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In this article, I distinguish Wittgenstein's conception of the dissolution of philosophical problems from that of Carnap. I argue that the conception of dissolution assumed by the therapeutic interpretations of the Tractatus is more similar to Carnap's than to Wittgenstein's for whom dissolution involves spelling out an alternative in the context of which relevant problems do not arise. To clarify this I outline a non‐therapeutic resolute reading of the Tractatus that explains how Wittgenstein thought to be able to make a positive contribution to logic and the philosophy thereof without putting forward any (ineffable) theses. This explains why there is no paradox in the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein compares philosophical explanations with explanations in aesthetics and ethics. According to him, the similarity between aesthetics and philosophy ‘reaches very far’, and as I aim to show, the comparison can be used to elucidate certain characteristic features of Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach. In particular, it can explain how his approach differs from metaphysical philosophy as well as clarifying the sense in which there are no theses or theories in philosophy, as Wittgenstein conceives it. In the last section of the essay, I examine certain consequences of Wittgenstein’s view, including the lack of conclusive arguments in philosophy. Rather than implying that philosophy falls short of its rational aspirations, I argue, Wittgenstein’s explanation of why there are no conclusive arguments in philosophy can help us to see in the right light the lack of agreement in philosophy, as well as explaining why this is not a defect.

In this chapter I discuss Wittgenstein’s early and later views on ethics in the light of the development of his views on logic and philosophical method, maintaining that these developments are motivated by his aspiration to discover a method that enables one to do justice to the complexity of though and language use, and the richness of phenomena. I begin by discussing certain continuous features of Wittgenstein’s views on ethics and philosophy, in particular his conception that philosophy can only offer reminders and clarifications, not give a foundation for language, thought or ethics. The first section thus introduces Wittgenstein’s notions of the personal character and groundlessness of ethics whose different reincarnations are taken up in the sections that follow. In the second section I seek to elucidate Wittgenstein’s early account of the possibility and nature of ethics, conceived in abstract and general terms as the problem of the relation of the will to reality, and his account of a happy or good life. This is followed by a discussion of his later rejection of the early account with its key assumptions, and its replacement with a different account that, in accordance with Wittgenstein’s new methodology, treats the problem of the relation of the will to reality as a particular aspect of ethics, rather than as constituting its underlying essence. In the final section will be concerned with the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s explanation of the nature or grammar of ethical justification, connected with the notions of personality and groundlessness. I argue that although Wittgenstein does regard ethical justifications as inconclusive, neither this nor the personal character and groundlessness of ethics implies relativism, as do not certain other remarks and reported discussions, contrary to what they might at first sight suggest.

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non-dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non-dogmatic arguments, they - or more specifically, what I shall call 'general transcendental arguments' - involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non-dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call 'specific transcendental arguments' and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re-interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non-dogmatic fashion.

The paper discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as devoid of theses. Although already the _Tractatus aims to abandon philosophical theses, it relapses to such theses. In his later work Wittgenstein develops a novel conception of the status of philosophical statements. Rather than to state what his object of investigation, e.g., the use of a word, must be, the philosopher is to employ rules, examples etc., as 'objects of comparison'. A philosophical statement does not describe a necessity in reality. The modality expressed by the statement is a characteristic of the philosopher's mode of presentation. The aim of Wittgenstein's shift is to avoid dogmatism

In this paper I discuss the role of the nonsensical ‘statements’ of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the aims of the book, a topic which has in recent years been the subject of, at times heated, controversy among Wittgenstein’s readers.1 In this debate the so-called ineffability interpretation argues that the role of nonsense in the Tractatus is to make us grasp ineffable truths which ‘strictly speaking’ cannot be said or thought2. By contrast, the interpretation known as the resolute reading emphasises the incomprehensibility of the notion of ineffable truths. According to the latter, nonsense in the Tractatus serves a therapeutic purpose: that of curing us from attempts to put forward nonsensical philosophical doctrines3. By employing a method of juxtaposition I..

This paper discusses Gordon Baker’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, in particular his interpretation of the notion of Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions and the notions of non-exclusivity, local incompatibility, non-additivity and global pluralism which Baker uses to characterize Wittgensteinian conceptions. On the basis of this discussion, and a critique of certain features of Baker’s interpretation of Wittgensteinian conceptions, I introduce the notion of a multidimensional logical description of language use, explaining how this notion, which Baker’s interpretation excludes, constitutes and important element of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical method of clarification and perspicuous representation. I conclude by explaining how Baker’s problematic notions of local incompatibility and non-additivity, if they are seen in the light of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of certain views of the completeness of philosophical or logical accounts, nevertheless point in the right direction

Wittgenstein on philosophical problems : from one fundamental problem to particular problems -- The Tractatus on philosophical problems -- Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems -- Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings -- Tendencies and inclinations of thinking : philosophy as therapy -- Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy : the contrast with the Tractatus -- Two conceptions of clarification -- The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis -- Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's notion of logical analysis -- Clarification in Wittgenstein's later philosophy -- From metaphysics and philosophical theses to grammar : Wittgenstein's turn -- Philosophical theses, metaphysical philosophy, and the Tractatus -- Metaphysics and conceptual investigation : the problem with metaphysics -- Conceptual investigation and the problem of dogmatism -- Wittgenstein's turn -- The turn and the role of rules -- Rules as objects of comparison -- Rules, metaphysical projection, and the logic of language -- Grammar, meaning, and language -- Grammar, use, and meaning : the problem of the status of Wittgenstein's remarks -- Wittgenstein's formulation of his conception of meaning -- The concept of language : comparisons with instruments and games -- Wittgenstein's development and the advantages of his mature view -- Examples as centers of variation and the conception of language as a family -- Avoiding dogmatism about meaning -- Wittgenstein's methodological shift and analyses in terms of necessary conditions -- The concepts of essence and necessity -- Constructivist readings and the arbitrariness/nonarbitrariness of grammar -- Problems with constructivism -- The methodological dimension of Wittgenstein's conception of essence -- The nontemporality of grammatical statements -- Explanations of necessity in terms of factual regularities -- Wittgenstein's account of essence and necessity -- Beyond theses about the source of necessity -- Philosophical hierarchies and the status of clarificatory statements -- Philosophical hierarchies and Wittgenstein's "leading principle" -- The concept of perspicuous presentation -- The (alleged) necessity of accepting philosophical statements -- The concept of agreement and the problem of injustice -- The criteria of the correctness of grammatical remarks -- Multidimensional descriptions and the new use of old dogmatic claims -- Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, everyday language, and ethics -- Metaphysics disguised as methodology -- The historicity of philosophy -- Philosophy and the everyday.

This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus’ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the Tractatus’ view, and its method for introducing syntactical concepts and principles should be entirely acceptable for Carnap by his own criteria. Moreover, despite the Tractatus’ rejection of syntactical statements, there is an important correspondence between Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction and Carnap’s object-language-syntax-language distinction: both constitute a distinction between logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and language as determined or described by those determinations. Wittgenstein’s distinction therefore constitutes a precursor of the object-language syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms, rather than simply contradicting it. The saying-showing distinction agrees with Carnap’s position also in marking logic as something that isn’t true/false about either language or reality, which is a conception that underlies Carnap’s principle of tolerance.

This paper develops an account of Wittgenstein’s method of language-games as a method of logic that exhibits important continuities with Russell’s and the early Wittgenstein’s conceptions of logic and logical analysis as the method of philosophy. On the proposed interpretation, the method of language-games is a method for isolating and modeling aspects of the uses of linguistic expressions embedded in human activities that enables one to make perspicuous complex uses of expressions by gradually building up the complexity of clarificatory models. Wittgenstein’s introduction of the language-game method constitutes an attempt to overcome certain limitations of calculus-based logical methods, and to respond in this way to problems with Russell’s and his own early philosophy of logic. The method is nevertheless compatible with the employment of calculus-based methods in logic and philosophy, and makes no exclusive claim to being the correct method.

The paper elucidates Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as devoid of theories or theses, comprehending this as an articulation of a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, it clarifies Wittgenstein's conception by using what he says about the concepts of meaning and language as an example and by developing an interpretation that purports to make plain that what Wittgenstein says about these issues does not constitute a philosophical thesis. Adopting Wittgenstein's approach, we can, arguably, have a richer view of meaning and language than a commitment to philosophical theses allows for. I conclude with remarks on the method of analysis in terms of necessary conditions.