•  145
    _The Nature of the Mind_ is a comprehensive and lucid introduction to major themes in the philosophy of mind. It carefully explores the conflicting positions that have arisen within the debate and locates the arguments within their context. It is designed for newcomers to the subject and assumes no previous knowledge of the philosophy of mind. Clearly written and rigorously presented, this book is ideal for use in undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind. Main topics covered include: * th…Read more
  •  329
    Moderately massive modularity
    In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons, Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-89. 2003.
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
  •  292
    Distinctively human thinking
    In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 69. 1998.
    This chapter takes up, and sketches an answer to, the main challenge facing massively modular theories of the architecture of the human mind. This is to account for the distinctively flexible, non-domain-specific, character of much human thinking. I shall show how the appearance of a modular language faculty within an evolving modular architecture might have led to these distinctive features of human thinking with only minor further additions and non-domain-specific adaptations.
  •  68
    The Innate Mind, Vol. III, Foundations and the Future (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability…Read more
  • Lycan, W. G., "Consciousness" (review)
    Mind 97 (n/a): 640. 1988.
  •  128
    Massive modularity is consistent with most forms of neural reuse
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 289-290. 2010.
    Anderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support
  • Review of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness by José Luis Bermúdez (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3): 483-486. 2000.
  •  256
    Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena
    In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 61-85. 2001.
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an.