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Review of John Dupre's Human Nature and the Limits of Science (review)Economics and Philosophy 18 (2): 357-362. 2002.
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31Introduction: What makes science possibleIn Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science, Cambridge University Press. 2002.
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10Some New Techniques for the Analysis Correlations of Point DistributionsIn R. J. Russell, N. Murphy & A. R. Peacocke (eds.), Chaos and Complexity, Vatican Observatory Publications. pp. 165. 1995.
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121Human nature and the limits of science, John Dupré. Clarendon press, 2001, 211 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 18 (2): 351-385. 2002.
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383Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap"Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2): 153-174. 2004.Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an
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112Who is blind to blindsight?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.This paper uses the explanation of blindsight generated by a two-systems theory of vision in order to set Siewert a dilemma. Either his blindsight examples are modelled on actual blindsight, in which case certain reductive theories of phenomenal consciousness will have no difficulty in accommodating them. Or they are intended to be purely imaginary, in which case they will have no force against a reductive naturalist
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189Valence and ValuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 658-680. 2017.Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions, moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion.This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest that enough is now known about the causes, consequences, and properties of valence to indicate that it forms a unitary natural-psychological kind, one that seemingly plays a fundamental role in motivating all kinds of intentional action. If this turns out to be true, then the correct characterization of the natur…Read more
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59Reductive Explanation and the "Explanatory Gap"Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2): 153-173. 2004.Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson, ; Levine,, ; McGinn ; Sturgeon, ; Chalmers,. Some of these writers claim that the existence of such a gap would warrant a belief in some form of ontological…Read more
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5Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of MindMind 97 (386): 310-312. 1986.
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75Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes: Differing Manifestations of the Same Representational Structures?Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1): 51-72. 2018.Implicit and explicit attitudes manifest themselves as distinct and partly dissociable behavioral dispositions. It is natural to think that these differences reflect differing underlying representations. The present article argues that this may be a mistake. Although non-verbal and verbal measures of attitudes often dissociate, this may be because the two types of outcome-measure are differentially impacted by other factors, not because they are tapping into distinct kinds of representation or d…Read more
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Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient DebatePhilosophy 67 (262): 567-569. 1992.
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169Basic questionsMind and Language 33 (2): 130-147. 2018.This paper argues that a set of questioning attitudes are among the foundations of human and animal minds. While both verbal questioning and states of curiosity are generally explained in terms of metacognitive desires for knowledge or true belief, I argue that each is better explained by a prelinguistic sui generis type of mental attitude of questioning. I review a range of considerations in support of such a proposal and improve on previous characterizations of the nature of these attitudes. I…Read more
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Critical study: Baker and Hacker's WittgensteinIn G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (eds.), Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Blackwell. 1980.
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69This chapter argues that there are multiple adaptations underlying the distinctiveness of the human mind. Careful analysis of the capacities that are involved in the creation, acquisition, and transmission of culture and cultural products suggests that it is very unlikely that these could all be underlain by just one, or a few, novel cognitive systems. On the contrary, there are at least a handful of such systems, each of which is largely independent of the others.
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179Cartesian Epistemology: Is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate?Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4): 28-53. 2008.This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such e…Read more
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216The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in PracticeCambridge University Press. 1992.Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. He explores a variety of moral theories, arguing that animals lack direct moral significance. This provocative but judiciously argued book will appeal to all those interested in animal rights, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why t…Read more
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120Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?In Christopher R. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds wit…Read more
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35Precis of "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory"SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 2 (1). 2001.
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208Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theoryIn Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 22--38. 1996.In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |