations of concepts to form creative thoughts, with the creativity of action being parasitic upon prior creative thinking. According to the proposed account, an additional (or perhaps alternative) locus of creativity lies in the assembly and a…Read more
  •  282
    Moral Responsibility and Consciousness
    with Matt King
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2): 200-228. 2012.
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, …Read more
  •  230
    Human creativity: Its cognitive basis, its evolution, and its connections with childhood pretence
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2): 225-249. 2002.
    This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other—namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a s…Read more
  •  61
    On concept and object
    Theoria 49 (2): 49-86. 1983.
  •  139
    Animal subjectivity
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4. 1998.
    Carruthers, P. . Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy
  •  404
    Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much
    Philosophical Psychology 18 (1): 83-102. 2005.
    According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychol…Read more
  • Reply to Levine
    Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1-2): 68-73. 2005.
  •  3
    First page preview
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4). 2004.
  •  14
    This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability…Read more
  •  215
    Moderately massive modularity
    In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-89. 2003.
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
  •  23
    Assertion and Conditionals
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145): 566. 1986.
    This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked thro…Read more
  •  69
    This chapter argues that there are multiple adaptations underlying the distinctiveness of the human mind. Careful analysis of the capacities that are involved in the creation, acquisition, and transmission of culture and cultural products suggests that it is very unlikely that these could all be underlain by just one, or a few, novel cognitive systems. On the contrary, there are at least a handful of such systems, each of which is largely independent of the others.
  • Lycan, W. G., "Consciousness" (review)
    Mind 97 (n/a): 640. 1988.
  •  78
    Opening Up Vision: The Case Against Encapsulation
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4): 721-742. 2016.
    Many have argued that early visual processing is encapsulated from the influence of higher-level goals, expectations, and knowledge of the world. Here we confront the main arguments offered in support of such a view, showing that they are unpersuasive. We also present evidence of top–down influences on early vision, emphasizing data from cognitive neuroscience. Our conclusion is that encapsulation is not a defining feature of visual processing. But we take this conclusion to be quite modest in s…Read more
  •  220
    The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice
    Cambridge University Press. 1992.
    Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. He explores a variety of moral theories, arguing that animals lack direct moral significance. This provocative but judiciously argued book will appeal to all those interested in animal rights, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why t…Read more
  •  122
    This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds wit…Read more
  •  32
    Understanding names
    Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130): 19-36. 1983.