-
Critical study: Baker and Hacker's WittgensteinIn G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (eds.), Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Blackwell. 1980.
-
20Better tests of consciousness are needed, but skepticism about unconscious processes is unwarrantedBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1): 36-37. 2014.
-
122Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?In Christopher R. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds wit…Read more
-
35Precis of "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory"SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 2 (1). 2001.
-
179Cartesian Epistemology: Is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate?Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4): 28-53. 2008.This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such e…Read more
-
48Review of Edward Stein: Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science_; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and David E. Over: _Rationality and Reasoning (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1): 189-193. 1998.
-
220The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in PracticeCambridge University Press. 1992.Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. He explores a variety of moral theories, arguing that animals lack direct moral significance. This provocative but judiciously argued book will appeal to all those interested in animal rights, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why t…Read more
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |